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Enough Is Enough: Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar
Bethany C. Sullivan*
Jennifer L. Turner**
Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court issued its watershed
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, landing a gut punch to Indian country.
Through that decision, the Supreme Court upended decades of
Department of the Interior regulations, policy, and practice related to the
eligibility of all federally recognized tribes for the restoration of tribal
homelands through the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. The
Court held that tribes must demonstrate that they were “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934 to qualify for land into trust under the first definition
of “Indian” in the IRA. Carcieri has impacted all tribes by upending the
land-into-trust process and requiring tribes (and Interior) to spend scant
resources to establish statutory authority for trust land acquisitions, a
burdensome task that had previously been straight forward. In addition,
Carcieri has complicated, if not prevented altogether, trust acquisition for
tribes who face difficulty in making the requisite jurisdictional showing.
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the last ten years
of Indian law and policy that have unfurled from the Supreme Court’s
decision. It describes how Carcieri has been weaponized by states, local
governments, citizens’ groups, individuals, corporations, and even other
tribes, to challenge the exercise of tribal sovereignty through the
*
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acquisition of tribal lands, and, at times, the very existence of Indian
tribes. This Article details the litigation that has since ballooned,
illustrating the dangerous scope creep of Carcieri, while categorizing and
evaluating the underlying claims. It also looks to the future, and concludes
that, while unlikely, a universal, clean congressional fix is the only real
solution. The last ten years of litigation, hearings, and never-ending
debate demonstrate that Carcieri is not a constructive or appropriate
framework for resolving larger policy questions about the land-into-trust
process. Finally, the Article ends by providing practice tips for tribes
navigating the current Carcieri landscape.
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INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Carcieri v. Salazar,1 landing a gut punch to Indian country. The
Supreme Court upended decades of Department of the Interior
(“Department” or “Interior”) regulations, policy, and practice by holding
that tribes must demonstrate that they were “under federal jurisdiction” in
1934 to qualify for land into trust under the first definition of “Indian” in
the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).2 In so doing, the Court took aim
at the critical ability of tribes to amass a land base over which to exercise
jurisdiction—and effectively divided tribes into the haves and the have
1.
555 U.S. 379 (2009).
2.
Id. at 382. Carcieri is often mischaracterized as requiring tribes to
demonstrate that they were under federal jurisdiction to qualify for land-into-trust,
full-stop. As explained further in this article, that assertion ignores the plain language
of the decision, other definitions of “Indian” in the IRA, as well as numerous
alternative statutes authorizing land into trust for specific tribes. Therefore, we are
careful in this article to tie the holding of Carcieri to the first definition of “Indian” in
the IRA only.
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nots. The “haves” consist of those tribes whose history readily
demonstrates they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, while the “have
nots” consist of those tribes who, through historical realities, face
difficulty in making such a showing. Moreover, the decision impacted all
tribes by complicating and slowing down the land-into-trust process and
requiring tribes (and Interior) to spend scant resources to establish
statutory authority for trust land acquisition, a burdensome task that had
previously been straight forward.
Carcieri has been weaponized by states, local governments,
citizens’ groups, individuals, corporations, and even other tribes, to
challenge the exercise of tribal sovereignty through the acquisition of
tribal lands, and, at times, the very existence of certain Indian tribes. It
has become a guise for anti-tribal, anti-gaming, and anti-competition
sentiments, giving tribal opponents another platform on which to raise
larger questions of federal Indian law and policy on their terms. Are all
tribes equal? Do tribes need more land? Is the fee-to-trust process broken?
Should states and local governments have a veto power over fee-to-trust
decisions?
Underlying these concerns is the specter of unfairness, that tribes
are somehow gaining an unfair advantage via the land-into-trust process,
gaming authorizations, and federal laws and policies aimed at promoting
tribal welfare. This mindset seeps through the language of court briefs,
congressional testimony, and apoplectic statements by anti-tribal gaming
groups. Yet the specter is just that, an apparition of a false reality. It
ignores the historical seizure of tribal lands, the unique development of the
federal-tribal relationship, fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty,
and perhaps above all else, the inherently unfair playing field on which
tribes have been forced to play.
This Article comprehensively examines the ten years of Indian
law and policy that have unfurled from the Carcieri decision, while
providing tribal practitioners a primer on the land-into-trust process and a
litigation toolkit. First, this Article provides the necessary history of the
IRA and the land-into-trust regulatory process. Second, it describes the
impetus behind and legal ramifications of the 2009 Supreme Court
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar. Third, it explains the immediate public,
congressional, and executive responses to this watershed decision. Fourth,
it details the litigation that has since ballooned, illustrating the scope creep
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of Carcieri, while categorizing and evaluating the underlying claims.3 The
Article further notes that, despite protests of some members of Congress
and fee-to-trust opponents, courts have overwhelmingly affirmed
Interior’s response to Carcieri, including its legal framework and fee-totrust decisions.
Finally, this Article looks to the future, considering pending
litigation and proposed congressional and agency action. The Article
concludes that while unlikely, a universal, clean congressional fix is the
only real solution. The last ten years of litigation, hearings, and debate
demonstrate that Carcieri is not a constructive or appropriate framework
for resolving larger policy questions about the land-into-trust process. The
Article also concludes with practice tips for tribal attorneys navigating the
hazardous Carcieri landscape for the indeterminable future.
II.

HISTORY OF THE IRA AND THE FEE-TO-TRUST PROCESS

A rich body of scholarship already exists concerning the history
of the IRA and the machinery it created to facilitate the re-acquisition of
Indian lands.4 Yet its importance to Indian country cannot be overstated
and therefore bears repeating here. The following section outlines the
history of the IRA, its statutory contours, and the resultant regulatory
procedures for land acquisitions.
Beginning with congressional enactment of the General Allotment
Act in 1887, the federal government unilaterally imposed a policy of
assimilation and allotment, breaking up communal tribal landholdings into
individual allotments. 5 The federal government was to hold these
3.
This litigation and associated claims have led one judge on the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to exclaim “[e]nough is enough!” in
dismissing a Carcieri-based challenge to the very existence of a tribe. Stand Up for
California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, __ S.Ct.
(2019).
4.
See, e.g., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT : CONGRESSES AND
BILLS (Vine Deloria ed. 2002); ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT
(2000); INDIAN SELF-RULE (Kenneth R. Philip, ed., 1986).
5.
General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, ch. 119 (1887)
(General Allotment Act); see also William Wood, Indian, Tribes, and (Federal)
Jurisdiction, 65 KAN. L. REV. 415, 458 (2016) (describing the allotment policy and
how allotted reservation lands were “subject to federal oversight and restrictions
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allotments in trust for a period of 25 years or until the Indian beneficiary
could demonstrate “competency” to hold title in fee simple. 6 The
remainder of tribal lands were considered “surplus” to Indian needs, and
procedures were established to dispose of such “surplus” lands to the
growing mass of non-Indian homesteaders.7
By enacting the General Allotment Act, Congress hoped to
eliminate communal land tenure and attendant tribal authority in favor of
private landholdings and assimilation modeled on the western ideals of the
independent farmer and rancher.8 This policy, however, proved to be a
categorical disaster. 9 In the course of nearly 50 years, tribal and Indian

against alienation, and federal bureaucrats managed individual Indians' property
interests”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 16.03[2][b] (Nell Jessup
Newton et. al. eds. 2017).
6.
General Allotment Act § 5 as modified by the Burke Act of 1906, 34
Stat. 182, ch. 2348; see also Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into
Law, Policy, and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 521 (2013) (explaining that during
the 25 year trust period, allotments could not be sold and were immune from local
property taxes).
7.
General Allotment Act § 5, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 348; see also D.S.
OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 8 (Francis P. Prucha
ed., Univ. of Okla. Press, 1973) (“The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands
and open them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indians
are but a pretext to get at the lands and occupy them.”) (citing an 1880 House Indian
Affairs Committee minority report).
8.
See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER : THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 224–27 (abridged ed., 1986)
(explaining the near religious belief that Indian “civilization was impossible without
the incentive to work that came only from individual ownership of a piece of
property”); Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of
Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust
Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 447-48 (2002/2003)
(describing the federal policy on allotment and assimilation, and quoting President
Chester A. Arthur’s proposal “to introduce among the Indians the customs and pursuits
of civilized life and gradually to absorb them into the mass of our citizens” as a method
of solving the “Indian problem”) (internal citation omitted).
9.
See generally The Problem of Indian Administration, The Inst. for
Gov’t Research (Dept. of Interior 1928) (“Meriam Report”); id. at 7 (“[P]olicies
adopted by the government in dealing with Indians have been of a type which, if long
continued, would tend to pauperize any race”). See also Rebecca Tsosie, Land,
Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America,
34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2001) (describing how the General Allotment Act “left a severe
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lands diminished by over two-thirds, from roughly 138 million acres to 48
million acres.10 Valuable lands fell into the hands of speculators and white
settlers, while Indians who were able to hold on to their allotments were
often left with lands ill-suited for agriculture and without the necessary
tools, supplies, and instruction. 11 As a result, many Indians became
landless and destitute, further suffering from social, psychological, and
cultural impoverishment. 12 Reservations transformed into checkerboards,
dotted with lands held by the tribe, individual Indians, white settlers, and
corporations, which created cultural conflict. 13
Individual Indian
allotments often became fractionated into dozens, sometimes hundreds, of
interests due to the inalienability of the property and the laws of
intestacy.14 Tribal governmental institutions were undermined by loss of
communal lands, influx of non-Indians, and burgeoning administrative
control by the federal government.
In response to the dire state of Indians across the country, and in
repudiation of the allotment policy, Congress passed the IRA in 1934. 15
The IRA was enacted to, among other purposes, “conserve and develop
Indian lands and resources,” “extend to Indians the right to form business
and traumatic legacy for Indian nations”); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 10–15 (Spring 1995).
10.
See Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before
the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 15–18 (Feb. 22, 1934) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 7902].
11.
See Royster, supra note 9, at 12–14 (describing how thousands of
individual Indian allottees lost their lands by voluntary or fraudulent sales or for nonpayment of taxes and, further, how the remaining “surplus” lands were wrested from
tribes at the behest of western politicians and white settlers); Pommersheim, supra
note 6, at 522 (explaining that the Allotment Act was “grossly undercapitalized,
sometimes providing less than ten dollars per allottee for implements, seeds, and
instructions,” and, moreover, that it was “insensitive to the hunting and food-gathering
traditions of nonagricultural tribes”).
12.
See McCoy, supra note 8, at 448-49.
13.
Pommersheim, supra note 6, at 522–23.
14.
Id. at 522; PRUCHA, supra note 8, at 297–98.
15.
Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984. See
generally RUSCO, supra note 4. This legislation has been referred to as the “Indian
New Deal,” in recognition of its place alongside the generally applicable New Deal
legislation designed to ameliorate the national economic depression. See generally
GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM : THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934-1945 (1980).
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and other organizations,” and “grant certain rights of home rule to
Indians.”16 Through this legislation, Congress intended to “establish
machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree
of self-government, politically and economically.”17 In other words, the
IRA radically changed the course of federal Indian policy by arming tribes
with the necessary legal mechanisms to strengthen tribal government
institutions and rebuild tribal resources. Congress hoped the IRA would
reduce the bloated—and costly—federal administrative state over Indian
affairs by encouraging tribal and individual Indian self-sufficiency.18
The cornerstone of this remedial legislation was Section 5, now
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5108, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire lands “within or without existing reservations” for the “purpose
of providing land for Indians.” 19 Such acquired lands are held in trust by
the federal government on behalf of the tribal or individual Indian
beneficiary and exempt from state and local taxation. 20 By authorizing
tribal land acquisitions under Section 5, Congress hoped to reverse the
“disastrous condition” of the Indians resulting from the allotment policy.21
Furthermore, Congress recognized the critical link between Indian lands
and the rehabilitation of Indian economies and tribal governance
structures—that in order to govern well and provide economic
opportunity, tribes must have a territorial home base.22 Accordingly, trust

16.
48 Stat. 984 (1934).
17.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974).
18.
See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 14 (1997) (explaining that the “major thrust” of the IRA was to
“minimize the enormous discretion and power exercised by the Department of the
Interior” and transfer such power to tribal governments); see also PRUCHA, supra note
8, at 263 (finding that “the paternalism of the federal government, which was supposed
to end when the individual Indians disappeared into the dominant American society,
increased instead of diminished, until the bureaucracy of the Indian Service dominated
every aspect of the Indians’ lives” during the allotment era).
19.
25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2018).
20.
Id.
21.
Hearings on H.R. 7902, supra note 10 (statement of Commissioner
of Indian Affairs John Collier).
22.
See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 423 (explaining that “[t]ribes share a
meaningful relationship with tribal land because it is homeland and sacred land, which
provides a sense of cultural, religious, and ethnic identity and community well-being.”
McCoy further explains that “tribes are also attached to the land because it provides a
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lands are largely removed from state and local regulatory authority and,
instead, fall within the tribe’s jurisdiction. 23
Another critical IRA provision is Section 19, identifying those
who are eligible for the IRA’s benefits. Section 19 provides that “tribe”
signifies “any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing
on one reservation.”24 In turn, Section 19 includes three definitions of
“Indian”:
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are [1] members of
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction, and [2] all persons who are descendants of
such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include [3] all other persons of one-half or more
Indian blood.25
Section 18 of the IRA is also significant. That section, now
inoperative, required the Secretary to hold elections regarding application
of the IRA to each reservation. 26 The “majority of the adult Indians on a
reservation” could vote against the application of the IRA to the
space within which they can exist as autonomous nations—supplying a sense of
political and national identify as well.”).
23.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at
§ 3.04; City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005) (describing
§ 5 of the IRA as the “proper avenue to reestablish sovereign authority over territory”);
MCCOY, supra note 8, at 445 (explaining that “land taken into trust via Part 151
becomes ‘Indian country’ (subject to the authority of tribes, generally exempting such
land from state taxation and other laws)”). Some state and local governments oppose
fee-to-trust applications on the basis that trust acquisition removes state jurisdiction
and taxation, infra note 118, but others enter into intergovernmental agreements with
tribes to address the impacts of trust land acquisition. See 78 Fed. Reg. 67928, 67932
(Nov. 13, 2013) (noting that state and local governments may negotiate with tribes to
resolve disagreements surrounding trust land acquisition). See generally David H.
Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American
Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding First Nations’ Self-Government, 1 REV.
CONST. STUD. 120 (1993) (describing the history and usefulness of intergovernmental
agreements between tribes and their neighboring governments).
24.
See 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2018).
25.
Id.
26.
25 U.S.C. § 5125 (2018).
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reservation. The Secretary was required to conduct these votes within one
year of the enactment of the IRA, which Congress later extended until June
18, 1936.27 Originally, a tribe that voted against the IRA could not take
advantage of the trust land provision in Section 5; however, in 1983,
Congress amended the IRA to provide that Section 5 applies to “all tribes
notwithstanding section [18].”28
In the decades immediately following the IRA’s enactment, the
Department exercised its Section 5 authority in a limited fashion,
accepting land into trust via an unpublished agency process. 29 Yet the
dawn of the self-determination era brought with it an uptick in Section 5
land acquisitions,30 generating the need for a clear, uniform, and publiclydeveloped Departmental process. 31
Accordingly, the Department
promulgated the first set of land acquisition regulations through noticeand-comment rulemaking in 1980. 32 In 1995, the Department revised the
regulations, imposing additional procedural requirements for offreservation land acquisitions.33 It is this iteration of the regulations that
largely stands today and which can be found at 25 C.F.R. Part 151.34
27.
28.

Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378.
Act of Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2515 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2202

(2018)).
29.
See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 453–454.
30.
See Larry E. Scrivner, Acquiring Land Into Trust for Indian Tribes,
37 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 603, 604–605 (Spring 2003).
31.
Land Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62034, 62035 (Sept. 18, 1980)
(explaining the need for new Federal land-into-trust regulations as to “enunciate land
acquisition policy and to bring uniformity into the application of that policy”).
32.
Id. at 62034 (originally codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 120a, subsequently
redesignated as 25 C.F.R. Part 151).
33.
Land Acquisitions (Nongaming), 60 Fed. Reg. 32874 (June 23,
1995) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.11).
34.
In 1996, the Department revised the notice requirements of the feeto-trust regulations to incorporate a 30-day waiting period between a fee-to-trust
decision and the actual trust transfer. Land Acquisitions, 61 Fed Reg. 18082 (Apr. 24,
1996). A 2013 rule eliminated the waiting period and made changes to the notice
requirements. Land Acquisitions: Appeals of Land Acquisition Decisions, 78 Fed.
Reg. 67928 (Nov. 13, 2013). In addition, in 2001, the Department formally revised
the fee-to-trust regulations. See BIA, Acquisition of Title to Land in Trust, 66 Fed.
Reg. 3452 (Jan. 16, 2011). The Department, however, subsequently rescinded these
revised regulations, leaving the 1995 regulations in place. Acquisition of Title to Land
in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (Nov. 9, 2001). The Department later made other
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The fee-to-trust regulations include several requirements for tribes
and individual Indians seeking trust land. 35 Additional information
concerning Departmental land acquisition procedures may be found in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (“BIA”) fee-to-trust handbook, which includes
a detailed 16-step process for trust acquisitions.36 The fee-to-trust process,
which begins with the submission of an application, often takes years.
As a threshold matter, tribal applicants must be federally
recognized tribes.37 Regardless of whether the application involves onreservation or off-reservation land, 38 the applicant must submit, and the
Department must consider, information concerning:
●
●
●
●
●
●

The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition;
The need of the tribe for additional land;
The purpose for which the land will be used;
The impact on the state and its political subdivisions resulting
from removal of the tract from tax rolls;
Jurisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use;
Whether the BIA is equipped to discharge the additional
responsibilities resulting from the acquisition of the land in trust
status; and

regulatory changes to eliminate a provision excluding land in Alaska from the
regulations, Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (Dec. 23,
2014), and to revise title evidence requirements for land acquisitions. Title Evidence
for Trust Land Acquisitions, 81 Fed. Reg. 30173 (May 16, 2016).
35.
Given this Article’s focus on the impact of Carcieri on tribal, as
opposed to individual Indian, land acquisitions, only the Part 151 provisions
pertaining to tribal requests will be discussed.
36.
See Acquisition of Title to Land Held in Fee or Restricted Fee Status
(Fee-to-Trust Handbook), Version IV (rev. 1), BIA, DEP’T OF INTERIOR (issued June
28, 2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/raca/handbook/
pdf/Acquisition_of_Title_to_Land_Held_in_Fee_or_Restricted_Fee_Status_50_OI
MT.pdf [hereinafter Fee-to-Trust Handbook].
37.
25 C.F.R. § 151.2(b) (2017). The regulations do not require a tribe
to demonstrate that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
38.
Applications are considered “on-reservation” when the subject land
is within or contiguous to the reservation. 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (2017). Additionally,
“reservation” is defined as the “area of land over which the tribe is recognized by the
United States as having governmental jurisdiction,” as well as former reservations in
the State of Oklahoma or where there has been a final judicial determination of
diminishment or disestablishment. 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(f).
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Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) and the Departmental procedures on hazardous
substance determinations.39

When an application is for an off-reservation tract of land, the
Department must also consider:
●
●

The tribe’s business plan, if the land is to be acquired for a
business purpose; and
The distance between the tract and the tribe’s reservation. As the
distance increases, the Secretary must give greater scrutiny to the
tribe’s justification of anticipated benefits and greater weight to
the concerns raised by the state and local government. 40

Both on- and off-reservation applications require the Department
to notify state and local governments of the potential acquisition and
provide a 30-day window to comment on the potential impacts to
regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special assessments. 41 The
regulations require the Department to consider the impacts of the trust
acquisition on state and local governments, but do not give such
governments a veto power over a proposed acquisition. The Supreme
Court has described this process as “sensitive to the complex interjurisdictional concerns that arise when a tribe seeks to regain sovereign
control over territory.” 42
Following consideration of these regulatory factors, and
compliance with NEPA and Departmental procedures on hazardous
substance determinations, the Secretary of the Interior issues a written
39.
See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
40.
See 25 C.F.R. § 151.11.
41.
See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10. The state and local government notice
requirement only applies to discretionary acquisitions and is not invoked when an
acquisition is mandated by legislation. Id.
42.
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220-21. Federal courts have only
required Interior to consider, but not resolve, concerns raised by state and local
governments. See, e.g, City of Lincoln City v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1109, 1125 (D. Or. 2001) (“the regulations require BIA to ‘consider’ [potential tax
impacts] but the regulations do not require the Tribe to agree to reimburse the City for
revenues that might be lost due to a fee-to-trust transfer, and do not require the BIA to
deny the application . . . merely because a potential impact exists”).

2019

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

49

decision either approving or denying the application. 43 This decisionmaking authority is typically delegated to either the Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs (“AS-IA”) or a BIA official, which then determines the
appropriate title transfer and appeal procedures. 44 AS-IA decisions result
in the immediate transfer of title into trust. 45 Additionally, AS-IA
decisions constitute final agency action subject to immediate judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).46 In contrast,
BIA decisions are subject to administrative review procedures and title
transfer does not occur until either the expiration of the 30-day window
for filing a notice of appeal or upon exhaustion of administrative
remedies.47 As a matter of current policy, AS-IA makes gaming and offreservation decisions, whereas BIA issues decisions on non-gaming, onreservation fee-to-trust acquisitions.48
While Congress occasionally enacts special legislation to accept
land into trust on a tribe-by-tribe basis, the Part 151 fee-to-trust process
has become the primary mechanism by which tribes can build their land

43.
25 C.F.R. § 151.12.
44.
The identity of the decisionmaker also determines notice procedures.
When the decisionmaker is the AS-IA, notice of the decision is provided to the
applicant and, if the decision is an approval, published in the Federal Register. 25
C.F.R. § 151.12(c) (2017). When the decisionmaker is a BIA official, notice of the
decision is provided to the applicant and, if the decision is an approval, notice is
provided to the state and local government, interested parties, and published in a local
newspaper of general circulation. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d).
45.
Title transfer is contingent on the satisfactory completion of title
review procedures under 25 C.F.R. § 151.13; see 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c)(2)(iii).
46.
25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c). Challenges to final Interior decisions to
acquire land in trust are “garden-variety APA claim[s].” Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217 (2012). Courts have
upheld Interior’s broad discretion to decide whether lands should be acquired in trust.
See, e.g, South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943 (D.S.D.
2004), aff’d, 423 F.3d 790, 801 (8th Cir. 2005).
47.
25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d). Additionally, title transfer is contingent on
the satisfactory completion of title review procedures under 25 § 151.13; see 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.12(d)(2)(iv).
48.
Off-Reservation Fee-to-Trust Decisions, Mem. No. NPM-TRUS-36,
DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ASSISTANT SEC’Y INDIAN AFFAIRS (May 31, 2018); Fee-to-Trust
Handbook, supra note 36, at 24.
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base and, simultaneously, strengthen their tribal governments and
economies.49
We close this section by noting that the significance of trust land
acquisition—and the land-into-trust process—to tribes cannot be
overstated. Interior has described taking land into trust as “one of the most
important functions Interior undertakes on behalf of the tribes. Acquisition
of land in trust is essential to tribal self-determination.” 50 As noted
previously, tribes exercise jurisdiction over trust lands, and state and local
jurisdiction is limited. 51 Trust status also qualifies land for certain federal
programs and services, and provides “enhanced opportunities for housing,
energy development, negotiated rights-of-way and leases, as well as
greater protections for subsistence hunting and agriculture.”52 And yet
today, the United States only holds approximately 57 million acres of land
in trust,53 “a restoration of less than 10% of the lands lost in less than 50
years under the allotment policy.”54 Thus, there is much work left to do.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S 2009 CARCIERI DECISION

The long-established fee-to-trust process dramatically changed in
2009 with the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Carcieri v.
Salazar.55 The case started as a dispute between the Narragansett Indian
Tribe (“Narragansett” or “Narragansett Tribe”), the State of Rhode Island,

49.
See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 445 (explaining that while, historically,
tribal land bases were created or protected via congressional or executive action, the
Part 151 process is “presently the primary method of placing land into trust [and] is
critical to Indians and tribes because it is the principal mechanism for rebuilding the
Indian land base.”).
50.
BIA, Fee-to-Trust, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/bia/ots/
fee-to-trust.
51.
See supra note 23.
52.
Fee-to-Trust, supra note 50.
53.
BIA,
Programs
&
Services,
DEP’T
OF
INTERIOR,
https://www.bia.gov/programs-services.
54.
The Lack of Adequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Indian,
Insular and Alaska Native Affairs of the H. Comm. on Nat. Resources, 114th Cong. 1
(May 14, 2015) [hereinafter Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing] (statement of Kevin
K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).
55.
555 U.S. 379.
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and a local government over land use regulation. 56 The Narragansett Tribe
once occupied much of present-day Rhode Island, but, over time, lost its
land base in transactions with the State and through the State’s policy of
“detribalization.”57 The Narragansett Tribe brought suit against the State
and others in the 1970s to reclaim its ancestral land, 58 arguing the
conveyances to the State violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. 59
Congress ultimately settled the Narragansett Tribe’s lawsuit through the
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1978. 60 In exchange for
relinquishing its land claims, the Narragansett Tribe received title to
approximately 1,800 acres of land in the Town of Charlestown, Rhode
Island,61 a small portion of its original land base. Interior formally
56.
Id. at 385. The facts behind, and holding of, Carcieri have been the
subject of numerous articles, Congressional hearings, and Interior opinions, and thus
we only provide a brief summary here. See, e.g., Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Ruth
K. Khalsa, A Post-Carcieri Vocabulary Exercise: What If 'Now' Really Means 'Then?’
1 UNLV GAMING L. J., 39 (2010); Sarah Washburn, Distinguishing Carcieri v.
Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got it Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should
Respond to Preserve Tribal and Federal Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions,
85 WASHINGTON L. REV. 603 (2010); Supreme Court Decision, Carcieri v. Salazar,
Ramifications to Indian Tribes: Oversight Hearing before the H. Comm. on Nat.
Resources, 111th Cong. (April 1, 2009) [hereinafter April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight
Hearing]; Hearing to Examine Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Lands for
Indian Tribes: Oversight Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong.
(May 21, 2009) [hereinafter May 21, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing]; M. Maureen
Murphy, Carcieri v. Salazar: The Secretary of the Interior May Not Acquire Trust
Land for the Narragansett Indian Tribe Under 25 U.S.C. Section 465 Because that
Statute Applies to Tribes “Under Federal Jurisdiction” in 1934, Congressional
Research Service RL34521, (Aug. 23, 2016) (on file with Pub. Land & Resources L.
Rev.); The Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” for Purposes of the Indian
Reorganization Act, Sol. Op. M-37029 (U.S. Dep’t of Interior Mar. 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Carcieri M-Opinion or M-37029], https://www.doi.gov/sites/
doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf.
57.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 383.
58.
Id. at 384.
59.
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1834). The Non-Intercourse Act prohibits the
conveyance of tribal land without federal approval.
60.
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92
Stat. 813 (1978).
61.
Id. § 8; Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384. Unlike other trust land, the Act
provided that the 1800 acres would be “subject to civil and criminal laws and
jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.” 92 Stat. at § 8(a).
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acknowledged the Narragansett Tribe through the Part 83 process in
1983,62 and accepted the 1,800 acres of land in trust in 1988.63
Shortly thereafter, the Narragansett Tribe’s housing authority used
funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
to purchase 31 acres of land adjacent to the settlement lands from private
developers for the purpose of providing low-income housing to tribal
members.64 The housing authority then conveyed the land to the
Narragansett.65 The State and Town of Charlestown sought an injunction
to prevent the Narragansett Tribe from constructing housing on the parcel
without obtaining permits and approvals under state and local law. 66 In
1997, the Narragansett Tribe requested that the BIA acquire the parcel in
trust pursuant to Section 5 of the IRA to resolve questions about land use
regulation and to ensure it could develop much-needed housing for its
members.67 On March 6, 1998, despite objections from the Governor of
Rhode Island and the Town, the BIA decided to acquire the land in trust
on behalf of Narragansett.68
The Governor and the Town appealed the BIA’s decision to the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”), 69 which affirmed the BIA’s
land-into-trust decision.70 The Governor and Town then challenged the
fee-to-trust decision in federal district court, arguing, among other things,
that the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for Indian tribes under
the first definition of “Indian” in the IRA was limited to tribes who were
62.
Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett
Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Feb. 10, 1983).
63.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384–85.
64.
Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. Eastern Area Director, 35
I.B.I.A. 93, 95 (2000).
65.
Id.
66.
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908,
911–12 (1st Cir. 1996).
67.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385; Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 95.
68.
Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 95.
69.
The IBIA is “an appellate review body that exercises the delegated
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to issue final decisions for the Department of
the Interior in appeals involving Indian matters.” About the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oha/organization/ibia. BIA
Regional Director (formerly Area Director) decisions to take land into trust may be
appealed to the IBIA pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Part 2, and are stayed pending resolution
of any administrative appeal. 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(a) (2017).
70.
Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 94.
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federally recognized in 1934, which was the date of the IRA’s enactment. 71
According to the Governor and Town, the Narragansett Tribe could not
meet the IRA’s first definition of “Indian” because Narragansett was not
federally recognized until 1983 and was thus ineligible to have land placed
into trust on its behalf. The district court rejected this argument, holding
that “as a federally-recognized tribe which existed at the time of the
enactment of the IRA,” as shown through its acknowledgment,
Narragansett was eligible to have land acquired in trust on its behalf. 72
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed, but under a different rationale than the district court. 73 The court
concluded the term “now” in the first definition of Indian in the IRA,
“members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,”
was ambiguous. The court reasoned that “now” could operate “at the
moment Congress enacted [the IRA] or at the moment the Secretary
invokes it.” 74 Applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,75 the Court deferred to the Secretary’s “reasonable”
interpretation of the statute, which authorized trust acquisitions for tribes
that were under federal jurisdiction and federally recognized at the time of
the trust application. 76
The Supreme Court granted the Governor, State, and Town’s
petitions for certiorari.77 Petitioners argued the IRA limits the Secretary’s
authority to tribes who were both federally recognized and under federal
71.
Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 178-179 (D.R.I. 2003).
72.
Id. at 180–81.
73.
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2008). Prior to the
decision, a panel of the First Circuit, in a decision that was later withdrawn, also
upheld the trust acquisition. Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005). On
rehearing, the panel held that the Secretary was authorized to acquire land in trust for
Narragansett, regardless of its status in 1934, and to hold otherwise “would diminish
the Tribe’s privileges in relation to other federally recognized tribes,” contrary to 25
U.S.C. § 476(f) (now § 5123(f)). Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005),
rehearing en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, withdrawn from West Reporter
publication.
74.
Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 26.
75.
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that,
where statutory language is ambiguous, a court should defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of the language in question and not substitute its own
construction. Id.
76.
Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 30-31.
77.
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008).
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jurisdiction in 1934. 78 Twenty-one states filed a brief in support of the
Governor and Town, complaining “the trust power has the capacity to
change the character of an entire state.” 79 The United States, supported by
amicus briefs filed by Narragansett, two other tribes, the National
Congress of American Indians, law professors, and historians, argued the
IRA authorized the acquisition of land in trust for “tribes” and “Indians,”
and the definition of “Indian” did not limit the definition of “tribe.”80 Even
if it did, the United States argued that “now” did not unambiguously mean
the date of the IRA’s enactment, and that ambiguity left a gap for the
agency to fill.81
The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit. 82 In a majority
opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held the term “now” in “members
of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” was
“unambiguous,” and referred to the time of the IRA’s enactment in 1934. 83
Justice Thomas relied on the “ordinary meaning” of the word “now,” the
“natural reading” of the word “now” in context, and references to “now or
hereafter” in other parts of the IRA, which, in Justice Thomas’s opinion,
demonstrated Congress intended to limit the word “now” to “events
contemporaneous with the Act’s enactment.” 84 Although insisting it was
not necessary for his holding, Justice Thomas noted that shortly following
78.
Brief for Petitioner Donald L. Carcieri at 13, Id. (No. 07-526); Brief
for Petitioner State of Rhode Island at 21, Id.; Brief of Petitioner Town of
Charlestown, Rhode Island at 25, Id.
79.
Brief of the States of Alabama et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Petitioners, Id. These states included Alabama, Connecticut, Alaska, Arkansas,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, and Utah.
80.
Brief for the Respondents at 12, Id. See also Briefs of the National
Congress of American Indians, the Narragansett Indian Tribe, Law Professors
Specializing in Federal Indian Law, Historians Frederick E. Hoxie, Paul C. Rosier,
and Christian W. McMillen, and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Nottawaseppi Huron
Band of the Potawatomi in Support of Respondents, Id.
81.
Brief for the Respondents at 10, Id.
82.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387.
83.
Id. at 390–91. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
84.
Id. at 388–90.
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the IRA’s enactment, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier,
sent a letter in which he interpreted the first definition as applying to a
recognized tribe “that was under Federal jurisdiction at the date of the
Act.”85 Justice Thomas concluded the Secretary’s authority to acquire
land in trust for tribes under the first definition of “Indian” is limited to
tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was enacted. 86
Critically, he did not define “under federal jurisdiction.” Because none of
the parties argued Narragansett was under federal jurisdiction in 1934,
however, and the Secretary failed to challenge the Governor and Town’s
assertion that the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in
1934, Justice Thomas concluded the Secretary did not have authority to
take the 31-acre parcel into trust for the Tribe. 87
Numerous commentators have, correctly in our view, challenged
Justice Thomas’s myopic and oversimplified analysis of the IRA,
concluding the Court got it wrong. 88 In addition, in a scathing report, the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs faulted the United States for failing
to argue Narragansett was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and to file key
documents with the Court, describing it as a “breach of the Federal
government’s trust responsibility.” 89 However, it is not the intent of this
article to re-litigate Carcieri, but rather to address its aftermath and to
recommend a path forward. To do so, it is necessary to also consider the
concurring opinions of Justices Breyer and Souter.
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion setting forth several
qualifications to his joining of the majority opinion. 90 The last of these
qualifications, in which he posited that the majority’s interpretation of
“now” as meaning 1934 “may prove somewhat less restrictive than it at

85.
Id. at 390.
86.
Id. at 382.
87.
Id. at 382-383, 395–396.
88.
See, e.g, Staudenmaier & Khalsa, supra note 56; Melanie Riccobene
Jarboe, Collective Rights to Indigenous Land in Carcieri v. Salazar, 30 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 395 (Spring 2010); Washburn, supra note 56.
89.
AMENDING THE ACT OF JUNE 18, 1934, TO REAFFIRM THE AUTHORITY
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO TAKE LAND INTO TRUST FOR INDIAN TRIBES,
S. REP. NO. 112-166, at 18 (May 17, 2012).
90.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 396 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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first appears,”91 has been the subject of analysis and debate. 92 To
demonstrate potential flexibilities, Justice Breyer made three key points.
First, he reasoned a “tribe may have been ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in
1934 even though the Federal Government did not believe so at the time,”
citing examples of tribes the Department erroneously believed had
dissolved or otherwise ceased to exist at one point but then later
recognized.93 Second, he explained the first definition “imposes no time
limit upon recognition;” in other words, “now” only modifies “under
federal jurisdiction” and not “recognized.” 94 Justice Breyer noted that a
tribe could have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, despite not being
formally recognized until later, and that, in fact, “later recognition reflects
earlier ‘Federal jurisdiction.’” 95 Finally, Justice Breyer identified some
types of evidence that, in his view, demonstrated a tribe was under federal
jurisdiction, including: (1) a treaty relationship; (2) congressional
appropriations; or (3) enrollment with the Indian Office. 96
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also agreed with the
majority that “now” meant 1934, and agreed with Justice Breyer’s three
qualifications.97 Justice Souter added that “[n]othing in the majority
opinion forecloses the possibility that the two concepts [of] recognition
and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.” 98 However, Justice
Souter dissented in part on the basis that he would have remanded the case

91.
Id. at 397 (Breyer, J., concurring). The other two qualifications were
that: (1) Justice Breyer did not believe the statutory language itself was determinative,
but did not afford the Department deference because of Collier’s 1936 letter and his
view that the legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to delegate
interpretive authority to the Department such that Chevron deference would apply;
and (2) his view that the legislative history also shows that “now” means “in 1934.”
Id. at 396-97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
92.
See M-37029, supra note 56 (relying heavily on Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Citizens Against Reservation
Shopping v. Jewell, Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433
(2017)(No. 16-572) (faulting the Solicitor’s reliance on Breyer’s concurring opinion).
93.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398–399 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94.
Id. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95.
Id. at 398–399 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96.
Id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring).
97.
Id. at 400 (Souter J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98.
Id.

2019

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

57

for the Department to consider whether the Tribe was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. 99
Two other points regarding the Carcieri opinion bear mentioning.
First, the majority opinion acknowledged the required demonstration of
federal jurisdiction in 1934 under the first definition of “Indian” does not
limit the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under other statutory
provisions.100 In that way, the Court left the door open for tribes qualifying
under other definitions of Indian in the IRA, or other statutes, such as tribespecific restoration acts. 101 As discussed in Section III(b)(iii) below,
Interior has seized upon this language to support trust acquisition for tribes
and to limit the holding of Carcieri. Second, the 31 acres at issue in
Carcieri remain in fee to this day. The houses constructed with HUD
funding have never been completed or used, 102 providing just one example
of the devastating impact that Carcieri has had on tribes.
IV.

RESPONSES TO CARCIERI

Indian country immediately responded to the Carcieri decision
with substantial concern and then swift action. Indian law and policy
experts criticized the Court’s cribbed reading of the IRA, as well as its
antagonism to tribal interests. 103 Although many identified the looming
99.
Id. at 401 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens issued a dissenting opinion, sharply criticizing the majority’s
“cramped” reading of a broad statute. Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued
that the Secretary had authority to acquire land in trust for “Indians,” which refers to
both tribes and individuals. Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only individuals are
required to demonstrate that they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Id. at 413
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Tribes, in Justice Stevens’ view, only had to demonstrate
that they are recognized, and, as a federally recognized tribe, the Narragansett Tribe
was therefore eligible to have land acquired in trust on its behalf. Id. at 411, 413
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 392.
101. See § III(b)(iii) infra.
102. Mem. from Joe Webster and Jerry Straus, Hobbs Straus Dean &
Walker, to Tribal Clients, SCIA Roundtable Discussion re Carcieri-fix legislation 4
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.usetinc.org/wp-content/uploads/LizMalerba/
WWS%20LnP/4_3_15/Report%20on%20Carcieri%20Roundtable%204%201%2015
.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Decision’s in. “Now” begins work
to
fix
Carcieri,
INDIAN
COUNTRY
TODAY
(Feb.
25,
2009),
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unknowns concerning the scope and meaning of “under Federal
jurisdiction,” it was generally recognized the decision would, or should,
not impact tribes with a longstanding, uninterrupted relationship with the
federal government. 104 Nonetheless, many feared that Carcieri-related
litigation would greatly increase the time and cost of acquiring tribal trust
lands, particularly for those tribes who had more recently obtained federal
recognition through the Departmental acknowledgement process. 105
Indian law scholar Matthew Fletcher accurately forecast that Carcieri
lawsuits may “forc[e] some tribes to undergo the strange and humiliating
process of earning a kind of federal recognition all over again.” 106
https://web.archive.org/web/20100108084036/http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/h
ome/content/40290987.html#close; Bryan Newland, Initial Reaction to Carcieri
Opinion, TURTLE TALK (blog for Michigan State University College of Law,
Indigenous Law & Policy Center) (Feb. 24, 2009), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/
2009/02/24/initial-reaction-to-carcieri-opinion/. For a general discussion of the
Supreme Court’s record in Indian law cases over the last 30 years, see Alexander
Tallchief Skibine, University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 230 (2017)
(concluding that “the Court has had difficulties upholding the federal policy of
respecting tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government”).
104. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust
Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 594 (2009) (“This decision will
create a cloud upon the trust title of every tribe first recognized by Congress or the
executive branch after 1934, every tribe terminated in the termination era that has
since been restored, and every tribe that adopted the IRA or OIWA and changed its
name or organizational structure since 1934.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 103;
Newland, supra note 103. It was also widely assumed that past tribal trust land
acquisitions would be insulated from Carcieri challenges on the basis of the Quiet
Title Act’s Indian lands exception. Yet that assumption was put to bed by the Supreme
Court’s 2012 Patchak decision, holding that the Quiet Title Act does not bar APA
challenges to fee-to-trust decision once land is acquired in trust as long as the
challenge is brought by plaintiffs not seeking to quiet title in themselves. See MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217
(2012).
105. Newland, supra note 103 (noting that Carcieri would affect tribes
not acknowledged until after 1934, “plac[ing] yet another litigation obstacle in front
of tribes as they seek to have land placed into trust”); Fletcher, supra note 103 (noting
that “Indian tribes in the twilight of the concurring opinions may be engaged in
expensive litigation to prove that they were ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in 1934” and
that such litigation “may require the heavy expenditure of funds for expert
witnesses”); see also Rice, supra note 104 at 594.
106. Fletcher, supra note 103.
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Prompted by these concerns, tribal leaders and pan-tribal organizations led
the rallying cry at the doors of Congress and the Department, seeking a
quick and forceful response by their federal trustee, as detailed below.

A.

Proposed Legislative Solutions

Spurred by tribes, Congress sprang into action by holding hearings
and considering legislation to address Carcieri. Since the Carcieri
decision in February 2009, Congress has introduced 15 clean Carcieri
fixes to provide that Interior has authority to acquire land in trust for all
tribes, without imposing other restrictions on the fee-to-trust process.
Several bills to ratify prior acquisitions have also been introduced, as well
as a bill to fix Carcieri but also requiring drastic changes to the fee-to-trust
process. Yet, with the exception of one tribe-specific bill, ten years later
Congress has failed to enact legislation remedying Carcieri’s
consequences. And such universal legislation seems unlikely, despite the
fact it remains desperately needed. As we explain below, what started with
the seemingly simple proposition that every federally recognized tribe
should be eligible to put land in trust under the IRA has evolved into a
much larger, at times ugly, debate about gaming and economic
development, state and local government authority, tribal sovereignty, the
legitimacy of certain tribes, and the fee-to-trust process as a whole. The
controversy over Carcieri has even led one reporter to characterize it as
“[t]he new Indian wars in Washington.” 107 The entrenched battle lines
have led to congressional paralysis, which is unlikely to change anytime
soon. While many tribes and tribal organizations want a clean Carcieri
fix, states and local governments, as well as citizens’ groups and some
members of Congress insist on broader changes to the fee-to-trust process
that most tribes do not want to see effectuated.
1. Initial Congressional Response
Less than two months after the Carcieri decision, in April 2009,
the House Natural Resources Committee held an oversight committee
hearing on the decision’s ramifications for Indian tribes. 108 Committee
107. David Rogers, The New Indian wars in Washington, POLITICO (Oct.
30, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/new-indian-warswashington-215208.
108. April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56.
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members and panelists expressed significant concerns about both the
Court’s reasoning in Carcieri and its implications. These implications
included: frivolous litigation challenging whether a tribe was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934; different classes of and false distinctions between
tribes, contrary to 25 U.S.C. § 5123(f) and (g); 109 questions about whether
Interior could take land into trust for recently recognized tribes; barriers to
economic development; confusion about and delays in the land-into-trust
process; and questions about criminal jurisdiction. 110 The overwhelming
consensus was that Congress must act to address Carcieri.111 Only one
panelist at the House hearing, Alaska attorney Don Mitchell, defended the
Supreme Court’s decision as correctly decided. 112
The next month, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs also held
an oversight hearing to discuss Carcieri.113 Committee members and
109. 25 U.S.C. § 5123(f) and (g), described as the “privileges and
immunities” clause of the IRA, prohibits Interior from making distinctions between
federally-recognized tribes.
110. April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56, at 2
(statement of the Honorable Nick J. Rahall, Chairman, Comm. on Nat. Resources)
(discussing frivolous litigation); id. at 6–7 (statement of Colette Routel, Visiting
Assistant Professor, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.) (arguing that the decision creates two
classes of tribes, “the haves and the have nots,” and noting that Interior would not be
able to acquire land in trust for recently recognized tribes without legislation); id. at
16 (statement of Michael J. Anderson, Partner, Anderson Tuell, LLP) (discussing
future delays and confusion about the land-into-trust process and noting Carcieri will
hinder economic development); id. at 31 (response of Michael J. Anderson to question
from Chairman Rahall) (noting possible challenges to criminal jurisdiction).
Portending litigation and turmoil at the Department of the Interior for years to come,
attorney Michael Anderson testified:
Regrettably, some attorneys and their clients may see the Carcieri
decision as a springboard to revisit assimilationist and
antisovereignty positions best left in the termination era. Facing such
litigation or, possibly, after an erroneous decision by lower courts,
the Department of the Interior could be compelled to examine the
historical record for individual tribes. My experience at the
Department has shown that gaps in historic records, staffing
shortages, restrictive interpretations, and well-funded opponents
could delay land-into-trust acquisitions for years.
Id. at 14.
111. See generally id.
112. Id. at 24–25 (Statement of Donald Craig Mitchell, Esq.).
113. May 21, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56.
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panelists expressed similar concerns to those raised in the House hearing
and argued that Congress must act quickly to fix Carcieri.114 The National
Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) proposed a clean Carcieri fix—
legislative language to remove the words “now under federal jurisdiction”
from the first definition of “Indian.” 115 However, the Attorney General of
the State of South Dakota, on behalf of the Conference of Western
Attorneys General, argued that Congress should use the Carcieri decision
to revisit the entire land-into-trust process.116 Mirroring attacks on the feeto-trust process raised by states in the Carcieri litigation, he argued trust
acquisitions inhibit economic development and the process was unfair to,
and biased against, state and local governments. 117 In addition to
testimony provided at the hearing, numerous state and local officials,
tribes, and attorneys, among others, provided written statements to the
committee, demonstrating the importance of, and controversy
surrounding, trust land acquisitions. 118
114. Id.
115. Id. at 19 (prepared Statement of Hon. Ron Allen, Sec’y, NCAI).
Attorney Edward Lazarus also argued that any administrative approach include a
brightline rule that any tribe that went through the federal acknowledgment process
had already established that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, based on a
finding that it had been “identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially
continuous basis since 1900.” Id. at 5 (statement of Edward P. Lazarus, Partner, Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer, and Feld, LLP.)
116. Id. at 21 (prepared Statement of Lawrence E. Long, Att’y Gen., S.
D., Chairman, Conference of Western Att’ys Gen.).
117. Id. at 22, 25.
118. Id. at 33–180. Submissions ranged from complaints that tribes
improperly seek to circumvent state law through trust land acquisition, id. at 33
(prepared statement of Robb and Ross Law Firm, on behalf of Artichoke Joe’s);
complaints about the negative impacts of trust acquisitions on state and local
government, id. at 46 (prepared statement of Hon. Richard Blumenthal, Att’y Gen.,
Connecticut), id. at 54 (prepared statement of Mike McGowan, Chairman, CSAC
Housing, Land Use, and Transp. Comm. and Indian Gaming Working Grp.), id. at 135
(Communication from the Chief Legal Offices of the Following States and Territories:
Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Utah to Senator Dorgan et al); frustration that the current fee-to-trust process “does
not provide for meaningful analysis of weighing of the input of states and local units
of governments and is void of binding limits on the discretion of the secretary,” id. at
135 (communication from the Chief Legal Offices of the Following States and
Territories: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
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In addition to holding oversight hearings, members of Congress
also introduced legislation to fix Carcieri. In September 2009, Senator
Byron Dorgan introduced a bill in the Senate to revise the first definition
of “Indian” to include “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” 119 In this
way, the bill would have removed the Supreme Court’s requirement that a
tribe demonstrate it was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, and the
Secretary would have authority to acquire land in trust for all federally
recognized tribes, as determined at the time of the trust application. The
bill applied retroactively to the date of the IRA. 120
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
and following several amendments, was reported favorably out of
committee through a business meeting. 121 The full Senate never voted on
the bill.
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives introduced two bills to
reaffirm the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for all Indian
tribes. The bills, introduced by Representatives Tom Cole and Dale
Kildee, were identical.122 Like Senator Dorgan’s bill, they would have
replaced “any recognized Indian tribe now under jurisdiction” in the IRA’s
first definition of “Indian” with “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” 123
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah to Senator Dorgan et al.); discussion of the devastating
impacts of the Carcieri decision on tribes, id. at 47 (prepared Statement of Bruce S.
“Two Dogs” Bozsum, Chairman, Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut), id. at
126 (Apr. 13, 2009 Letter from Chairman Janice Mabee to Senator Bryon Dorgan);
and challenging the legitimacy of numerous tribes id. at 59-61 (prepared statement of
Donald Craig Mitchell, Attorney, Anchorage, Alaska) (arguing that, since June 18,
1934, Congress and Interior “have created at least 104 ‘federally recognized tribes’”).
119. S. 1703, 111th Congress § 1(a)(2) (introduced Sept. 24, 2009).
120. Id. at § 1(b).
121. S. REP. NO. 111-247, 111th Cong. (2009). The revised bill stated that
it did not affect any other federal law or any limitation on the Secretary’s authority
under any other federal law or regulation other than the IRA. S. 1703, as amended §
1(c). It also required the Secretary to submit a report to Congress discussing the
effects of the Carcieri decision within one year of enactment and including a list of
each tribe and parcel of land effected by the decision. Id. § 1(d).
122. H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (introduced Oct. 1, 2009); H.R. 3742, 111th
Cong. (introduced Oct. 7, 2009).
123. H.R. 3697 § 1(a)(1); H.R. 3742, § 1(a)(1). Unlike the Senate’s bill,
however, they also would have replaced the existing definition of “Indian tribe,” “any
Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation” with
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The bills’ changes to the definition would have operated retroactively,
with an effective date of June 18, 1934. 124 In this way, the bills sought to
remove any question about the validity of fee-to-trust decisions issued
before the Carcieri decision.
On November 4, 2009, the House Committee on Natural
Resources held a legislative hearing on both bills. 125 Testimony revealed
the sharp differences of opinion about land-into-trust. An Interior official,
tribal officials, and attorneys spoke about the importance of trust land
acquisition for tribes and the need to quickly act to fix Carcieri.126 State
and local government officials criticized the land-into-trust process, and
demanded a fix that would protect state and local governments. 127 Some
members were equally skeptical about a clean Carcieri fix—
Representative Doc Hastings noted that 27 state Attorneys General voiced
concerns about the land into-trust process, and giving the Secretary
unconditional authority to acquire land in trust. 128 The committee did not
vote on the bills, and they never made it out of committee.
The closest Congress came to enacting a Carcieri fix was in late
2010, when the House of Representatives passed a continuing resolution
(“CR”) for the 2011 fiscal year budget that included a clean Carcieri fix.129
The House affirmed the authority of the Secretary to acquire trust land for
all federally recognized tribes. 130 The CR also expressly ratified and
confirmed prior fee-to-trust decisions, to the extent there was a challenge
based on whether a tribe was recognized or under federal jurisdiction in
a definition requiring federal acknowledgment. H.R. 3697, § 1(a)(2); H.R. 3742, §
1(a)(2).
124. H.R. 3697, § 1(b); H.R. 3742, § 1(b).
125. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3697 and H.R. 3742, to Amend the Act
of June 18, 1934, to Reaffirm the Authority of the Secretary of the Interior to Take
Land into Trust for Indian Tribes, 111th Congress (Nov. 4, 2009).
126. Id. (statements of: Chairman Bill Iyall, Cowlitz Indian Tribe;
Chairman Janice Mabee, Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Chairwoman Sandra Klineburger,
Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians; and Riyaz Kanji, on behalf of the Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians).
127. Id. (statements of Steven Woodside, Sonoma Cty. Counsel; Att’y
Gen. Richard Blumenthal, Conn.).
128. Id. at 3 (statement of the Hon. Doc Hastings).
129. House Continuing Resolution for 2011 Fiscal Year; H.R. 3082,
111th Cong. § 2727 (2010).
130. Id. § 2727(a).
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1934.131 Finally, like the Senate bill, the CR clarified that it did not affect
other statutes.132 However, the version of the CR with the Carcieri fix did
not pass the Senate. It remains the only Carcieri fix to ever pass in either
chamber of Congress.
2. 112th and 113th Congresses
In the next Congress, Representatives Dale Kildee and Tom Cole
again introduced legislation clarifying the authority of the Department to
acquire land in trust for federally recognized tribes. 133 The bills were
referred to the House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native
Affairs, which held a hearing on July 12, 2011. 134 The same battle lines
were drawn, with Interior and tribal officials lining up in support of a clean
Carcieri fix135 and a local government official and citizens’ group
representative demanding larger changes to the land-into-trust process.136
Cheryl Schmidt, the Director of Stand Up For California!, also expressed
significant concerns about gaming, 137 despite the fact that only a tiny
fraction of trust acquisitions are for gaming purposes.138 Both bills died in
the subcommittee without further action.
131. Id. § 2727(b).
132. Id. § 2727(c)
133. H.R. 1234, 112th Cong. § 1(a)(1) (introduced Mar. 29, 2011); H.R.
1291, 112th Cong. §§ 1(a)(b) (introduced Mar. 31, 2011). The Kildee bill also
expressly ratified and confirmed prior fee-to-trust decisions, to the extent there was a
challenge based on whether a tribe was recognized or under federal jurisdiction in
1934. Cole’s bill would have clarified that Section 5 of the IRA would not apply in
Alaska.
134. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1291, H.R. 1234 and H.R. 1421: House
Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (July 12,
2011).
135. Id. (statements of Donald “Del” Laverdure, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs; Chairman Earl J. Barbry, Sr, Tunica-Biloxi
Tribe of Louisiana; Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe).
136. Id. (statements of Susan Adams, President, Marin County Board of
Supervisors; Cheryl Schmit, Director, Stand Up For California!).
137. Id. (statement of Cheryl Schmit, Director, Stand Up for California!).
138. According to the Acting BIA Director, as of April 2018, there were
21 pending gaming applications, less than two percent of the total pending fee-to-trust
requests. Tribal homelands hit a wall under President Trump after historic Obama
era, INDIANZ (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/04/25/
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Meanwhile, on the Senate side, Senator Daniel Akaka introduced
legislation reaffirming the authority of the Secretary to acquire land in trust
for all federally recognized tribes, with an effective date of June 18,
1934.139 The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
which did not hold a legislative hearing. However, the Senate Committee
held an oversight hearing on the “Carcieri Crisis.”140 With one exception,
all of the testimony at the hearing discussed the devastating impacts of the
Carcieri decision on Indian country and urged Congress to quickly enact
a clean Carcieri fix.141 However, the California State Association of
Counties (“CSAC”) provided a statement opposing a clean fix, and instead
urged Congress to address Carcieri as part of “broader trust reform
legislation.” 142 CSAC’s statement foreshadowed later debates and
lobbying efforts that would make passing a clean Carcieri fix impossible.
The Senate Committee reported the Akaka Carcieri fix favorably
in a business meeting and heavily criticized the handling of the Carcieri
litigation by the Department of Justice and the Interior Solicitor’s
Office.143 The full Senate never took action on the Akaka bill.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Match-E-Be-NashShe-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,144 the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs held a second oversight hearing during the
112th Congress on Carcieri on September 13, 2012.145 After Carcieri the
United States took the position that, once the Department acquired land in
tribal-homelands-hit-a-wall-under-presid.asp.
139. S. 676, 112th Cong. (as introduced, Mar. 30, 2011).
140. Oversight Hearing on the Carcieri Crisis: The Ripple Effect on Jobs,
Economic Development and Public Safety in Indian Country: S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 112th Cong. (Oct. 13, 2011).
141. Id. These impacts included: “a more burdensome and uncertain fee
to trust process;” an increase in costly litigation; barriers to economic development,
including access to capital and job growth; and the creation of two classes of tribes.
Id. at 10 (prepared statement of the Hon. Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y for Indian
Affairs); id. at 24 (prepared statement of Richard Guest, Staff Att’y, NARF); id. at
38–39 (prepared statement of William Lomax, President, Native Am. Finance Officers
Ass’n).
142. Id. at 51.
143. Id. at 2, 5–7, S. REP. NO. 112-166 (May 17–20, 23–26, 2012).
144. 567 U.S. 209 (2012). See generally infra § III(b).
145. Addressing the Costly Administrative Burdens and Negative Impacts
of the Carcieri and Patchak Decisions: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
S. Hrg. 112-710, 112th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 112-710].
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trust on behalf of an Indian tribe, subsequent challenges were barred by
the “Indian lands” exception of the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C.
§2409a.146 In Patchak, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
QTA does not bar judicial review under the APA unless the plaintiff seeks
to quiet title to the property at issue. 147 Therefore, because plaintiff David
Patchak did not seek quiet title himself, his claim could proceed under the
APA, despite the trust status of the land. 148 The Patchak decision sent
shockwaves through Indian country, as tribes became concerned that
decades-old trust acquisitions could be reversed on Carcieri or other
grounds.149
At the 2012 oversight hearing, NCAI testified that the fee-to-trust
process was under attack through “harassment litigation” against tribes
regarding their status in 1934 and through retroactive challenges to trust
land acquisitions following Patchak.150 Other panelists testified about the
urgent need for congressional action to fix Carcieri and reaffirm past trust
acquisitions, noting the costly burdens, including litigation, and
uncertainty imposed by both the Carcieri and Patchak decisions.151
However, the CSAC, in a written statement, urged Congress to enact
legislation to amend the land-into-trust process generally in accordance
with the views of state and local governments. 152
In the next congressional session, in 2013, the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs held a hearing entitled “Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to
Trust Land Acquisitions.” 153 The same battle lines were drawn again,
including those linking a Carcieri fix to the negative effects of fee-to-trust

146.
See supra note 104.
147. Patchak, 567 U.S. at 217, 220–221.
148. Id.
149. S. Hrg. 112-710, supra note 145, at 12 (prepared statement of Hon.
Jefferson Keel, President, NCAI).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8 (prepared statement of Donald “Del” Laverdure, Acting
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs), 13 (statement of John EchoHawk, Exec. Dir.,
Native American Rights Fund), and 26-27 (prepared statement of Colette Routel).
152. S. Hrg. 112-710, supra note 145, Appendix at 31 (prepared
statement, Prepared Statement of Mike McGowan, President, California State
Association of Counties).
153. Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to Trust Land Acquisitions: Hearing
before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (Nov. 30, 2013).
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acquisitions and gaming on local communities. 154 Also in the 113th
Congress, Senator Jon Tester and Representative Cole and Markey
introduced Carcieri bills mirroring prior proposed fixes, none of which
progressed far in the legislative process. 155
Despite Congress’ failure to enact a clean Carcieri fix in the years
following Carcieri, Congress did enact a tribe-specific Carcieri related
bill in the 113th Congress: the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act
(“Gun Lake Act” or “Act”).156 The Gun Lake Act “ratified and confirmed”
Interior’s 2009 trust acquisition for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan (“Gun Lake” or “Gun Lake Band”),157
154. Senator Feinstein, for example, stated that any Carcieri fix “must
address concerns about tribal gaming.” Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein). Diane Dillon, Supervisor, Napa County Board of Supervisors, also insisted
on a fix that would address state and local concerns, describing Carcieri as “an historic
opportunity.” Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Diane Dillon). On the other side of the
debate, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs testified in favor of a clean Carcieri
fix, noting that the Department was “up to our eyeballs in litigation.” Id. at 13
(response to questioning by Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs). NCAI also testified
in support of a clean Carcieri fix, noting that state and local governments already have
a role in the land-into-trust process, and describing the devastating impacts of the
decision on Indian country. Id. at 22, 24 (prepared statement of Jacqueline JohnsonPata, Exec. Dir.).
155. Senator Tester’s bill, identical to his proposed fix in the previous
Congress, was reported favorably out of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs after
a hearing but never taken up by the full Senate. S. 2188, 113th Cong. (introduced Mar.
31, 2014); Legislative Hearing to Receive Testimony on Several Bills, including S.
2188 before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (May 7, 2012) (testimony
of Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, and Brian Cladoosby,
President, NCAI) (both Interior and NCAI spoke out strongly in favor of a clean
Carcieri fix). Representative Cole introduced a bill that would have, like his earlier
bills, revised the definitions of “Indian” and “tribe” to address Carcieri but it died in
subcommittee without a hearing. H.R. 279, 113th Cong. (introduced Jan. 15, 2013).
Representative Markey introduced a bill identical to the Senate bill, which was
referred to subcommittee where no action was taken. H.R. 666, 113th Cong.
(introduced Feb. 13, 2013).
156. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128
Stat. 1913 (Sept. 26, 2014).
157. Id. at § 2(a). The Gun Lake Act provided that “an action (including
an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating
to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal
court and shall be promptly dismissed.” Id.
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which had been challenged on Carcieri grounds in the previously
discussed Patchak litigation.158 The Gun Lake Act effectively ordered the
dismissal of Patchak’s federal court action. 159 In passing the Act, the
Senate explained that the legislation would provide certainty to the status
of the land.160 The House acknowledged that there was “no consensus in
Congress on how to address” Carcieri, and determined that bills to take
specific lands in trust would be, for the time being, “the appropriate means
of resolving trust land matters.”161 The House also questioned whether the
prior trust acquisition for Gun Lake was lawful, noting that Gun Lake’s
members “were not recognized and under federal jurisdiction on the date
of the enactment of the IRA.” 162 Thus, despite the significance of
Congress providing certainty as to the status of Gun Lake’s trust lands,
such progress must be measured against the statements by certain
members of Congress taking a broad view of Carcieri and refusing to
move forward with a clean Carcieri fix.
3. 114th Congress
During the 114th Congress, members of the House and Senate
once again introduced three clean Carcieri fixes, which tracked the
language of previous proposals.163 All three died in committee without a
hearing. Bills to reaffirm all prior trust acquisitions likewise never made
it out of committee.164
Although not specifically focused on Carcieri, in May 2015, the
House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs held a

158. See infra Section IV(a)(iv).
159. Gun Lake Act § 2(b).
160. S. REP. NO. 113-194 at 2 (2014).
161. H. REP. NO. 113-590 at 3 (2014).
162. Id.
163. H.R. 249, 114th Cong. (introduced Jan. 9, 2015); H.R. 407, 114th
Cong. (introduced Jan. 20, 2015); S. 732, 114th Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 2015).
164. S. 1931, 114th Cong. (introduced Aug. 4, 2015); H.R. 407, 114th
Cong. (introduced Jan. 20, 2015). Senator Barrasso held a roundtable discussion to
discuss a way forward on Carcieri, but, like prior hearings, panelists advanced their
positions either for or against a clean Carcieri fix and land-into-trust without any
progress towards a legislative fix. Roundtable Discussion on the Carcieri v. Salazar
Supreme Court Decision and Exploring a Way Forward, 114th Cong. (Mar. 25, 2015).
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hearing attacking Interior’s approach to land-into-trust.165 The title of the
hearing, “Inadequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934,” demonstrated the Republican majority’s
antagonism towards the existing land-into-trust process.166 Ignoring the
fee-to-trust regulations, the handbook, countless decisions upholding
Section 5 of the IRA,167 and specific fee-to-trust decisions, the Hearing
Memorandum asserted that there were no “limits, conditions, or
guidelines” on the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under
Section 5.168 The memorandum further asserted that Interior’s legal
opinion on Carcieri, discussed in Section III(b)(ii), “effectively defines
the term ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in a manner that—unsurprisingly—
serves to render the Supreme Court’s ruling meaningless and empower the
Secretary to take lands in trust for a tribe at any time.” 169 The Hearing
Memorandum also complained that Interior had failed to provide the
committee with information regarding how many tribes are affected by
Carcieri.170
In the Senate, Senator Barrasso introduced the Interior
Improvement Act, which simultaneously addressed Carcieri and
overhauled the land-into-trust process.171 The committee amended the bill
and reported it to the full Senate. 172 The bill would have revised the first
definition of Indian to authorize fee-to-trust acquisitions for all federally
recognized tribes and provided a new process for off-reservation
acquisitions.173 Under the proposed process, tribes that had cooperative
agreements with local governments would enjoy expedited treatment of
their fee-to-trust applications, and an application could be “deemed
165. Inadequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian,
Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 114th Cong. (May 14, 2015).
166. Id., Mem. from Majority Staff, Subcomm. On Indian, Insular and
Alaska Native Affairs, to Nat. Res. Comm. Members [hereinafter Hearing Memo].
167. See e.g, Michigan Gaming Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23,
30-33 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009); South Dakota v. U. S.
Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 796-99 (8th Cir. 2005).
168. Hearing Memo, supra note 166, at 3.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id.
171. S. 3879, 114th Cong. (introduced July 28, 2015).
172. S. REP. NO. 114-279 (2016).
173. Id. at § 3.
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approved” if Interior did not meet the timelines specified in the bill. The
bill also would have increased notice requirements and codified existing
regulatory requirements for off-reservation applications. 174 The Senate
never acted on the Interior Improvement Act, and it was not reintroduced
in the next Congress.
Carcieri reversed decades of Interior’s policy of acquiring trust
lands for all federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states. State and
local governments and other fee-to-trust opponents turned congressional
debate and action on a possible fix into a debate about fee-to-trust
generally and not just the Secretary’s statutory authority. Ultimately, the
opposition proved too much, and with each successive Congress, there has
been diminishing congressional activity on a possible fix. Therefore, it
has been left to Interior to issue and defend individual decisions regarding
whether specific tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. While
Interior has successfully defended each of its determinations that a tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934—as predicted by tribes and
representatives at the first hearing following Carcieri—the cost to Interior
and tribes has been significant.

B.

The Department of the Interior’s Response

The United States argued Carcieri in the waning days of the
George W. Bush administration, at a time when Interior was skeptical of
both land-into-trust generally, and off-reservation and gaming acquisitions
in particular.175 When Carcieri was decided—barely a month after
President Barack Obama took office—new political appointees had either
just started or had yet to be appointed or confirmed at the Departments of
Justice and Interior. 176 The new political appointees wanted to reassure
174. Id.
175. See e.g. Mem. from Assistant Sec’y Carl Artman to Reg’l Dirs.,
Guidance on taking off-reservation land into trust for gaming purposes (Jan. 3, 2008),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/artman0103081.pdf.
176. The Senate unanimously confirmed Secretary Salazar on January 20,
2009. Ken Salazar Confirmed as 50th Secretary of the Interior, U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR
(Jan.
20,
2009),
https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
2009_01_20_release). Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Larry EchoHawk was
confirmed on May 20, 2009. Senate Approves Nomination of Larry Echo Hawk for
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (May 20, 2009)
https://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-release/senate-approves-nomination-
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tribes who were frustrated with the land-into-trust policies of the Bush
administration.177 These appointees faced pressure to forcefully respond
to the Carcieri decision, which Indian country viewed as devastating and
wrongfully decided. It quickly became evident in the aftermath of
Carcieri that a quick fix (either legislative or administrative) was unlikely,
leading one commentator to later describe the decision as an “albatross”
around the neck of the Obama administration. 178
Three days after the Supreme Court decided Carcieri, Interior
Secretary Ken Salazar expressed his “disappoint[ment],” and committed
to “supporting the ability of all federally recognized tribes to have lands
acquired in trust.”179 Two weeks later, by memorandum dated March 12,
2009, George Skibine, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Economic Development, issued a memorandum to all BIA Regional
Directors (“Skibine Memorandum”) regarding the application of Carcieri
to pending fee-to-trust acquisitions.180 The Skibine Memorandum
established four classes of tribes: (1) those that were unquestionably under
federal jurisdiction in 1934; (2) those with land acquisition authority not
derived from Section 5 of the IRA; (3) those with “an organizational
history that raises any questions about whether they were under Federal
jurisdiction in 1934”; and (4) those who were federally acknowledged,
restored, or reaffirmed after June 1934. 181 While applications for fee-tolarry-echo-hawk-assistant-secretary-indian-affairs). Solicitor Hilary Tompkins, the
first Native American Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, was confirmed on
June 18, 2009. ABQ Journal News Staff, U.S. Senate Confirms Tompkins for Interior
Post, ABQ JOURNAL, June 18, 2009, https://www.abqjournal.com/17449/u-s-senateconfirms-tompkins-for-interior-post.html.
177. See e.g. National Congress of American Indians Resolution #PHX08-008, Fee to Trust Land Acquisitions (Oct. 19–24, 2008).
178. Loretta Tuell, The Obama Administration and Indian Law – A
Pledge to Build a Nation-to-Nation Relationship, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2016,
at 46.
179. Department of the Interior Statement on Carcieri Court Decision,
DOI (Feb. 27, 2009), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
2009_02_27_release.
180. Mem. from George Skibine to Reg. Dirs., Application of the Holding
in Carcieri v. Salazar to Pending Requests to Acquire Land-in-Trust (Mar. 12, 2009),
https://www.standupca.org/gaming-law/land-acquisitions/
March%202%2C%202009%20Memo%20to%20Regional%20Directors%20Carcieri
%20v.%20Salazar.pdf/view [hereinafter Skibine memo].
181. Id. at 2.
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trust acquisitions from the first two groups could continue to be processed,
the BIA was directed to seek advice from the Solicitor’s Office for
applications from the latter two groups.182
The Skibine Memorandum did not define “under federal
jurisdiction” or explain how the Supreme Court’s holding should be
applied, other than to note that the 1947 report, Ten Years of Tribal
Government under the Indian Reorganization Act by Theodore H. Haas
(“the Haas list”), would be “helpful as a starting point.” 183 The Haas list
identifies, inter alia, most of those tribes that held Section 18 elections
under the Secretary in the years following the IRA’s enactment and voted
to accept or reject the IRA.184 The Skibine Memorandum also requested
information about tribes and trust acquisitions from the regional BIA
offices, aiming “to identify tribes that may be impacted by the Carcieri
decision.”185 Although tribes initially expressed concern that Interior
might use information collected under the Skibine Memorandum to
compile a list of tribes who were or were not under federal jurisdiction,
Interior later clarified that it did not intend to prepare a list. 186 At
congressional hearings, Interior officials explained that all tribes were
affected by Carcieri because the Department must issue a Carcieri
determination for any tribe seeking land-into-trust under the first
definition of “Indian” in the IRA.187
Interior also held three tribal consultation sessions to receive tribal
input on how Interior should respond to the Carcieri decision.188 At the
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Theodore H. Haas, Ten Years of Tribal Government Under I.R.A.,
U.S. INDIAN SERVICE, Table A (1947), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
migrated/library/internet/subject/upload/Haas-TenYears.pdf [hereinafter Haas list].
185. Skibine memo, supra note 180, at 1.
186. Carcieri Tribal Consultation, Arlington Session Transcripts, BIA
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR 15 (July 8, 2009), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/asia/consultations/tribal-consultations-archive [hereinafter Arlington Consultation].
187. See, e.g., Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to Trust Land Acquisitions:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 13 (Nov. 30, 2013)
(responses of Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Kevin K. Washburn to questions).
188. Letter from Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Larry EchoHawk to
Tribal Leaders (June 9, 2009), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/sites/bia.gov/
files/as-ia/consultation/idc002746.pdf. The Director of the Office of Indian Gaming
also attended a Carcieri strategy session with the United South and Eastern Tribes
(“USET”) on May 12, 2009. Carcieri v. Salazar United South and Eastern Tribes
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consultation sessions, Interior requested tribal perspective on possible
legislation to respond to Carcieri as well as input on whether Interior
should amend its fee-to-trust regulations to define “under federal
jurisdiction.” 189 Although there was consensus that immediate action
needed to be taken to address Carcieri, tribes had differing views on what
that action should look like. 190 Some tribes expressed concern that
regulatory changes would lead to litigation and preferred a legislative
approach,191 whereas other tribes expressed concerns that Congress would
be unable to enact legislation and supported Interior taking regulatory
action.192 Other tribes supported both routes. 193 Several tribes argued
Interior should take the position that all federally recognized tribes were
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, or otherwise respond to Carcieri in a
manner that would indiscriminately permit trust acquisitions for all
tribes.194 In response to questions about whether the land-into-trust
process had stalled because of Carcieri, Interior officials explained that
Interior was continuing to move forward with land-into-trust but was also
taking a hard look at how to respond to Carcieri.195
Strategy
Meeting,
Session
Summary,
BIA
(MAY
12,
2009),
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc-001875.pdf.
The President of USET argued that Interior should interpret “under federal
jurisdiction” to include all federally recognized tribes. Id. at 1.
189. BIA, Carcieri Tribal Consultation Informational Powerpoint, U.S.
DEP’T OF INTERIOR (JUNE 9, 2009), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/
files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc-002458.pdf.
190. See, e.g, Carcieri v. Salazar Tribal Consultation Session Summary,
Bloomington, Minnesota, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (June 29, 2009) [hereinafter
Bloomington Consultation]; Carcieri v. Salazar Tribal Consultation Session
Summary, Sacramento, California, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter
Sacramento Consultation]; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186 (all available at
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/consultations/tribal-consultations-archive).
191. Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 3, 7; Sacramento
Consultation, supra note 190, at 8; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 25–26,
66.
192. Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 2, 5.
193. Sacramento Consultation, supra note 192, at 5, 6, 8–9; Arlington
Consultation, supra note 186, at 70, 116.
194. Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 5, 6; Sacramento
Consultation, supra note 190, at 5, 6, 10; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at
41, 73.
195. Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 62.
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In addition to answering the question of how to address Carcieri
in fee-to-trust applications going forward, Interior also addressed Carcieri
challenges to prior secretarial decisions. As a result of the Supreme
Court’s grant of certiorari in Carcieri, David Patchak, who resided close
to property held in trust and used for gaming purposes by the Gun Lake
Band, challenged Interior’s authority to acquire land in trust for the
Band.196 The crux of his argument was that the Gun Lake Band was not
federally recognized in 1934; therefore, Interior lacked authority to
acquire land in trust for the Band.197 At the Carcieri consultations, Interior
committed to forcefully defend against the challenge under the QTA198 as
well as any challenges to the status of land already held in trust.199
However, questions remained about whether Interior would be
successful.200
Following the consultations, Interior weighed several options for
responding to Carcieri in future fee-to-trust applications. In a letter to
Senator Bryon Dorgan, Interior announced its support for Dorgan’s
proposed clean Carcieri fix in Congress, which would clarify the
Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for all federally recognized
tribes without making other changes to the land-into-trust process or any
196. Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d
and remanded, 632 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and rehearing en banc denied (Mar.
28, 2011), aff’d sub nom Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209
(2012). Patchak’s lawsuit ultimately led Congress to enact the Gun Lake Act,
discussed supra § III(a)(2).
197. Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. With limited exception, the QTA waives the
United States’ sovereign immunity from a suit by a plaintiff asserting an interest in
real property that conflicts with an interest claimed by the United States. Id. §
2409a(d). The waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply, however, to “trust or
restricted Indian lands.” Id. § 2409a(a). The United States argued that all challenges
to the United States’ title in trust or restricted land were therefore barred by the QTA’s
Indian lands exception. E.g., Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees (Initial Brief)
at 23–24, Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5324).
199. In fact, other litigation had sprung up—a citizens’ group in
California challenged a decades old trust acquisition for the Jamul Indian Village of
California on Carcieri grounds. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13–14, Rosales v.
U.S., 89 Fed. Cl. 565 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (No. 10-5028) (arguing that the United States
did not hold land in trust for the JIV it acquired decades earlier because the Tribe was
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934).
200. Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 28–29, 64.
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other statutory or regulatory schemes. 201 The President and Interior
maintained support for a clean fix throughout the remainder of the Obama
administration; for example, the fix was included annually in the
President’s budget requests beginning in fiscal year 2012.202
Other actions proved more difficult. Regarding the administrative
fix debated at the consultations, questions arose about whether it would be
best accomplished through changes to the fee-to-trust regulations at Part
151; a new stand-alone regulation defining “Indian” under the IRA;
changes to the acknowledgment regulations; and/or a Solicitor’s
Opinion. 203 To this day, Interior has not promulgated any regulations
addressing Carcieri, although it has set forth a Solicitor’s Opinion, as
detailed in Section III(b)(ii).
Even more problematic for Interior was how to define “under
federal jurisdiction.” At the consultations, tribes argued that based on the
plenary power of the federal government in Indian affairs, “under federal
jurisdiction” should mean all federally recognized tribes. 204 This “plenary
power” argument was advanced in a submission provided by the Cowlitz
Indian Tribe (“Cowlitz” or “Cowlitz Tribe”) 205 to Interior in support of the

201. Letters from Secretary Ken Salazar, U.S. Sec’y of Interior, to the
Hon. Bryon Dorgan (Oct. 23, 2009 and July 30, 2010) (included in S. REP. NO. 111247, 111th Cong., 12–13 (2010)).
202. Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing, supra note 54 (statement of
Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).
203. E.g., Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 59; see also Howard
L. Highland, A Regulatory Quick Fix for Carcieri, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 933 (Fall 2011)
(arguing that Interior could “fix” the Carcieri problem, at least for tribes
acknowledged pursuant to Part 83, by asserting its authority under 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
9).
204. E.g., Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, Comments of Randy
Noka on behalf of NCAI, at 41. As explained by the Supreme Court, “the Constitution
grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers
that [the Supreme Court has] consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
205. In the interest of consistency, throughout this Article we cite to tribal
names as they appear on the List of Federally Recognized Tribes currently published
in the Federal Register. 84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019). In some instances, a tribe
has changed its name since the tribe first submitted its fee-to-trust application, and
Interior and court decisions may refer to a tribe by another name.
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Tribe’s fee-to-trust application. 206 As explained by Cowlitz, the
Constitution “endows the United States Congress with plenary authority—
i.e., plenary legal jurisdiction—over all Indian tribes.”207 Cowlitz relied
on the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “jurisdiction” from 1934, which
defined jurisdiction as the “authority of a sovereign power to govern or
legislat[e]; power or right to exercise authority; control.” 208 Cowlitz
further reasoned that “Congress’ jurisdiction over Indian tribes, is, as a
legal matter, continuous and uninterruptable unless the tribe itself ceases
to exist.” 209 The failure or “disinclination” of Congress to exercise
jurisdiction over a tribe did not “diminish the continued existence of that
legal authority.”210 Applying this argument, by virtue of Congress’
plenary power over them, all tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934;
therefore, all tribes are eligible for trust land acquisition.
In July 2009, Interior announced that responding to Carcieri was
its top priority; however, the Department could not commit to a timeframe
for a fix, though it was looking at different interpretations of “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934.211 For the first year and a half after Carcieri was
decided, Interior took no formal administrative action on Carcieri and
declined to promulgate regulations, issue a Secretarial Order, or issue a
Solicitor’s Memorandum Opinion (these Memorandum Opinions are often
referred to as M-Opinions).212 Frustrated with the pace of Interior’s
response, in June 2010, the NCAI enacted a resolution describing
Interior’s inaction on Carcieri and fee-to-trust as “a failure of the trust
obligation to take such lands into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes

206. Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Fee-to-Trust Application and Reservation
Proclamation Request Supplemental Submission on Carcieri’s “Under Federal
Jurisdiction” Requirement, at 1 (June 18, 2009), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.
com/2009/11/cowlitz-carcieri-submission.pdf.
207. Id. at 11.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 13.
210. Id. at 14.
211. Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 74–75.
212. Departmental Manual, 209 D.M. 3.2(A)(11) (U.S. Dep’t of Interior
March 16, 1992). An “M-Opinion” constitutes “final legal interpretations . . . on all
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, which shall be binding, when
signed, on all other Departmental offices and officials and which may be overruled or
modified only by the Solicitor, the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary.” Id.
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across the United States.”213 Six months later, Interior issued its landmark
Cowlitz decision, in which it set forth its two-part test for determining
whether a tribe was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.
1. The Cowlitz Two-Part Framework
On December 17, 2010, the Department issued a Record of
Decision (“ROD”) accepting into trust nine land parcels amounting to
roughly 152 acres for the Cowlitz Tribe. 214 This decision marked the first
test of Carcieri’s impact on recently recognized tribes. The Cowlitz Tribe,
which was formally recognized in 2002 through the Department’s
acknowledgment process in 25 C.F.R. Part 83, 215 held no land base. It
sought the trust acquisition to establish an initial reservation and develop
housing, tribal government buildings, a wastewater treatment facility, a
cultural center, and a casino resort. 216 The Department determined that the
Cowlitz Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and, therefore,
eligible for trust acquisition. 217 The ROD was subsequently litigated and
remanded to the Department because of gaming-related issues.218 On
213. Calling on the Secretary of Interior to Follow Through on His
Commitment to Acquire Land into Trust, NCAI Resolution #RAP-10-016 (June 20–
23, 2010), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_
lnuZCDWPilZXamRndgbgRkSRNOTGgQVEvSpcZUeVsGNbdFzRnaP_RAP-10016_amended.pdf.
214. Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Rec.
of Decision, (BIA Dec. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Cowlitz ROD],
http://cowlitzeis.com/documents/decision_package/section_1.pdf.
215. In order to obtain federal acknowledgement, the Cowlitz Tribe had
to demonstrate that it existed as an Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis
since at least 1878–80, and otherwise satisfy the criteria in 25 C.F.R. Part 83. See
Confed. Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 394 (D.D.C.
2014). The acknowledgment regulations at Part 83 have since been revised. See BIA,
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37861 (July 1, 2015).
216. Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Rec.
of Decision (BIA Apr. 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cowlitz ROD],
http://www.cowlitzeis.com/documents/record_of_decision_2013.pdf.
217. 2010 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 214, at 77–103.
218. Confed. Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Salazar, Nos. 11-384 &
11-378, 2012 WL 3757655 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2013).
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April 22, 2013, the Department issued a new ROD on remand. 219 The
Carcieri analysis is substantially the same in the 2010 and 2013 RODs.
The Department’s 2013 ROD devoted 28 pages to analyzing the
impact of Carcieri on the Department’s IRA Section 5 authority and the
Department’s ability to use this authority to acquire trust land for the
Cowlitz Tribe.220 It began by considering Carcieri’s holding that the
Department may only acquire trust land for tribes that were “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934. The Department found that the Court had not
defined or explained the phrase “under federal jurisdiction.”221 Therefore,
it was left to the Department to determine whether the phrase had a plain
meaning. After considering at length the IRA’s legislative history, text,
and implementation, as well as relevant dictionary definitions and
fundamental principles of federal Indian law, the Department concluded
there was no plain meaning of “under federal jurisdiction.” 222
Relying on these same sources, the Department interpreted the
phrase as requiring a two-part inquiry. 223 First, the Department examined
“whether there is a sufficient showing in the tribe’s history” that the tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in or prior to 1934.224 In other words, the
Department considered evidence demonstrating the United States had, in
1934 or earlier, “taken an action or series of actions—through a course of
dealings or other relevant acts for or on behalf of the tribe or in some
instances tribal members—that are sufficient to establish or generally
219. 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 1.
220. Id. at 78–106.
221. Id. at 82–83.
222. Id. at 84–94. See id. at 90 (supporting the lack of an unambiguous or
global understanding of which tribes are “under federal jurisdiction” by quoting a
1980 Solicitor’s Office opinion that found “it is very clear from the early
administration of the [IRA] that there was no established list of ‘recognized tribes now
under [f]ederal jurisdiction’ in existence in 1934 and that determinations would have
to be made on a case by case basis for a large number of Indian groups”).
223. 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 94. The Cowlitz Tribe and
other parties had argued that all tribes are under federal jurisdiction as a matter of law
pursuant to Congress’ Constitutional plenary power, and therefore no further inquiry
is necessary. Id. at 96–97. However, the Department found that relying exclusively
on the plenary power doctrine would be at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carcieri; accordingly, the Department determined there must be a further showing
that the federal government actually exercised its jurisdiction over the particular tribe.
Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 94.
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reflect federal obligations, duties, responsibility for, or authority over the
tribe by the Federal Government.”225 The Department noted that certain
types of federal actions standing alone may conclusively demonstrate
federal jurisdiction status, whereas other types of actions, viewed together,
sufficiently show that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction. 226
The second prong of the inquiry required the Department to
“ascertain whether a tribe’s jurisdictional status remained intact in
1934.”227 The Department found this may be illustrated by circumstantial
evidence.228 The Department noted that the absence of federal actions
towards a particular tribe during this period did not necessarily reflect the
loss or termination of federal jurisdiction. 229 Further, the Department
noted that the “lack of probative evidence that the tribe’s jurisdictional
status was terminated or lost prior to 1934” strongly indicated that
jurisdiction remained intact. 230 As a general evidentiary note, the
Department found that the “extensive factual and historical record
developed . . . as part of the [Federal Acknowledgment process]
establishes significant factual underpinnings relevant to th[e]
determination” of whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 231
As applied to the Cowlitz Tribe, the Department found the first
prong was satisfied by evidence of the federal government’s unsuccessful
treaty negotiations with one of the Cowlitz’s predecessor bands in the
1850s and 1860s.232 The Department determined this was clear indicia of
a government-to-government relationship, which was further buttressed
by evidence of federal actions to distribute goods to Cowlitz members,
enumerate tribal members on the local superintendent’s annual census, and
provide educational and medical services to tribal members.233
225. Id. at 94–95.
226. Id. at 95.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 79.
232. Id. at 97–98.
233. Id. at 98–99. Additionally, federal officials had considered whether
to authorize special legislation for the Cowlitz Tribe that would allow it to bring a land
claim against the United States. Id. at 100. Although this legislation was never
enacted, the Tribe later successfully brought suit before the Indian Land Claims
Commission. Id.
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The Department then applied the second prong of the test and
determined that the federal provision of goods and services to the Cowlitz
Indians continued in the 1930s, thereby supporting the conclusion that the
Tribe remained under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 234 These actions
included the attendance of Cowlitz children at BIA schools; authorization
of federal expenditures for health services, funeral expenses, and store
goods for tribal members; enumeration of tribal members on various types
of BIA censuses; and granting of allotments to tribal members.235 The BIA
also approved an attorney contract for the Cowlitz Tribe in 1932, which
was close in time to the IRA’s enactment. 236
Taking all the historical evidence into consideration, including the
lack of clear evidence that federal jurisdiction was terminated, the
Department found the Cowlitz Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in
1934.237 As a result, the Department determined it had authority pursuant
to the IRA to accept the parcels into trust. 238 As discussed in Section IV
below, the 2013 ROD and the two-part Carcieri framework were
immediately challenged in federal court.
2. Institutionalization of the Two-Part Framework in M-37029
Following development and application of the two-part Carcieri
framework to Cowlitz, the Department issued a formal Carcieri MOpinion in 2014. 239 The M-Opinion set forth the Department’s legal
authority to acquire land in trust following the Carcieri decision. Building
on its analysis in the Cowlitz fee-to-trust decision, the M-Opinion
thoroughly examined the Carcieri holding, the remaining ambiguity as to
234. 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 99–103. See also id. at 99
n.115 (acknowledging the potential argument that federal actions toward individual
Indians does not sufficiently demonstrate federal jurisdiction over the tribe, and
rejecting it on the basis of the whole record, which included federal actions vis a vis
the Cowlitz Tribe, as well as on the basis of the federal acknowledgment decision
which found that the Tribe had continuously existed since at least 1855).
235. Id. at 99–103.
236. Id. at 103.
237. Id. at 106. The Department also expressly considered, and rejected,
arguments raised by third parties contesting the Tribe’s jurisdictional status. See id.
at 103–106.
238. 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 106.
239. Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56.
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the meaning of “under federal jurisdiction,” and the necessary backdrop
of both federal Indian law and principles of judicial deference to agency
interpretations.240 Importantly, the M-Opinion institutionalized the twoprong test adopted in Cowlitz, wherein the Department must determine:
(1) whether there is a sufficient showing in a tribe’s history that during or
prior to 1934, the tribe was under federal jurisdiction; and (2) whether the
tribe’s jurisdictional status remained intact in 1934. 241
The M-Opinion constitutes an essential resource for an Indian law
attorney with a fee-to-trust practice. Because the M-Opinion is
comprehensive, this Article will only highlight the most critical aspects.
First, the M-Opinion fleshed out the types of evidence relevant to or
determinative of federal jurisdiction but did not provide an exhaustive list.
Relevant evidence includes: “the negotiation of and/or entering into
treaties; the approval of contracts between a tribe and non-Indians;
enforcement of the Trade and Intercourse Acts (Indian trader, liquor laws,
and land transactions); education of Indian children at BIA schools; and
the provision of health or social services to a tribe.”242 Evidence is
considered on a case-by-case basis.243 The M-Opinion also determined that
tribes who voted on whether to opt out of the IRA in the years immediately
following the IRA generally need not make an additional showing of
federal jurisdiction. 244 This remains true regardless of how the tribe voted,
because the holding of the election itself is clear contemporaneous
evidence that the federal government found the underlying tribe met the
IRA’s definition of “Indian” and was therefore subject to the Act’s
provisions.245
The M-Opinion also elucidated the second prong of the test—
whether jurisdiction remained intact in 1934—by explaining that federal
jurisdiction may, during certain periods, exist but lie dormant. 246 Further,
“evidence of executive officials disavowing federal responsibility in
certain instances cannot, in and of itself, terminate federal jurisdiction
240. See generally id.
241. Id. at 19.
242. Id. at 19.
243. Id. at 23.
244. Id. at 20 (discussing IRA Section 18, which allowed reservation
Indians to vote on whether to opt out of the Act).
245. Id. at 21.
246. Id.
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without express congressional action.” 247 This latter point highlights the
importance of Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes, a foundational
legal principle the M-Opinion explained should be considered in all
determinations of federal jurisdiction. 248 However, the M-Opinion again
rejected the argument that plenary power and federal jurisdiction (as
understood by the Carcieri Court) are coterminous, and instead found that
Carcieri demands the actual exercise of federal jurisdiction over a tribe.249
The Carcieri M-Opinion also clearly differentiated federal
recognition from federal jurisdiction. 250 While the Carcieri Court held
that, pursuant to the first definition of Indian in the IRA, a tribe must have
been “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the Department rejected the
argument that Carcieri similarly imposed a temporal requirement on when
a tribe is formally recognized. 251 Relying on Justice Breyer’s concurring
opinion, the M-Opinion found the IRA “imposes no time limit on
recognition,” and “a tribe may have been ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in
1934 even though the Federal Government did not realize it at the time.” 252
Moreover, the M-Opinion explained that untethering formal
federal recognition from 1934 jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the
evolving concept of federal recognition and the practical realities at the
time of the IRA. The M-Opinion found the term “recognized Indian tribe”
has historically been used in various ways, including the cognitive or
quasi-anthropological sense (which is the sense reflected in the IRA’s

247. Id.
248. Id. at 12–16.
249. Id. at 18 (“I believe that the Supreme Court's ruling in Carcieri
counsels the Department to point to some indication that in 1934 the tribe in question
was under federal jurisdiction. Having indicia of federal jurisdiction beyond the
general principle of plenary authority demonstrates the federal government's exercise
of responsibility for and obligation to an Indian tribe and its members in 1934.”).
250. See 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 87-89. The Carcieri MOpinion elaborated on analysis that contrasted federal recognition with federal
recognition in the Cowlitz decision.
251. See 25 U.S.C. § 5129; Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 24.
The full statutory definition of “Indian” that was at issue in Carcieri covers “persons
of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction.”
252. Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 24 (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
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legislative history) as well as the legal or political sense. 253 It further
explained that the process for obtaining such political recognition has
evolved substantially over the course of the United States’ dealings with
tribes.254 Presently, recognition or “federal acknowledgment” is typically
attained through a formal departmental process, established in 1978 and
codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 83. 255 Yet this formal acknowledgment process
did not exist in 1934 when the IRA was enacted, and historically, political
recognition of a tribe occurred on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.256 So,
contrary to what one might assume, in 1934 there was no common
understanding of the term “recognized Indian tribe,” no list of recognized
Indian tribes, and no single, formal process for becoming a recognized
Indian tribe. However, it is important to note, as the M-Opinion does, that
evidence submitted during the modern Part 83 acknowledgment process
“may be highly relevant and may be relied on to demonstrate that a tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.” 257
The Carcieri M-Opinion provides the legal foundation for most
fee-to-trust acquisitions. Nonetheless, the Department has at different
times employed alternative legal bases to support trust acquisition
decisions.
3. Alternative Approaches
As an alternative to undertaking the often highly laborious, factintensive inquiry into whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in
1934, the Department has also used other statutory authorities to effectuate
trust land acquisitions. This approach was sanctioned by the Carcieri
Court, which noted that “[i]n other statutory provisions, Congress chose
to expand the Secretary’s authority to particular tribes not necessarily
encompassed within the definitions of ‘Indian’ set forth in [Section

253. Id. (describing the cognitive sense as one by which federal officials
simply knew or assumed that an entity constituted by an Indian tribe and the political
sense as one by which an Indian tribe is recognized as a governmental entity holding
a political relationship with the United States government).
254. Id. at 24–25.
255. Id. Congress may also acknowledge tribes via specialized
legislation, however this mechanism for recognition is rare.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 25.
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19].”258 Alternative authorities relied upon by the Department include the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, tribe-specific legislation, the Alaska IRA,
and other definitions of “Indian” contained within Section 19 of the IRA.
a. Authority Pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act
In 2011 and 2012, the Department issued two decisions to acquire
trust lands in Oklahoma for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians in Oklahoma (“UKB”) tribal corporation pursuant to the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (“OIWA”).259 Historically, the UKB was
considered a cultural society within the Cherokee Nation aimed at
preserving Indian traditions. Congress formally recognized the UKB as a
separate tribe in 1946 via special legislation. 260 Following its recognition,
the UKB formed a tribal corporation pursuant to Section 3 of the OIWA,
which authorizes the formal organization of tribal corporations in
Oklahoma and allows such tribal corporations to “enjoy any other rights
or privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe under the [IRA].”261 The
UKB then sought to place lands in trust where its community services
center was located and where it operated a casino.262
Both decisions relied on the OIWA to establish the Department’s
authority to acquire trust land. The Department determined that its land
acquisition authority was derived from OIWA Section 3, extending the
benefits and privileges of the IRA to Oklahoma tribal corporations,
thereby implicitly authorizing the Department to acquire trust land for the

258. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 392 (2009).
259. See Trust Acquisition of Community Services Parcel, Decision Letter
(BIA May 24, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 UKB Decision]; Trust Acquisition of
Keetoowah Casino Property for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Tribe,
Decision Letter (BIA July 30, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 UKB Decision],
https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Docs/2012/7/6486_UKB30July2012.pdf.
260. 2012 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 2.
261. See id. at 2; 25 U.S.C. § 5203. The UKB corporate charter, approved
by the Secretary, expressly set out the tribal corporation’s right to acquire land for the
Band. See Corporate Charter of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians,
Oklahoma,
sections
1(b),
3(r)
(ratified
Oct.
3,
1950),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-indian-consts/PDF/51061613.pdf.
262. See 2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 1; 2012 UKB Decision,
supra note 259, at 1–2.

2019

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

85

UKB corporation. 263 Moreover, the Department found Carcieri
inapplicable to the exercise of IRA benefits by these Oklahoma tribes
because Carcieri’s limitations attach only to the IRA’s definition of
“Indian,” whereas tribes organized under the OIWA are separately defined
under its statutory scheme. 264 Accordingly, the Department did not analyze
whether the UKB were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 pursuant to
Carcieri.265
b. Authority Pursuant to Specialized Legislation
The Department invoked alternative legal authority when
acquiring trust lands for the Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, this time relying
on specialized legislation. On January 19, 2018, the Department issued its
decision to acquire in trust 102.98 acres of land in Texas County,
Oklahoma for the Shawnee Tribe. 266 The Shawnee Tribe originally
resided in Pennsylvania but, following several rounds of forced removal,
ultimately settled in Oklahoma. 267 Although the Shawnee historically
constituted a distinct tribal entity, the federal government imposed the
Tribe’s integration into the Cherokee Nation following the Civil War.268
It was not until 2000 that Congress formally recognized the Shawnee Tribe
again, as a separate and independent tribal government pursuant to the
263. 2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 4; 2012 UKB Decision, supra
note 259, at 6.
264. See 2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 4. The 2011 UKB
Decision only alludes to this argument, which was later fleshed out in more detail in
the Federal Government’s brief before the 10th Circuit. See Opening Brief for Federal
Appellants at 25–27, Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, 2017 WL 6017500 (10th Cir. Dec.
1, 2017) (No. 17-7044) (arguing that the District Court “mistakenly conflates the
IRA’s benefits—‘rights or privileges’ that the OIWA extended to Oklahoma tribes
regardless whether those tribes are ‘necessarily encompassed within’ the IRA’s
definitions of ‘Indian,’ Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 392—with the IRA’s beneficiaries,
namely, any ‘Indian’ as defined under the IRA”) (emphasis in original).
265. Both decisions were subsequently challenged in federal district
court. See infra Section IV(a)(vii).
266. Trust Acquisition of 102.98 acres in Texas County, Oklahoma for the
Shawnee Tribe, Rec. of Decision (BIA Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 Shawnee
Decision), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/
gaming-applications/2018.01.19%20Shawnee%20151%20Decision%20Signed.pdf.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Id. at 4.
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Shawnee Tribe Status Act. 269 The Act, in addition to restoring the Tribe’s
recognition, expressly established the Tribe’s eligibility to acquire trust
lands pursuant to Section 5 of the IRA and Section 1 of the OIWA. 270
In its 2018 fee-to-trust decision, the Department addressed its
legal authority for the Shawnee land acquisition as required by 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.10(a).271 It highlighted the Carcieri Court’s comment that “[i]n
other statutory provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secretary’s
authority to particular Indian tribes not necessarily encompassed within
the definition of ‘Indian’ set forth” in the IRA. 272 The Department cited
the Shawnee Tribe Status Act as providing such authority, which
eliminated the need for the Department to undertake a Carcieri analysis of
whether the Shawnee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 273
c. Authority Pursuant to the IRA’s Other Definitions of “Indian”
Beyond alternative statutory frameworks, the Department has also
relied on multiple sources of authority contained within the IRA itself. In
September of 2015, the Department issued a decision to acquire two
parcels of land into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (“Mashpee”
or “Mashpee Tribe”) in Massachusetts.274 The Mashpee Tribe has a long
recorded presence in southeastern Massachusetts, existing before
European contact in the 1600s.275 Similar to the Narragansett Tribe of
Rhode Island, the subject of the Carcieri litigation, the Mashpee were

269. Id.
270. 2018 Shawnee Decision, supra note 266, at 4 (citing Pub. L. 106568, Title VII, 114 Stat. 291 (2000) (amended by Pub. L. No. 109–159, 119 Stat. 1939
(Aug. 10, 2005)).
271. Id. at 9.
272. Id. at 12 (citing Section 7 of the Shawnee Tribe Status Act, which
provides that “[t]he Tribe is eligible to have land acquired in trust pursuant to Section
5 of the [IRA] and Section 1 of the [OIWA]”).
273. Id.
274. Trust Acquisition and Reservation Proclamation for 151 Acres in the
City of Taunton, Massachusetts, and 170 Acres in the Town of Mashpee,
Massachusetts, for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, Rec. of Decision (BIA Sept.
2015)
[hereinafter
2015
Mashpee
ROD],
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/ public/oig/pdf/idc1-031724.pdf.
275. Id. at 62.
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often left to the authority of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.276
Although the federal government intermittently interacted with the Tribe
and its members, it typically deferred to Massachusetts’ handling of Indian
affairs.277 It was not until 2007 that the federal government formally
recognized the Mashpee Tribe through the Part 83 acknowledgment
process.278 Immediately following its acknowledgment, the Mashpee
Tribe submitted an application for the Department to acquire in trust land
in the Town of Mashpee for governmental services, cultural preservation,
and housing, as well as land in the City of Taunton for a casino-resort.279
Eight years later, the Department approved the Mashpee Tribe’s
application.
In contrast to the majority of the Department’s fee-to-trust
decisions, the Mashpee decision relied exclusively upon the authority of
the IRA’s second definition of Indian: “[A]ll persons who were
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” 280 As the language
indicates, the IRA’s applicability pursuant to this definition focuses on
reservation residence in 1934, as opposed to membership in a tribe under
federal jurisdiction (as contemplated by the first definition).
Since Mashpee provided the first instance in which the
Department relied primarily on the oft forgotten second definition, the
Department undertook extensive analysis of the statutory language in its
decision document. It found the language ambiguous in several respects,
including whether the term “such members” incorporated, by reference,
the entire first definition of “Indian” and, consequently, the Carcieri
limitations.281 To clarify these ambiguities, the Department considered the

276. See, e.g., id. at 117–119.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 4.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 80–120. As detailed supra, Section II, the Carcieri decision
addressed the first definition of Indian—“members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction”—and did not opine on the remaining categories of Indians
set forth in § 19. See also Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 4.
281. 2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274, at 80-81. Other points of
ambiguity identified by the Department include: whether the second definition applies
only to individuals or also to tribes; what constitutes a “reservation”; whether “present
boundaries” refers to boundaries as of 1934 or at the time of the Act’s application; and
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IRA’s purpose, legislative history, implementation, and other tools of
statutory construction. 282 The Department ultimately concluded that “such
members” incorporates only “members of recognized Indian tribes” in
1934 and not the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” as interpreted
by Carcieri.283 Accordingly, the Department held that it need not
determine whether the Mashpee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in
1934 for purposes of satisfying the second definition of Indian. 284 Rather,
the test was whether the Mashpee Tribe consists of “descendants of
members of a recognized Indian tribe who maintained residence within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation as of June 1, 1934.”285 After
thoroughly reviewing the historical evidence, the Department concluded
that Mashpee satisfied this definition, and therefore, the Department had
authority under the IRA to acquire the trust lands. 286
As described later in this Article, the Department’s 2015 decision
for Mashpee was successfully challenged in federal district court on
several grounds, including the Department’s statutory interpretation of the
second definition of “Indian.”287
d. Authority Pursuant to IRA Section 13
The Department has also relied on Section 13 of the IRA as
statutory authority for trust acquisitions on behalf of certain Oklahoma
tribes. In Section 13, Congress excluded the application of certain IRA
provisions to 29 tribes in Oklahoma. 288 In a recent fee-to-trust decision
whether the 1934 residency requirement attaches to “descendants” or to “members.”
Id. at 81.
282. Id. at 81–92.
283. Id. at 93–95. Regarding the other statutory ambiguities, the
Department concluded that: the second definition applied to both individuals and
tribes; a “reservation” is land set aside of land for Indian use and occupation; “present
boundaries” means as of 1934; and it need not determine whether the 1934 residency
requirement attaches to “descendants” or “members,” because Mashpee satisfied
either interpretation. Id. at 92–93, 95–100.
284. Id. at 93–95.
285. Id. at 101.
286. Id. at 120.
287. See Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D.
Mass. 2016).
288. 25 U.S.C. § 5118 (2018).
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for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the Department concluded that since
certain provisions of the IRA do not apply to Section 13 listed tribes,
Congress intended the remaining provisions of the IRA, including Section
5, to apply.289 Therefore, listing in Section 13 eliminates the need for any
further analysis under Carcieri.
e. Authority Pursuant to the Alaska IRA
The history of native lands in Alaska is both complicated and
singular. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the
nuances of Alaskan native lands, a brief primer is necessary to understand
the Department’s post-Carcieri approach to Alaska fee-to-trust.
When the IRA was enacted in 1934, Congress excluded Alaska
and other U.S. territories from the land acquisition authority set forth in
Section 5.290 However, in 1936, Congress amended the IRA to explicitly
extend Section 5 to Alaska, along with the authority to proclaim new
Indian reservations in Alaska.291 Following Alaska’s entrance to statehood
in 1958 and in response to mounting unresolved Alaskan native land
claims, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act

289. Trust Acquisition for The Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Decision Letter
9
(BIA
Apr.
30,
2018),
[hereinafter
Muscogee
Decision],
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/gaming-applications/The
Muscogee %28Creek%29 Nation, April 30, 2018, Trust Acquisition Decision
Letter.pdf.
290. See Authority to Acquire Land into Trust in Alaska, Sol. Op. M37043 at 2 (Dep’t of Interior Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter M-37043] (citing IRA § 13
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5118 (2018)). Although certain provisions were made
inapplicable to Alaska, the original IRA expressly included Alaskan natives within its
general scope. See M-37043 at 2 (citing IRA § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2018)
which includes “Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska” in the Act’s
definition of “Indian”).
291. See id. at 4 (citing Act of May, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 5119 (2018)) (“Alaska IRA”); see also Land Acquisitions in the State
of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888 and 76,889 (Dec. 23, 2014) (codified at 25 C.F.R. §
151.1(2018)). The Alaska IRA established two different authorities for designating
Indian reservations in Alaska. First, it extended the IRA § 7 reservation proclamation
provision to Alaska. Alaska IRA § 1. Second, it created a new authority to designate
Indian reservations on various types of land reservations and public lands in Alaska.
Alaska IRA § 2.
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(“ANCSA”) in 1971.292 Through ANCSA, Congress extinguished all
aboriginal land claims in Alaska in exchange for the transfer of $962.5
million and 44 million acres of fee land to ANCSA native corporations. 293
Additionally, Congress revoked the existing reservation status of Alaska
Indian reserves, with the exception of the Metlakatla Indian Community,
Annette Island Reserve. 294 Importantly, ANSCA did not explicitly repeal
the applicability of IRA Section 5 to Alaska.295 Shortly thereafter, in 1976,
Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”). FLPMA rescinded the Department’s authority to establish
new Indian reservations in Alaska pursuant to Section 2 of the Alaska IRA
but again did not repeal or amend the Department’s IRA Section 5 fee-totrust authority in Alaska.296
Subsequently, the Department grappled with the lack of clarity
concerning its fee-to-trust authority in Alaska. Following internal
deliberation and guidance from the Solicitor’s Office, the Department
initially concluded that it lacked authority to utilize IRA Section 5 to
acquire trust lands in Alaska. 297 This position was embodied in the
Department’s first set of fee-to-trust regulations, promulgated in 1980, and
was known as the Alaska exception. 298 Following litigation on the issue
and full reconsideration of the law and policy governing fee-to-trust in
Alaska, the Department promulgated a new rule in 2014, which eliminated

292. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat.
688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2018)) (“ANCSA”).
293. M-37043, supra note 290, at 7 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1605,
1607).
294. Id. at 7–8 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a)). ANSCA set forth a new
policy promoting the rapid settlement of Native claims in Alaska “without creating a
reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b).
295. See M-37043, supra note 290, at 8; Land Acquisitions in the State of
Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889.
296. M-37043, supra note 290, at 8 (citing Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2744 (1976)) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2018)).
297. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889; M37043, supra note 290 at 8 & n.64.
298. See Land Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034, 62,036 (Sept. 18, 1980)
(formerly codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.1). Although Alaska lands were generally
excluded from the fee-to-trust process, the Department provided an exception for
acquisitions on behalf of the Metlakatla Indian Community. Id.
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the Alaska exception from the Part 151 regulations.299 The new rule was
followed in 2017 by a Solicitor’s M-Opinion (“M-37043”) that supported
the continued existence of the Department’s land acquisition authority in
Alaska and determined that Carcieri does not apply to trust acquisitions in
Alaska.300 Yet the change of presidential administration brought with it
another pivot of the Department’s position on Alaska fee-to-trust. On June
29, 2018, the Solicitor’s Office issued M-37053, which withdrew M37043 and provided for a six-month notice-and-comment period followed
by a six-month agency review period on “the Secretary’s exercise of his
authority to take off-reservation land into trust in Alaska.”301
Putting aside whether ANSCA, FLPMA, or other federal laws
repeal or limit the authority of the Department to acquire trust land in
Alaska, the Department’s interpretation of Carcieri’s impact on Alaska
land acquisitions is an open question following M-37053. M-37043 stated
that Congress’ extension of the IRA to Alaska in 1936 provided
independent specific authority for trust acquisitions for Alaskan tribes and,
accordingly, Carcieri was inapplicable.302 This position was supported by
the Carcieri decision itself, which noted that: “[i]n other statutory
provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secretary’s authority to
particular tribes not necessarily encompassed within the definitions of
‘Indian’ set forth in [Section 19],” expressly citing the Alaska IRA as an

299. See Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76,888
(Dec. 23, 2014) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2018)); see also Akiachak Native
Cmty. v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that ANSCA did not
implicitly repeal the Department’s fee-to-trust authority in Alaska and the Alaska
exception violates the anti-discrimination provision at 25 U.S.C. § 476(g) (now §
5123), and ultimately vacating the Alaska exception from the Part 151 regulations),
vacated on other grounds by Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 827
F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
300. See generally M-37043, supra note 290.
301. Letter from Principal Deputy Sol. to Sec’y, Assitant Sec’y, and Dir.
BIA, Withdrawal of Solicitor Opinion M-37043, “Authority to Acquire Land into
Trust
in Alaska” Pending Review,
M-37053 (June
29,
2018)
https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37053.pdf [hereinafter M-37053].
The comment period closed on December 20, 2018. See BIA, Alaska IRA and Landinto-Trust in Alaska, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/raca/regulationsdevelopment-andor-under-review/alaska-ira-and-land-trust-alaska.
302. M-37043, supra note 290, at 9-12.
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example.303 Additionally, the Department found that Carcieri does not
impact the Department’s authority to acquire trust land for the other
categories of Indians as set forth in IRA Section 19. Section 19 separately
and explicitly provides: “Eskimos and aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall
be considered Indians.” The Department concluded that these groups need
not also qualify as “recognized Indian tribes now under Federal
jurisdiction,” as set forth in the first definition. 304
With the issuance of M-37053 and the reopening of the
Department’s fee-to-trust authority in Alaska, it is unclear whether the
Department will maintain its position that Carcieri does not limit or
prohibit Alaska trust land acquisitions. The outcome may depend, in part,
on the comments the Department receives. However, it is important to
note that the Department’s rationale for withdrawing M-37043 concerned
only the legal developments concerning ANCSA, FLPMA, and nonCarcieri issues since the Alaska IRA. 305 It did not directly question the
validity of the Department’s position on Carcieri.
V.

A.

THE LITIGATION AFTERMATH OF CARCIERI

Administrative Procedure Act Challenges to Interior Fee-to-Trust
Decisions

Beginning with the original Cowlitz ROD in December 2010,
local governments, tribes, citizens’ groups, and individuals have
challenged Interior’s determinations that Carcieri does not limit its fee-totrust authority for particular tribes. Fee-to-trust opponents have also
challenged title to land acquired in trust before Carcieri was decided. As
predicted at the early congressional hearings, these lawsuits have not only
challenged whether tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, but also
questioned tribes’ histories, membership, and even their existence. 306
303. Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 392 & n.6; see also M-37043, supra note
290, at 10–12.
304. M-37043, supra note 290, at 12–20.
305. See generally M-37053, supra note 301.
306. Some of these lawsuits are brought by organizations, characterized
by some as anti-Indian hate groups, whose underlying mission is to challenge the
exercise of tribal sovereignty in any setting. See Anna V. Smith, Why Don’t AntiIndian Groups Count as Hate Groups? HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018).
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Although the majority of Carcieri challenges have failed,
plaintiffs continue to press the same claims. Despite the continued success
of tribes and the United States in defending determinations that tribes were
under federal jurisdiction, the never-ending litigation has consumed
limited tribal and federal resources. These are resources that otherwise
would be spent supporting tribal governments and providing vital services
to tribal members.307 Unless Congress enacts a clean Carcieri fix, the
lawsuits summarized below will continue for as long as Interior acquires
land in trust for tribes.
1.

Cowlitz Indian Tribe

Following Interior’s April 2013 fee-to-trust decision for Cowlitz,
the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon
(“Grand Ronde”), who operate a nearby casino, and a group of plaintiffs
including Clark County, the City of Vancouver, a citizens’ group,
cardrooms, and others, challenged the decision in federal district court,
alleging negative impacts from the proposed casino.308 Plaintiffs argued
that Interior’s two-part test violated the IRA, and that the Interior lacked
authority to acquire land in trust for the Cowlitz because the tribe was
neither “recognized” nor “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.309 Plaintiffs
also challenged Cowlitz’s recently expanded enrollment, arguing
Interior’s failure to consider it voided the fee-to-trust decision.310 The
district court rejected all of plaintiffs’ arguments and upheld Interior’s
decision.311

307. Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing, supra note 54 (statement of
Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y, for Indian Affairs).
308. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F.
Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 2014).
309. Id. at 397, 402.
310. Id. at 408. In addition, plaintiffs argued that the Secretary erred in
determining that the parcel was eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act’s “initial reservation” exception, and made several environmental
challenges. Id. at 409, 415.
311. Id. at 424. Relevant to Carcieri, the court determined that “under
federal jurisdiction” was ambiguous and thus Interior’s two-part test was entitled to
deference under Chevron. Id. at 404. The court also upheld Interior’s application of
the two-part test to Cowlitz. Id. at 406–08.
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Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
and the court affirmed.312 The D.C. Circuit first rejected plaintiffs’
argument that the Supreme Court in Carcieri had “foreclosed any role” for
Interior in interpreting the first definition of Indian. 313 The court
concluded that Carceri’s holding “reache[d] only the temporal limits of
the Federal-jurisdiction prong,” and both “recognized” and “under federal
jurisdiction” were ambiguous. 314 Applying Chevron, the court held that
the Secretary “reasonably interpreted and applied” the IRA in developing
the two-part test and concluding that the Cowlitz were a “recognized tribe
now under federal jurisdiction.” 315 The court upheld Interior’s reliance on
treaty negotiations and Interior’s actions in taking the Cowlitz’s land after
failed treaty negotiations as evidence of federal jurisdiction over the
Cowlitz.316 The D.C. Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) and tribal membership arguments.317
The citizens’ group, Citizens Against Reservation Shopping
(“Citizens”), as well as the cardrooms, filed a petition for certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. 318 In their petition, Citizens argued that,
contrary to Interior’s interpretation, the first definition of Indian requires
a tribe to have been “recognized” and “under federal jurisdiction” in
1934.319 Citizens also argued, for the first time, that to be under federal
jurisdiction in 1934, Cowlitz needed to reside in Indian country in 1934. 320
The United States, less than two months into the Trump administration,
filed a brief opposing Citizens’ petition. 321 The Supreme Court denied

312. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d
552 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
313. Id. at 559.
314. Id. at 560, 564.
315. Id. at 556.
316. Id. at 565.
317. Id. at 568–570.
318. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Citizens Against Reservation
Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 (2017) (No. 16-572). Neither Clark County nor
Grand Ronde filed a petition for certiorari.
319. Id. at 10.
320. Id. at 19.
321. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, Citizens Against
Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 (2017) (No. 16-572).
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Citizens’ petition, 322 and the Cowlitz casino has been successful since
opening.323
2. Ione Band of Miwok Indians
Interior’s two-part Carcieri framework was also the issue in
litigation challenging a 2012 fee-to-trust decision for the Ione Band of
Miwok Indians of California (“Ione” or “Ione Band”). Ione is a successor
in interest to the signatories of an unratified treaty between the United
States and California Indians in the mid-1800s.324 In the early 1900s, the
Ione occupied an approximately 40-acre tract in Amador County,
California.325 Beginning in 1915, the United States sought to purchase the
land for the Ione Band, but title issues prevented the purchase, leaving Ione
without a permanent reservation. 326 In 1972, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs sent a letter to the Ione acknowledging it as an Indian tribe,
directing the Regional Office to assist the Ione Band in efforts to organize,
and agreeing to accept the 40 acres of land in trust. 327 However, the
acquisition was never completed, 328 and Interior began to question whether
Ione was, in fact, federally recognized. In 1990, Interior argued in
litigation that Ione was not a recognized tribe. In 1994, Interior reversed
course once again, and, in a letter by then Assistant Secretary Ada Deer,
“reaffirm[ed]” the Commissioner’s 1972 determination that the Band was
recognized.329 Interior included the Ione on the list of federally recognized

322.

Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433

(2017).
323. Marissa Luck, After Six Months, Business is Booming at Ilani, THE
COLUMBIAN, Nov. 2017, https://www.columbian.com/news/2017/nov/29/ilanicasino-clark-county-business/.
324. Trust Acquisition of the 228.04-acre Plymouth Site in Amador
County, California, for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, Rec. of Decision 54 (BIA
May 2012).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 57.
328. Id.
329. Cty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 64 (2018).
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tribes published in the Federal Register the next year.330 However, the
Ione remained landless.
In May 2012, Interior issued a decision to acquire 228 acres of
land in Amador County in trust for the Ione Tribe to use for gaming
purposes. Amador County and No Casino in Plymouth, a citizens’ group,
filed separate lawsuits in federal district court challenging the decision on
Carcieri and IGRA grounds.331 The County challenged the legitimacy of
the Ione Band, arguing that it is not “a separate and distinct tribal entity in
its own right.”332 The County argued that Interior did not hold a Section
18 vote on the IRA or an election to organize under Section 16, and thus,
the Ione Band was not a distinct tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 333
The district court rejected these arguments, noting that it was reasonable
for Interior to conclude that no election was held for Ione because it had
no “Rancheria” in 1934. 334 The court declined the County’s invitation to
“conduct an independent investigation into the genealogy and political
history supporting recognition of Ione as a distinct tribe” as beyond its
“authority and expertise,” and instead deferred to Interior’s determination
that the Ione Band was a distinct tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 335
The court also rejected the County’s argument that Interior’s failure to
acquire land for Ione meant that Ione was not under federal jurisdiction,
finding no support for the County’s bare assertion. 336
In its separate action, the citizens’ group also challenged Interior’s
determination that Ione was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 337 The
citizens’ group argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri
foreclosed Interior from judicial deference in interpreting “under federal
jurisdiction.” 338 The district court rejected this argument, noting that the
Supreme Court did not interpret “under federal jurisdiction,” nor provided
standards for being under federal jurisdiction. 339 The court determined
330. Id.
331. Cty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D.
Cal. 2015); No Casino in Plymouth v. Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
332. Cty. of Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1210.
333. Id. at 1208.
334. Id. at 1209–1210.
335. Id. at 1213.
336. Id. at 1213–1214.
337. No Casino in Plymouth, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1184.
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that Interior’s determinations under its two-part framework were entitled
to deference, and upheld Interior’s fee-to-trust decision in both actions. 340
The County and the citizens’ group appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In a short memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the citizens’
group’s appeal for lack of organizational standing. 341 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision upholding Interior’s fee-to-trust
decision.342 The court agreed with Interior that “the better reading” of the
first definition of “Indian” is that “now” only modifies “under federal
jurisdiction,” and a tribe need only be recognized at the time of the fee-totrust decision.343 The court upheld Interior’s interpretation of “under
federal jurisdiction” using its two-part framework and the framework’s
application to Ione.344 The court declined to rule on whether Chevron
deference was owed to Interior in its two-part framework because “we
reach the same conclusion as the agency even without it.” 345 The court
concluded it was reasonable for Interior to interpret its efforts to purchase
land for Ione, beginning in 1915, as evidence that Ione was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. 346 The County filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court on Carcieri and IGRA grounds, and the petition was
denied.347
3.

Oneida Indian Nation

The Secretary’s application of the two-part framework to trust
acquisitions for the Oneida Indian Nation (“Oneida”) was also the subject
of federal litigation. In May 2008, nine months before the Supreme Court
decided Carcieri, Interior issued a decision to acquire 13,000 acres of land
in trust in central New York for the Oneida.348 Interior’s decision did not

340. Id. at 1192–93; Cty. of Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1197.
341. No Casino in Plymouth v. Zinke, 698 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2017).
342. Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d at 1015.
343. Id. at 1024.
344. Id. at 1027–1028.
345. Id. at 1025.
346. Id. at 1027.
347. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cty. of Amador, Cal. v. Dep’t of
Interior, 139 S. Ct. 64 (2018) (No. 17-1432).
348. Oneida Indian Nation of New York Fee-to-Trust Request, Rec. of
Decision (BIA May 2008).
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address Carcieri.349 Following the Carcieri decision, state and local
governments and citizens’ groups argued in federal district court that the
Oneida were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, as required by the
Supreme Court. 350 Rather than decide that “threshold inquiry” 351 in the
first instance, the district court remanded the fee-to-trust decision to the
Department to “further develop the record” on the Department’s authority
to acquire the land in trust. 352 The court recognized Interior’s “specific
expertise that the Court lacks,” and that the Carcieri question is “one that
requires a detailed analysis of contested, factually-laden historical
accounts.”353
Following the court’s remand, Interior requested briefing from the
litigants on whether the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 354
Before Interior issued their subsequent decision, the Oneida, the State of
New York, Madison County, and Oneida County entered into a historic
agreement to settle long standing fee-to-trust, tax, land claim, and gaming
issues.355 The state and counties agreed to abandon their challenges to the
13,000 acre acquisition as well as other legal disputes. 356
In December 2013, Interior issued an amendment to the original
fee-to-trust decision, adopting a 40-page opinion prepared by the
Solicitor’s Office on the Carcieri question.357 Interior applied its two-part
framework and determined that the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction
in 1934.358 Interior’s decision relied on evidence of a vote by the Oneida
to reject the IRA in 1936; the Treaty of Canandaigua between the Oneida
349. Id.
350. N.Y. v. Salazar, Nos. 08–64, 08-648, 08–633, 08–647, 08–660, 2012
WL 4364452 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
351. Id. at *14.
352. Id. at *1.
353. Id. at *14–*15.
354. Mem. from Jennifer L. Turner, Assistant Sol., Branch of Env’t &
Lands, to Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Determination of
Whether the Oneida Indian Nation was Under Federal Jurisdiction in 1934, at 2 (Dec.
23, 2013) https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/344-interior-rodamendment.pdf [hereinafter Memo from Jennifer L. Turner].
355. Settlement Agreement by the Oneida Nation, the State of N.Y., the
Cty. of Madison, and the Cty. of Oneida (May 16, 2013) (on file with State of N.Y.).
356. Id. at Art. VI.
357. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. Fee-to-Trust Request, Am. to the May
20, 2008 Rec. of Decision (BIA Dec. 2013).
358. Memo from Jennifer L. Turner, supra note 354, at 3.
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and the United States in 1794; and land claim litigation brought by the
United States on behalf of the Oneida shortly before the IRA’s enactment;
and other evidence of federal jurisdiction, either taken alone or together.359
Interior also found it unnecessary to determine whether the Oneida were
recognized in 1934; but, in any event, noted that the Oneida have been
recognized since the Treaty of Canandaigua in 1794.360
Several citizens’ groups and two local towns challenged the feeto-trust decision, including the Carcieri opinion. One set of citizens’
groups, led by Central New York Fair Business Association
(“CNYFBA”), argued that the Oneida were neither recognized nor under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.361 CNYFBA made a number of assertions:
(1) the Oneida were under state, and not, federal jurisdiction; (2) any
remaining federal jurisdiction ended with the Removal Act and the Treaty
of Buffalo Creek in the 1830s; (3) the United States’ land claim litigation
was on behalf of individual Indians, and not the Tribe; and (4) the IRA
vote was not conclusive as to the Onieda’s federal jurisdictional status in
1934.362 Applying Chevron deference—due to ambiguity in the phrase
“under federal jurisdiction”—the district court rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments.363 Relying on the Treaty of Canandaigua, the court concluded
the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction. 364 The court noted it was
359. Id.
360. Id. at 34.
361. Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 08-660, 2015 WL
1400384 (N.D.N.Y. 2015), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 6694117 (N.D.N.Y.
2015), aff’d 673 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2016). Another citizens’ group plaintiff in this
lawsuit was Citizens Equal Rights Alliance (“CERA”), whose website declares that
“Federal Indian Policy is unaccountable, destructive, racist, and unconstitutional. It
is, therefore CERF and CERA’s mission to ensure the equal protection of the law as
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution of the United States.” Citizens Equal
Rights Alliance Website, http://citizensalliance.org/. Their website links to an article
declaring that Obama’s Indian law policy, included fee-to-trust, threatened all
Americans, by “subverting our constitutional order and successfully transferring vast
land holdings and natural resources to corrupt, federally controlled tribal
governments.” Elaine Willman, Warpath: Obama’s Indian Policy Threatens All
Americans, Both Tribal and Non-tribal Citizens, THE NEW AMERICAN (Aug. 31,
2016), https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/23964-warpathobama-s-indian-policy-threatens-all-americans-both-tribal-and-non-tribal-citizens.
362. Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2015 WL 1400384.
363. Id. at *7.
364. Id. at *8.
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bound by Second Circuit precedent, which had held that the Oneida
reservation was not disestablished by the Treaty of Buffalo Creek, the
reservation remained intact, and that the affirmative land claim litigation
had been brought on behalf of the Tribe. 365 Additionally, the court
affirmed that Interior’s interpretation that the IRA places no time limit
upon recognition was reasonable, and the Oneida are federally
recognized.366
CNYBA appealed the district court’s decision to the Second
Circuit, which affirmed.367 However, CNYFBA did not appeal on the
Carcieri issue, but instead focused on if the Oneida reservation had been
disestablished, as well as a constitutional claim.368 The Supreme Court
denied CNYFBA’s petition for certiorari. 369
Another set of plaintiffs, led by citizens’ group Upstate Citizens
for Equality (“UCE”), argued that the Oneidas were under state
jurisdiction with a state reservation. 370 Additionally, UCE, like CNYFBA,
challenged the Oneida’s status as a federally recognized tribe. 371 The
district court rejected these arguments, noting that it was bound by Second
Circuit precedent. 372 The court declined to disturb Interior’s determination
that the Oneida are a federally recognized tribe. 373 UCE appealed the
365. Id. at *9 (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337
F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003)).
366. Id. at *11. The two towns did not brief the Carcieri issue on summary
judgment, despite having raised it in their complaint. Town of Verona v. Jewell, No.
08-647, 2015 WL 1400291 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). The court therefore
concluded that they had not met their burden, and granted the United States’ motion
for summary judgment on the towns’ Carcieri claims in their complaint. Id. The
towns appealed to the Second Circuit, but did not raise a Carcieri argument. Upstate
Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. U.S., 841 F.3d 556, 564 at n. 9 (2d. Cir. 2016), cert.
denied __ S.Ct. __ (2017).
367. Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, 673 F. App’x 63 (2d. Cir.
2016).
368. Id.
369. Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017).
370. Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., v. Jewell, No. 08-0633, 2015 WL
1399366 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). UCE has been cited as an example of an
anti-Indian hate group for its “multifaceted attempts to reduce Indigenous political
power while promoting racial stereotypes.” See Smith, supra note 306.
371. Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 2015 WL 1399366 at *5.
372. Id. at *5–6.
373. Id. at *1, *6.
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district court’s decision to the Second Circuit, but did not raise Carcieri.
Instead, UCE challenged the constitutionality of IRA Section 5 and the
applicability of the IRA to the Oneidas.374 The Second Circuit rejected
these arguments, and ultimately, the Supreme Court denied UCE’s petition
for certiorari. 375
4. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of
Michigan
As previously noted in Section II(a)(ii), in 2012, the Supreme
Court held that the QTA does not bar APA challenges to a fee-to-trust
decision once the land is in trust, but the challenge cannot be brought by
plaintiffs seeking to quiet title themselves. 376 The Supreme Court’s
decision allowed David Patchak’s Carcieri-based challenge to Interior’s
decision to acquire trust land for the Gun Lake Band to proceed as a
“garden-variety APA claim.”377 The Court remanded the case for further
proceedings.378
While the case was pending before the district court on remand,
Interior determined that the Gun Lake Band was under federal jurisdiction
in 1934 for purposes of a different fee-to-trust acquisition.379 Applying its
two-part Carcieri framework, Interior determined that the historical
record, which included numerous treaties between the United States and
the Band; Interior’s provision of benefits to the Band; and federal efforts
to remove the Band from Michigan, “reflect[ed] a course of dealings
between the United States and the Gun Lake Band beginning in 1795 and
. . . there is sufficient subsequent evidence that the Tribe remained under

374. Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 841 F.3d at 577.
375. Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. U.S., __ S.Ct.__, 199 L. Ed. 2d
372, 2017 WL 5660979 (2017). Interestingly, Justice Thomas dissented from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that, in his view, the Indian Commerce
Clause did not give Congress power to “authorize the taking of land into trust under
the IRA.” Id. at *2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
376. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217 (2012).
377. Id. at 220-21.
378. Id. at 228.
379. Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 158 (D.D.C. 2015).
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federal jurisdiction through the passage of the IRA in 1934.” 380 Patchak
challenged Interior’s determination and argued that Interior’s fee-to-trust
decisions were not entitled to Chevron deference because the IRA was
unambiguous and Interior’s two-part Carcieri framework was set forth in
an informal, internal memorandum.381 Patchak also challenged Interior’s
application of the two-part framework to Gun Lake, noting that Gun Lake
was not federally recognized until it completed the federal
acknowledgment process in 1999, years after the IRA was enacted. 382
However, the merits of Interior’s Carcieri decision were never
decided in court because in September 2014 Congress enacted the Gun
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act.383 The Act reaffirmed Interior’s
decision to acquire land in trust for the Band and ordered the dismissal of
Patchak’s case.384 Although Patchak challenged the constitutionality of
the Act, arguing it violated separation of powers, the First Amendment
right to petition, due process, and the bill of attainder clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the district court upheld the Act and dismissed Patchak’s
lawsuit.385 The district court never reached the question of whether the
Gun Lake Band was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 386 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. 387 On February 27, 2018, in
a decision by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, concluding that the Act was “well within”
congressional authority to strip federal courts of jurisdiction. 388
Patchak’s Carcieri arguments and constitutional claims bear
noting because they track those of other tribal opponents, and these
arguments are likely to reappear in challenges to other fee-to-trust
decisions or tribe specific legislation.

380. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of the U.S.’s
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 28, id. (No. 08-1331).
381. Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply to Defendants’ and IntervenorDefendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 10, id. In
addition, Patchak described the two-part framework as “limitless,” accusing Interior
of rendering the term “under Federal jurisdiction” “meaningless.” Id. at 11
382. Id. at 18.
383. Gun Lake Act, 128 Stat. 1913.
384. Id.
385. Patchak, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
386. Id. at 158-59, 165.
387. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
388. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018).
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5. Northfork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California
In litigation involving trust acquisitions for Cowlitz, Ione, Oneida,
and the Gun Lake Band, the plaintiffs challenged the Department’s twopart Cariceri framework. However, another central component of the
Carcieri M-Opinion was the memorialization of the Department’s brightline test, which states that the holding of a Section 18 vote by a tribe on
whether to accept or reject the IRA is dispositive of whether a tribe was
under federal jurisdiction in 1934. In Stand Up for California! v. U.S.
Department of the Interior, this bright-line test was challenged by a
citizens’ group opposed to gaming, a tribe operating a competing casino,
and others seeking to overturn a fee-to-trust decision for the Northfork
Rancheria of Mono Indians (“North Fork” or “North Fork Rancheria”).389
In Stand Up!, the plaintiffs objected to the Department’s decision to
acquire in trust for North Fork a 305 acre parcel of land in Madera County,
California, located 38 miles from the North Fork Rancheria.
Stand Up!’s complaint and briefs focused on the perceived evils
of gaming and an allegedly greedy, fraudulent tribe. 390 However, the
389. 204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 229 (D.D.C. 2016). Prior to the fee-to-trust
decision, Interior had issued a two-part determination under IGRA, finding that the
proposed off-reservation casino on was in the best interest of the North Fork Rancheria
and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.
Secretarial
Determination Pursuant to the IGRA for the 305.49-Acre Madera Site in Madera
County, California, for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, Rec. of Decision
(BIA Sept. 1, 2011) (on file with the Public Land & Resources Law Review). The
Governor of California concurred in the Department’s determination. Trust
Acquisition of the 305.49-Madera site in Madera County, Cal., for the North Fork
Rancheria of Mono Indians, Rec. of Decision 1 (BIA Nov. 2012),
http://www.northforkeis.com/documents/rod/ROD.pdf [hereinafter North Fork IRA
ROD].
390. See, e.g. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief ¶¶ 1, 5, 26, 28, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 71 F.Supp.3d
109 (D.D.C. 2014) (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071) (complaining about the alleged
negative impacts of gaming, and that the Tribe already has trust land but is engaging
is “reservation shopping” to build a mega-casino far away from its reservation);
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at
3, 11–17, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212
(D.D.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879
F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071) (arguing that there was no link
between the Indians for whom Interior acquired land for in 1916 and for whom the
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history of the North Fork Rancheria, as well its current circumstances, tell
the opposite story. Interior had originally set aside approximately 80 acres
of “absolutely worthless” land for North Fork in 1916, an area that became
known as the North Fork Rancheria.391 In June 1935, the Secretary held a
Section 18 vote, in which a majority of the adult Indians residing on the
Rancheria voted against the application of the IRA, as reflected in the Haas
List.392 In 1958, as part of the shift in federal Indian policy towards
termination, Congress enacted the California Rancheria Act, which
authorized the Secretary to “terminat[e] . . . the Federal trust relationship”
with several California tribes, including the North Fork Rancheria, and to
distribute the Tribe’s lands to individual ownership. 393 In 1966, the
Secretary published notice in the Federal Register that title to the
Rancheria had passed to an individual Indian. 394 In 1983, following
litigation brought by 17 Rancherias, including North Fork, the Secretary
agreed to recognize North Fork and restore the Rancheria to trust status. 395
Interior subsequently acquired 61.5 acres of land in trust for North Fork
for housing, government, and conservation purposes, but the land was
unusable for economic development purposes. 396
In agreeing to accept the 305-acre Madera site in trust for North
Fork, the Secretary determined the acquisition would “promote the longterm economic self-sufficiency, self-determination, and self-governance
of the Tribe.” 397 The Secretary also noted that North Fork had entered into
a memorandum of understanding with the County to address impacts of

Secretary held an election and the North Fork Rancheria today); Stand Up Plaintiffs’
Final Opening Brief at 24, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d
1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) cert. denied sub nom. Stand Up for California v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) (Nos. 16-5327 & 16-5328) (arguing that there is no
evidence of continuous tribal existence).
391. Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 212, 229.
392. Haas List, supra note 184, at 15.
393. Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, § 9, 72 Stat. 619 (1958).
394. Certain Rancherias in California: Notice of Termination of Federal
Supervision Over Property and Individual Members, 31 Fed. Reg. 2911 (Feb. 18,
1966).
395. Restoration of Federal Status to 17 California Rancherias, 49 Fed.
Reg. 24,084 (June 11, 1984).
396. North Fork IRA ROD, supra note 389, at 4-5.
397. Id. at summary, 1.
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the trust acquisition.398 Regarding Carcieri, in a short analysis, the
Department determined that the “calling of a Section 18 election at the
Tribe’s Reservation [on June 10, 1935] conclusively establishes that the
Tribe was under Federal jurisdiction for Carcieri purposes.” 399 The
Department also reasoned that North Fork’s vote against the IRA did not
limit its ability to have land acquired in trust under the IRA, based on 1983
legislation amending the IRA to provide that Section 5 “applies to all tribes
notwithstanding Section 18 of such Act.” 400 Interior did not provide any
other reasoning for the Department’s statutory authority to acquire land in
trust for North Fork Rancheria.
Plaintiff citizens’ group and the Picayune Rancheria of the
Chukchansi Indians, who operate a competing casino, challenged the
North Fork decision in federal district court on Carcieri and other
grounds.401 With respect to Carcieri, the plaintiffs argued that a Section
18 election “cannot, on its own, be conclusive evidence that a tribe was
under federal jurisdiction.” 402 Plaintiffs asserted that the Indians who
voted were not necessarily members of one particular “tribe.” 403 Plaintiffs
then went one step further and argued that the present-day North Fork
Rancheria is not the same tribe for whom Interior acquired the Rancheria
in 1916 or for whom the Secretary held a vote in 1935. 404 Plaintiffs
accused the Secretary of fabricating “a narrative of recognition,
termination, and restoration.”405
On September 6, 2016, the district court upheld Interior’s
decision.406 The court held that a Section 18 election “can, by itself,
conclusively establish the existence of a tribe under federal jurisdiction”
because under the definitions section of the IRA, ‘“Indians residing on one
reservation’ constitute a ‘tribe’” and Section 18 elections were held for
398. Id. at 56.
399. Id. at 55.
400. Id. (citing the Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459,
96 Stat. 2515 (1983), codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2202 (2018)).
401. Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212 (D.D.C. 2016) (also
addressing claims based in IGRA, the Clean Air Act, and NEPA).
402. Id. at 281.
403. Id. at 282.
404. Id. at 283.
405. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of
Summary Judgment at 11–12, Id. (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071).
406. Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 323.
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Indians at reservations. 407 In other words, a Section 18 vote of the adult
Indians on a reservation was a vote of a tribe. The court also held that the
IRA “does not require ‘unified’ tribal affiliation,” and chided the plaintiffs
for conflating recognition and federal jurisdiction.408 The court concluded
that North Fork’s jurisdictional status in 1934 was confirmed by Interior’s
purchase of the Rancheria in 1916. 409 Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’
challenge to North Fork’s “continuing Tribal existence” noting that any
such claims were untimely and that, in any event, the Secretary “was not
required to make factual findings regarding the North Fork Tribe’s
continuous existence.”410
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
which affirmed. 411 Plaintiffs again argued that participants in the 1934
election did not belong to any one tribe, and that Interior had not
demonstrated a connection between the Indians who voted in 1935 and the
North Fork Rancheria today.412 The D.C. Circuit rejected plaintiffs’
argument, citing the definition of “tribe” as including “Indians residing on
one reservation,” and concluding that “a section 18 election on a
reservation establishes that the Indian residents qualify as a tribe subject
to federal jurisdiction.” 413 With respect to plaintiffs’ argument challenging
North Fork’s continued tribal existence, the D.C. Circuit exclaimed
“Enough is enough!” and affirmed the Department’s reliance on the
“unremarkable assumption that a political entity, even as its membership
evolves over time, retains its essential character.” 414 Plaintiffs, refusing to
take the D.C. Circuit’s words to heart, filed a petition for rehearing en
banc, which was denied. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court. 415 In its petition, plaintiffs asserted, as it did below,
that a Section 18 vote was held only for a reservation, and not for a
407. Id. at 283, 284-286.
408. Id. at 283, 288.
409. Id. at 283.
410. Id. at 291–292, 301–302.
411. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177
(D.C. Cir. 2018), rehearing en banc denied (Apr. 20, 2018).
412. Id. at 1182.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1186. The D.C. Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ IGRA and
Clean Air Act arguments. Id. at 1190–1191.
415. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stand Up for California! v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) (No. 18-61).
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particular tribe. 416 On January 4, 2019, the Supreme Court denied
plaintiff’s certiorari petition in Stand Up!.417
6. Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California
A similar challenge to the Secretary’s reliance on a Section 18
vote as dispositive evidence separately arose in the Ninth Circuit. In
November 2012, Interior decided to acquire 40 acres of trust land in Yuba
County, California, for gaming purposes for the Enterprise Rancheria of
Maidu Indians of California (“Enterprise”).418 The decision section
discussing Carcieri mirrored Interior’s North Fork decision by relying on
the Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence of Enterprise’s federal
jurisdictional status. 419 In addition, Interior summarized the history of
Enterprise. Enterprise had limited land holdings—40 acres—that did not
provide a usable land base for economic development.420 Interior found
that Enterprise demonstrated a need for land “to better exercise its
sovereign responsibility to provide economic development to its tribal
citizens.” 421
Citizens for a Better Way, other citizens’ groups, individual
citizens,422 and two other tribes who operate competing casinos,
challenged Interior’s fee-to-trust decision in federal district court. 423 The
citizens’ groups argued that the Secretary’s authority to acquire trust land
under the IRA was limited to tribes who were recognized in 1934, which
416. Id. at 13. Stand Up! also argued that the Secretary erred in
concluding that the casino would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.
Id. at 9.
417. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786
(2019).
418. Trust Acquisition of the 40-acre Yuba County Site in Yuba County,
California, for the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California, REC. OF
DECISION 1 (BIA Nov. 2012), https://docs.google.com/file/d/edit.
419. Id. at 43–44 (citing Haas List, supra note 184, at 15).
420. Id. at 44.
421. Id.
422. These plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys who
represent the citizens’ groups in Grand Ronde and Stand Up for California!.
423. Citizens for a Better Way v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 12-3021,
2015 WL 5648925 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015). In addition to Carcieri¸ plaintiffs raised
arguments based on the IRA, NEPA, and IGRA.
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they alleged Enterprise was not. 424 The groups also argued that Section 18
votes were held by reservation, not by tribe, and thus a vote among Indians
residing on the Enterprise Rancheria in 1935 did not establish that
Enterprise, as a tribe, was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.425 In an
unpublished decision, the district court rejected the citizens’ groups’
arguments and upheld Interior’s fee-to-trust decision on all grounds. 426
Regarding Carcieri, the court “found no reason to stray” from Interior’s
practice of determining federal jurisdiction, including the reliance on the
Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence. 427
The citizens’ groups as well as one tribe appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 428 Once again, the citizens’ groups argued
that votes were held by reservation, not by tribe. 429 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that it ignored the “expansive definition of
‘tribe’ contained in the IRA,” which included “Indians residing on one
reservation.” 430 The Ninth Circuit held that the Section 18 vote established
that Enterprise was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, noting that this
holding was consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Stand Up!.431
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Interior’s acquisition of the
Rancheria for Enterprise in 1915 was additional evidence that Enterprise
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 432 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision upholding the acquisition. 433
7. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma
As discussed above, in separate decisions dated 2011 and 2012,
Interior agreed to accept land in trust for the corporate arm of the UKB for
gaming and community purposes, respectively. In both decisions, Interior
424. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 11, Id. (No. 12-3021).
425. Id. at 7.
426. Citizens for a Better Way, 2015 WL 5648925 at *24.
427. Id. at *22.
428. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v.
Zinke, 889 F.3d 584, 594 (9th Cir. 2018).
429. Id. at 595.
430. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5129).
431. Id.
432. Id. at 594.
433. Id. at 608.
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concluded that Carcieri did not limit the Secretary’s authority to acquire
land in trust for the UKB because the OIWA extended the benefits of the
IRA, including land-into-trust, to OIWA tribes. 434 The Cherokee Nation
separately challenged both decisions in federal court.435 In May 2017, the
district court ruled in favor of the Cherokee Nation in the non-gaming
parcel litigation, remanding the decision to Interior to obtain the Cherokee
Nation’s consent and for further consideration of Carcieri and potential
jurisdictional conflicts and administrative burdens the acquisition would
place on the BIA. 436 Regarding Carcieri, the district court found that the
OIWA incorporated the IRA as a whole, and thus UKB must demonstrate
that it satisfied a definition of “Indian” in the IRA. 437 As explained by the
court, “[t]o allow a corporation formed under the OIWA to enjoy a portion
of the IRA’s provisions without regard to its other provisions and
definitions would be to provide it more rights and privileges than the IRA
provides.”438 The United States and UKB appealed to the Tenth Circuit,
where the case remains pending. 439 In its appeal, the United States argued
that incorporated Oklahoma tribes “need not meet the IRA’s separate
definition of ‘Indian’ because . . . the OIWA extended the IRA’s ‘rights or
privileges’ to ‘the incorporated group’ of ‘[a]ny recognized tribe or band
of Indians residing in Oklahoma.’”440 The district court has yet to rule on
the separate gaming decision.
8. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
As discussed above, in September 2015, Interior decided to accept
two parcels of land in trust on behalf of the Mashpee Tribe for gaming and

434. See supra Section III(b)(iii)(a).
435. The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 12-493, 2013 WL 5329787
(N.D. Okla. 2013); The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 14-428, 2017 WL 2352011
(E.D. Okla. 2017).
436. The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, 2017 WL 2352011 at *1, *7.
437. Id. at *7.
438. Id. at *6.
439. The Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044, 2017 WL
2352011 (10th Cir. 2017).
440. Opening Brief for Federal Appellants at 18, id. (10th Cir. Dec. 1,
2017) (Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044).
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other purposes.441 Interior declined to make a determination as to whether
Mashpee was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, instead relying on the
second definition of “Indian” in the IRA. 442 That definition includes: “all
person who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” 443
Interior found that Mashpee satisfied that definition. 444 As part of its
determination, Interior concluded that the reference to “such members” in
the second determination was ambiguous as to whether it incorporated the
entire first definition, “all persons of Indian descent who are members of
any recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” or whether it only
incorporated a portion of the definition, “members of any recognized
Indian tribe.” 445 Considering the broad remedial purposes of the IRA, its
legislative history, and other rules of statutory construction, Interior
determined the second definition only incorporated a portion of the first
definition, and did not require Mashpee to demonstrate it was under
federal jurisdiction in 1934 to satisfy the second definition. 446
Plaintiffs David Littlefield and other residents of the Town of
Taunton, opposed to the Mashpee’s planned development, challenged
Interior’s decision in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that the Mashpee
did not meet the second definition of “Indian” in the IRA, because, in their
view, it plainly incorporated the first definition. 447 They argued that “such
members” refers to the entirety of the first definition, and thus, in addition
to meeting the second definition’s residency requirements, Mashpee
needed to show that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.448 The court
agreed with plaintiffs, finding that the second definition unambiguously
441. 2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274. See also supra Section
II(b)(iii)(c).
442. Id. at 79–80.
443. 25 U.S.C. § 5129.
444. 2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274 at 79. See also supra Section
II(b)(iii)(c).
445. Id. at 81.
446. Id. at 94–95.
447. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391, 396 (D.
Mass. 2016). In press interviews, plaintiffs made it clear that they did not oppose
casinos generally, or even a casino in their town, but rather opposed a tribal casino.
See, e.g, Sean P. Murphy, Taunton casino’s foes will press on, BOSTON GLOBE (June
28, 2016).
448. Littlefield, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 396.
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incorporated the entire first definition, and no deference was due to
Interior’s interpretation under Chevron.449 The court also suggested that
Mashpee was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934— despite the fact that
Interior had never decided the question—apparently on the basis that
Mashpee was not formally recognized until 2007. 450 At Interior’s request,
the court subsequently issued an order clarifying that it did not decide the
jurisdictional issue, and remanded the matter to Interior for a
determination on whether the Mashpee were under federal jurisdiction in
1934.451
Following the district court’s decision, Mashpee intervened as a
defendant452 and appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.453 Interior
filed a notice of appeal, which it later dismissed.454 The First Circuit
stayed Mashpee’s appeal pending Interior’s decision on remand, which, as
discussed in Section V(c), was issued on September 7, 2018. The Tribe
has since filed a lawsuit challenging Interior’s decision on remand in
federal district court in the District of Columbia. 455
9.

Interior Board of Indian Appeals

Several IBIA decisions have addressed Carcieri. The IBIA
reviews decisions of BIA Regional Directors to acquire land in trust,
among other decisions. In several cases, the IBIA has upheld BIA’s
reliance on a Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence that a tribe was under
federal jurisdiction. The IBIA first addressed the issue in Shawano County
v. Midwest Area Director, in which the County challenged a fee-to-trust
decision for the Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin.456 The
449.
450.
451.

Id. at 400.
Id.
Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. Mass.

2016).
452. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 318 F.R.D. 558 (D. Mass. Sept.
23, 2016).
453. Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, No. 16-2484 (1st
Cir.).
454. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 16-2481, 2017 WL
10238203, at *1 (1st Cir. May 8, 2017).
455. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, No. 18-2242 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,
2018).
456. Shawano Cty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 I.B.I.A. 62, 75–76 (2011).
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IBIA held that the “Secretary’s act of calling and holding this [Section 18
election] for the Tribe informs us that the Tribe was deemed to be ‘under
Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934.” 457 In addition, citing a Supreme Court
decision, the IBIA concluded that even if, at times, the state had exercised
jurisdiction, and “Federal supervision had not been continuous, that did
not destroy the Federal government’s jurisdiction over the [t]ribe.”458
The next year, the IBIA again concluded that a Section 18 vote
was conclusive of the Carcieri question, upholding Interior’s authority to
acquire trust land for the Oneida Nation on the basis of a Section 18
vote.459 The IBIA reasoned that Interior’s holding of a Section 18 vote
“necessarily was premised upon a determination by the Executive Branch
that the individuals allowed to vote were ‘adult Indians’ within the
meaning of the [25 U.S.C. § 5129].”460 Although not necessary to its
holding, the IBIA noted that other evidence in the historical record further
demonstrated federal jurisdiction over the Oneidas, including lands
already held in trust for the Tribe and individual Indians, and the
“inclusion in the Indian population census and assignment of the Tribe to
the jurisdiction of a BIA agency.”461
Likewise, in a separate decision concerning the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe, the IBIA held that the Secretary’s calling of a Section 18
vote was dispositive evidence that the Tribe was under federal
jurisdiction. 462 The IBIA noted in that case that the set aside of a
reservation for the Tribe, through a treaty, also indicated federal
jurisdiction. 463 Moreover, the IBIA cited the United States bringing
affirmative litigation on behalf of the Tribe in 1938 as additional evidence
of federal jurisdiction. 464 The IBIA also relied on the Secretary’s call for
a vote on whether to accept or reject the IRA in cases affirming trust

457.
458.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 74 (citing U.S. v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 n.20, 652–653

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Vill. of Hobart v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 57 I.B.I.A. 4, 22–23 (2013).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
N.Y. v. Acting E. Reg’l Dir., 58 I.B.I.A. 323, 332 (2014).
Id. at 333.
Id.

(1978)).
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acquisitions for the La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians of the La
Posta Indian Reservation, California465 and the Wyandotte Nation. 466
Additionally, the IBIA has upheld BIA Carcieri determinations
for tribes lacking a Section 18 vote but where other types of federal actions
demonstrated federal jurisdiction. For example, in Mille Lacs County v.
Acting Midwest Regional Director, the IBIA upheld a BIA decision to
acquire land in trust for the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians of the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (“Mille Lacs Band”).467
The IBIA
acknowledged that while there was nothing in the record demonstrating
the occurrence of a Section 18 vote, “the absence of such evidence does
not compel a finding that the tribe was not under Federal jurisdiction in
1934.”468 To establish that the Mille Lacs Band was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934, the IBIA relied on the “long history of Federal
treaties, statutes, congressional appropriations, and executive agency
actions undertaken with or on behalf of the Mille Lacs Band prior to and
contemporaneous with the enactment of the IRA.” 469 For example, the
Mille Lacs Band entered into seven treaties with the United States between
1825 and 1867, and Congress enacted 12 statutes relating to the tribe
between 1884 and 1933. 470 The IBIA rejected Mille Lac County’s
argument that the Mille Lacs Band today is a “new and distinct entity from
the Mille Lacs band which existed historically.”471
The IBIA also relied on treaty rights as compelling evidence of
federal jurisdiction over the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians, Michigan (“Grand Traverse Band”).472 In Grand
Traverse County Board of Commissioners v. Acting Midwest Regional
Director, other acts, in addition to a treaty, similarly showed federal
jurisdiction.473 Specifically, upon an authorization by Congress, the Grand
465.
466.

Rodney R. Starkey v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 63 I.B.I.A. 254, 264 (2016).
State of Kansas v. Acting E. Okla. Reg’l Dir., 62 I.B.I.A. 225, 236

467.

Mille Lacs Cty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 62 I.B.I.A. 130

(2016).
(2016).
468. Id. at 142.
469. Id. at 140.
470. Id. at 141.
471. Id. at 143.
472. Grand Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir.,
61 I.B.I.A. 273 (2015).
473. Id.
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Traverse Band filed a claim with the Court of Claims Commission
resulting in a judgment being awarded and the BIA compiled a roll to
distribute the judgment. 474 However, the County argued that the Secretary
terminated federal recognition of the Grand Traverse Band in 1872 and
that correspondence around the time of the IRA questioned the tribe’s
status.475 The County further noted that the Department had not extended
IRA benefits to the Grand Traverse Band.476 The IBIA rejected that this
evidence was dispositive, citing Justice Breyer’s comment in Carcieri that
“a tribe may have been ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in 1934 even though
the Federal government did not believe so at the time.” 477 The IBIA also
explained: “in 1934, the Tribe undoubtedly held a reservation of Federally
protected fishing rights and other associated property rights, and those
legal rights could be neither diminished nor terminated by the Secretary’s
improper de facto ‘termination’ of the Federal government’s relationship
with the Tribe, based on his erroneous interpretation of the 1855 treaty.” 478
In several cases, the IBIA accepted requests by the Regional
Director to have a fee-to-trust decision remanded to the Region to address
Carcieri. In those cases, the Regional Director acknowledged that the
decision had not considered Carcieri, and thus, the trust acquisition could
not proceed. 479 In another case, the IBIA held that Carcieri did not limit
the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under separate statutory
authority found in a restoration act.480

474. Id. at 279.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 279.
477. Id. at 281 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 397 (2009)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
478. Id. at 282.
479. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 51 I.B.I.A. 141 (2010) (trust
acquisition for Big Lagoon Rancheria, California); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Acting E.
Reg’l Dir., 57 I.B.I.A. 192 (2013) (acquisition for the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians);
Pres. of Los Olivos v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., Nos. IBIA 05-050A & 05-05-1 (May 17, 2010)
(order vacating decision in part and remanding in part) (acquisition for the Santa Ynez
Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation).
480. City of Bloomfield v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 61 I.B.I.A. 296,
300 (2015) (affirming mandatory trust acquisition for the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska).
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Summary

To date, courts and the IBIA have approved every single Interior
determination that a particular tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934,
satisfying the first definition of “Indian” in the IRA. Federal courts have
also unanimously upheld the Department’s interpretation of “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934, concluding it was reasonable. Critically, courts have
also recognized Interior’s unique and specialized expertise in determining
whether a particular tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.481 In only
two instances has a court struck down an Interior fee-to-trust decision
based on Carcieri, Interior’s decisions in UKB and Mashpee. However,
in both of those cases Interior did not determine whether the tribe was
under federal jurisdiction in 1934—Interior relied on other authority
instead.
Certain categories of claims have emerged over the last ten years
of litigation. Several cases challenged the validity of Interior’s statutory
interpretation of “under Federal jurisdiction” as embodied in its two-part
framework.482 These cases generally included claims that not only federal
jurisdiction, but also formal federal recognition, is required in 1934. 483
Additionally, some litigants argued evidence that an IRA Section 18
election was held at the tribe’s reservation is not dispositive of 1934
jurisdiction. 484 Other cases challenged Interior’s application of its two481. See, e.g, Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v, Jewell,
75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 407 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that “the Secretary has exercised her
expertise in Indian Affairs to construe ambiguous statutory language and in
reconciling different approaches taken by different agencies as they exercise their
responsibilities to Indian tribes”); N.Y. v. Salazar, No. 6:08–CV–00644, 2012 WL
4364452, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“There is an institution specifically designed and
coordinated to have expertise in the social, cultural, political, and legal history of the
indigenous people of the United States. This institution is not the Court. It is the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.”).
482. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., 75 F.
Supp. 3d 387; Cty. of Amador v. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012 (2017); No Casino
in Plymouth, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (2015).
483. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell,
830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 6:08–cv–
0660 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).
484. See, e.g., Stand Up for California! V. Dep’t of Interior, 204 F. Supp.
3d 212 (D.D.C. 2016); Citizens for a Better Way v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2015 WL
5648925; Shawano County, 53 I.B.I.A. 62; Village of Hobart, 57 I.B.IA. 4.
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part framework to particular tribes. 485 Several cases involved claims that
the tribe did not actually exist as a tribal entity in 1934, regardless of
whether its individual members were under federal jurisdiction. 486
Similarly, some litigants argued that a modern tribe was not the same
entity as the tribe that was allegedly under federal jurisdiction in 1934.487
A few cases raised claims that the historical exercise of state jurisdiction
ousted the existence of federal jurisdiction. 488 None of these categories of
claims have been successful.

B.

Collateral Attacks on Interior Trust Decisions

Litigation spurred from the Carcieri decision has not been limited
to direct attacks on the Department’s land acquisition authority. Thus far,
Carcieri has also reared its ugly head through collateral attacks on
decades-old trust acquisitions, illustrating the dangerous scope creep of
historically misinformed court precedent.489 This section examines
collateral Carcieri claims raised in cases related to IGRA—such as the
duty to negotiate compacts in good faith, state causes of action for IGRA
violations, and gaming eligibility of Indian lands—as well as in the context
of tax liability for trust lands and the legality of state gaming license
preferences.

485. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., 75 F.
Supp. 3d 387; Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d 1012; Mille Lacs Cty., 62 I.B.I.A. 130; Grand
Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 61 I.B.I.A. 273.
486. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Way, 2015 WL 5648925; Cty. of
Amador, 872 F.3d 1012; Kansas, 62 I.B.I.A. 236.
487. See, e.g., Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 841 F.3d 556; Cty. of
Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193.
488. See, e.g., Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2015 WL 14000384; New
York, 58 I.B.I.A. 323; Shawano Cty., 53 I.B.I.A. 62.
489. See, e.g., ROBERT A WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON : THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA
(2005) (discussing how Indian law decisions rooted in racial prejudices, stereotypes,
and historical half-truths necessarily, and undesirably, expands its reach over time due
to the principle of stare decisis).
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1. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In litigation involving the Big Lagoon Rancheria in California
(“Big Lagoon”), the State of California argued that IGRA imposed no duty
to negotiate in good faith for a gaming compact when the underlying trust
lands, on which gaming is intended, were acquired for a tribe that was
allegedly not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 490 Big Lagoon originally
filed the litigation in 2009 after years of failed negotiations with California
concerning the siting of and environmental specifications for Big
Lagoon’s proposed casino.491 California responded with a post hoc
argument that it could not be compelled to negotiate in good faith because
the lands did not qualify as “Indian lands” for purposes of triggering IGRA
because the Department had allegedly acquired the land in trust for the
tribe without proper authority, as defined by Carcieri.492 Bear in mind that
the land acquisition at issue occurred in 1994 and, at that time, the State
had not challenged the Department’s authority under the IRA. 493 Nor had
the State attempted to join the United States to the subsequent Big Lagoon
litigation.494
Despite these facts, the Ninth Circuit originally held that the State
could raise its Carcieri-related claim, regardless of the APA’s six-year
statute of limitations, because the State’s interests in the trust acquisition
were not invoked until Big Lagoon filed its IGRA lawsuit.495 The Ninth
Circuit then proceeded to rule on the merits, deciding after a cursory
review of an incomplete record that Big Lagoon was not under federal
jurisdiction in 1934; therefore, the Department lacked authority to acquire
the trust land, and Big Lagoon had no right to compel negotiations to
conduct gaming activities on that land. 496 Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit
righted course upon rehearing en banc, where it tossed California’s
Carcieri-based claim because the State failed to bring a timely APA claim

490. See generally Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (2015 Big Lagoon Decision), reversing and remanding 741 F.3d
1032 (9th Cir. 2014) (2014 Big Lagoon Decision).
491. 2015 Big Lagoon Decision at 951–952.
492. Id. at 952.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 954.
495. 2014 Big Lagoon Decision at 1042–1043.
496. Id. at 1043–45.
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against the United States to challenge the 1994 trust acquisition. 497 The
Ninth Circuit also rejected an attempt by California to challenge BIA’s
recognition of Big Lagoon, concluding that such a challenge would be
time-barred.498
While the Ninth Circuit considered California’s collateral
challenge in Big Lagoon, the Eleventh Circuit grappled with a similar
challenge raised by the State of Alabama against the Poarch Band of
Creeks (“Poarch” or “Poarch Band”). In Alabama v. PCI Gaming
Authority, Alabama sued the tribal gaming authority and tribal officials for
the alleged operation of Class III gaming activities. 499 As part of its claims,
Alabama argued that Poarch Band’s casinos were not located on “Indian
lands” as required by IGRA. 500 Although the Department issued trust
deeds for the lands in 1984, 1992, and 1995, Alabama argued that these
acquisitions were invalid because the Poarch Band was not federally
recognized until 1984, and therefore was not “under federal jurisdiction”
in 1934 for purposes of Carcieri.501
The Eleventh Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Alabama’s attempt
to circumvent the APA. Noting the Supreme Court’s Patchak language
that a fee-to-trust challenge is a “garden-variety APA claim,” the Eleventh
Circuit found that Alabama “cannot raise . . . a collateral challenge to the
Secretary’s authority to take the lands at issue into trust” in litigation
brought decades after the transfer of trust title and without the Secretary’s
involvement as a party. 502 Moreover, and in line with the Big Lagoon en
banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that Alabama’s APA action
accrued at the time the agency decision was issued. 503 The Eleventh
Circuit did, however, consider Alabama’s argument that it qualified for an
497. 2015 Big Lagoon Decision at 954. Id. at 954 (“Allowing California
to attack collaterally the BIA’s decision to take the eleven-acre parcel into trust outside
the APA would constitute just the sort of end-run that we have previously refused to
allow, and would cast a cloud of doubt over countless acres of land that have been
taken into trust for tribes recognized by the federal government.”).
498. Id.
499. See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015),
aff’ing 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
500. Id. at 1290–1291.
501. Id. at 1290–1292.
502. Id. at 1291.
503. Id. at 1291–1292 (“[T]he statute begins to run when the agency
issues the final action that gives rise to the claim”).
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exception to the APA’s six-year statute of limitations, yet ultimately
rejected this argument since there was no evidence that Alabama was
unaware of the trust acquisitions at the time they were made. 504
Big Lagoon is not the only tribe in the Ninth Circuit to contend
with an improper collateral attack on its trust land under the auspices of a
gaming challenge. A citizens’ group challenged a decades old trust
acquisition for the Jamul Indian Village of California (“JIV”). Jamul
Action Committee (“JAC”) brought a lawsuit against the National Indian
Gaming Commission’s purported issuance of an Indian lands
determination under IGRA for the JIV on Carcieri grounds. JAC argued
that because JIV was neither federally recognized nor under federal
jurisdiction in 1934, JIV’s reservation did not qualify as “Indian lands”
under IGRA.505 The district court dismissed JAC’s complaint in part,
concluding that JAC’s challenge to the status of JIV’s land was barred by
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Big Lagoon.506 JAC appealed the district
court’s decision, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.507 JAC then
appealed a final judgment by the district court to the Ninth Circuit, and the
case remains pending. 508
2. Tax Liability
Carcieri also played a central role in a lawsuit between the Poarch
Band and the Tax Assessor for Escambia County, Alabama, concerning

504. Id. at 1292.
505. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 86–99, Jamul
Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 2015 WL 1802813, (E.D.Cal. 2015) (No. 13-1920). JAC
routinely issues “legal updates” challenging not only the Tribe’s plans for economic
development but also the existence of and status of the JIV. See, e.g, JAC Legal
Update (Aug. 17, 2016), https://jacjamul.com/news/20160817.shtml (arguing that
JIV’s Reservation is not held in trust, is not eligible for gaming, and that JIV was not
properly recognized and does not possess sovereign immunity).
506. Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F. Supp .3d 1042, 1051–
1052 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 651 Fed. Appx. 689,
690 (9th Cir. 2016)).
507. Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, No. 16-16442, 2017 WL
3611433 (9th Cir. June 15, 2017).
508. See Jamul Action Com. v. Stevens, No. 17-16655 (9th Cir.).
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the Poarch Band’s tax liability for its trust land. 509 This litigation involved
the same three tribal properties at issue in PCI Gaming Authority, acquired
in trust in 1984, 1992, and 1995. 510 The County sought to levy property
taxes against the Poarch Band’s trust land, arguing that the lands were
improperly taken into trust because Poarch had not been under federal
jurisdiction in 1934 and, accordingly, they remained fee lands. 511 Poarch
filed suit to enjoin the County from levying the property tax. 512 The
district court relied on its prior decision granting a preliminary injunction,
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, as well as the holding in PCI Gaming
Authority, to grant a permanent injunction and declaratory relief
prohibiting the County from assessing taxes on Poarch’s trust property. 513
In effect, this decision reaffirmed that neither a state nor county may
collaterally attack Departmental fee-to-trust decisions outside the APA
framework and six-year statute of limitations.
3. State Gaming Laws
In Massachusetts, a non-Indian casino development company, KG
Urban Enterprises, sued the Governor of Massachusetts and the
Massachusetts Gaming Commission (collectively “Massachusetts” or “the
509. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, No. 15-277, 2015 WL
4469479 (S.D. Ala.) (granting preliminary injunction against the Escambia County
Tax Assessor), aff’d, 656 Fed. Appx. 934 (11th Cir. 2016); Poarch Band of Creek
Indians v. Moore, No. 15-277, 2016 WL 10807587 (S.D. Ala.) (final order granting
permanent injunction and declaratory judgment against the Escambia County Tax
Assessor).
510. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 656 Fed. Appx. at 937.
511. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2015 WL 4469479 at *2.
512. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2016 WL 10807587 at *2.
513. See id. at *4. The District Court granted the Tribe’s requested relief
even though the Escambia County Tax Assessor had since withdrawn his opposition
to the injunction, arguably mooting the controversy. Id. at *2. While the County’s
change of position may have been partially fueled by change of personnel in the
Escambia County Tax Assessor role, it was certainly also prompted by the related
outcome in PCI Gaming Auth, supra note 499. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2016
WL 10807587 at *4. In any event, the District Court entered the declaratory judgment
and permanent injunction, finding this relief will “inevitably serve a ‘useful purpose’
to settle the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty and freedom from local property taxes and
will ‘afford relief’ from any future uncertainty that this issue will be revisited.” Id. at
*5.
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Commonwealth”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s gaming law and
licensing procedures violated the U.S. Constitution by creating a racial
preference for Indian tribes in the state. 514 Although the plaintiff’s claims
were grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
they implicated Carcieri to the extent the Commonwealth argued that its
special treatment of tribal gaming applicants was authorized by Congress,
and therefore justified by Supreme Court precedent in Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation.515 In order for
the State to invoke Yakima, however, it had to show that it was acting
pursuant to federal law, which in this case was IGRA.516 Yet IGRA could
only provide the necessary federal hook if the tribal license preference was
for proposed gaming on “Indian lands.” At the time of litigation, the First
Circuit found there were no qualifying “Indian lands” in Massachusetts,
although the Mashpee Tribe had a fee-to-trust application pending with
the Department of the Interior. 517 The plaintiff argued that because both
of Massachusetts’ federally recognized tribes—the Wampanoag Tribe of
Gay Head (“Aquinnah”) and the Mashpee Tribe—were recognized after
1934, the Department lacked authority under Carcieri to acquire trust land
for their benefit; therefore, neither tribe could qualify for gaming under
IGRA, resulting in the unconstitutionality of the tribal preference in the
state gaming law.518
In vacating the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint,
the First Circuit issued a rather opaque decision holding that the plaintiff’s
Carcieri-based claim has sufficient merit to survive a motion to dismiss.
The First Circuit agreed with plaintiff that neither Mashpee nor Aquinnah
514. KG Urban Enter. v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding
the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction but vacating the district court’s
dismissal of complaint and remanding for further proceedings); KG Urban Enter. v.
Patrick, No. 11-12070, 2014 WL 108307 (D. Mass.) (2014) (granting summary
judgment to the defendants).
515. KG Urban Enter., 693 F.3d at 20-21. Yakima holds that states may
step into the shoes of the federal government when enacting legislation that singles
out Indian tribes, and such state legislation does not trigger strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause when the state does so pursuant to federal authorization. See
generally Washington v. Confed. Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463 (1979).
516. 693 F.3d at 19–21.
517. Id. at 21; See also supra Section III(b)(iii)(c).
518. 693 F.3d at 12, 20, and 22–23.
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were federally recognized in 1934, and the court described the Carcieri
question as both a “serious issue” and the plaintiff’s “strongest
argument.” 519
The First Circuit essentially found that while the
Commonwealth may arguably claim a valid tribal preference as authorized
by IGRA, this argument “become[s] weaker with the passage of time and
the continuation of the status that there are no ‘Indian lands’ in the
region.” 520 In other words, the longer the Commission waited for a
Massachusetts tribe to acquire trust lands that qualify for IGRA gaming,
the more unlikely that IGRA actually applied and authorized the
Commonwealth and Commission to implement a tribal licensing
preference. Ultimately, however, the strength and scope of plaintiff’s
Carcieri-related argument was not tested by the courts. Between the First
Circuit’s decision and the district court’s decision on remand, the
Massachusetts Gaming Commission opened the licensing application
process to all commercial applicants, tribal or not. 521 Accordingly, the
district court found that the 18 months between passage of the
Massachusetts Gaming Act and the opening of the commercial application
process to any applicant was a constitutionally permissible amount of
time.522 As a result, the district court did not need to evaluate whether a
continued tribal preference would have been justified under IGRA by the
likelihood that either Massachusetts tribe would be able to acquire trust
land in light of Carcieri.523
There are two takeaways from these rulings on collateral Carcieri
claims. First, Carcieri has the potential to create or bolster claims far
519. Id. at 11, 22.
520. Id. at 24-25; See also KG Urban Enter., 2014 WL 108307 at *4
(“Although the First Circuit’s guidance to this district court, and perhaps others, is
inscrutable, a careful reading yields a consistent rationale for its decision: despite not
being fully authorized by the IGRA, the Massachusetts statute can be considered a
“valid parallel mechanism” to the IGRA and, therefore, warrants rational basis review
for a ‘limited period of time.’”) (quoting the First Circuit decision in KG Urban).
521. KG Urban Enter., 2014 WL 108307 at *15–16.
522. Id. at *15-17. The District Court also determined that the review
criteria for the application process did not, on its face or as applied, constitute a racial
preference. Id. at *18-32.
523. Id. at *17-18 (“Because the Court finds that the Commission’s
opening of the commercial application process frames the applicable time period, it
need not speculate as to the ultimate resolution of the so-called Carcieri question with
respect to the rights of the Mashpee or Aquinnah tribes to take land into trust. Any
lingering uncertainty with respect to the Mashpee tribe’s eligibility is immaterial.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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outside the traditional APA fee-to-trust decision setting. It seems any
creative lawyer can finesse an argument that lands do not amount to
“Indian country” or a tribe does not constitute a “real” tribe on the basis of
Carcieri, regardless of the particular facts or claims at issue. Second, and
more reassuringly, courts appear reluctant to allow parties, even states, to
challenge decades old fee-to-trust decisions outside of the APA.
VI.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: CARCIERI’S ONGOING
IMPACTS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Given the tremendous amount of activity that has occurred in the
wake of Carcieri’s issuance in 2009, it is unsurprising that much remains
to be resolved. In this section, we attempt to summarize the major
Carcieri-related actions that are on the horizon, offering our perspectives
on what may come and providing advice for tribal leaders and practitioners
as they continue to pursue important trust land objectives.

A.

The Future of Legislative Action

Clean Carcieri fixes did not advance in the 115th Congress nor
did any Senator even introduce a clean fix in the Senate. In the House,
Congressman Cole again introduced a clean fix, which was referred to
subcommittee but no action was taken.524 In an interesting twist, a
controversial bill to revise the Federal acknowledgment process was
amended by Representative Grijalva to include a retroactive Carceri fix.525
The revised bill was reported favorably out of committee, but did not pass
the House.526
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Indian, Insular
and Alaska Native Affairs held a general land-into-trust hearing on July
13, 2017, where it was again apparent that the Republican majority
opposed the existing fee-to-trust process and Interior’s response to
Carcieri.527 The hearing memorandum asserted: “[f]or decades the
524. H.R. 130, 115th Cong. (introduced Jan. 3, 2017).
525. Tribal Recognition Act, H.R. 3744, 115th Cong. (introduced Sept.
12, 2017).
526. H.R. REP. No. 115-953 (2018).
527. Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition with the intent of
the 73rd Congress in Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act: Oversight Hearing
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secretary has acquired land in trust regardless of the impact on other tribes,
state local governments, and landowners, and regardless of the capacity of
the government to manage the trust lands.” 528 The memorandum criticized
the IRA’s lack of “limits, standards, or guidelines” on the Secretary’s
power to acquire land in trust, and that “[d]espite Carcieri,” M-Opinion
37029 “enable[d] the Secretary . . . to acquire land in trust for tribes
recognized after 1934.”529 The Interior representative at the hearing,
Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason, also expressed concern about the
impact of fee-to-trust on local communities, and speculated, without any
specific examples, that tribes could seek land in trust for one purpose, only
to initiate a different purpose, i.e. gaming, once the land was in trust. 530
Regarding Carcieri, Cason expressed concern: “the criteria [in M-37029]
is very wide and it doesn’t respond very particularly to the Supreme Court
decision. So we have concerns about the current advice in the Solicitor’s
Opinion, about being specific enough to actually distinguish between

Before the H. Subcomm. On Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 115th Cong.
1, (July 13, 2017) [hereinafter Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition
Oversight Hearing].
528. Id., Mem. from Majority Comm. Staff, Subcomm. On Indian, Insular
and Alaska Native Affairs to All Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native
Affairs Members, https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov//
uploadedfiles/hearing_memo_--_ov_hrg_07.13.17.pdf.
529. Id. at 4. M-37029 was also the subject of attack at an oversight
hearing of the House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations hearing on May 24, 2017. The Hearing Memo states “[i]nstead of
applying the IRA on its plainly-read terms as directed by the Supreme Court, [MOpinion 37029] . . . provides DOI’s own opinion and focus of the Court’s holding in
Carcieri to ultimately justify accepting land into trust on behalf of tribes that were not
formally recognized by 1934.” Mem. from Majority Staff, Subcomm. On Oversight
and Investigations to All Subcomm. Members, Oversight Hearing: Examining
Impacts of Federal Natural Resources Laws Gone Astray (May 22, 2017),
https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov//uploadedfiles/hearing_memo_-_ov_hrg_on_05.24.17.pdf.
530. Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition Oversight Hearing,
supra note 527 (statement of James Cason, Acting Deputy Sec’y).
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applications.”531 Cason did not commit to endorsing a Carcieri fix but did
note that a fix would “simplify matters.” 532
On January 9, 2019, at the start of the 116th Congress,
Congressman Cole again introduced a clean Cariceri fix, which has been
referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources.533
1. Tribe Specific Fixes
Despite congressional paralysis on a nationwide Carcieri fix,
Congress actively considered several targeted, tribe or parcel specific bills
in the 115th Congress. The House of Representatives alluded to this
approach in 2014 when it passed the Gun Lake Act, noting that, because
of the lack of consensus regarding how to fix Carcieri, “consideration of
bills to take specific lands in trust, as long as they have the support of the
elected representatives for the affected lands, tribes, and communities, is
the appropriate means of resolving trust land matters.” 534
Several tribe-specific fee-to-trust bills related to Carcieri were
considered by the 115th Congress. For example, members of both the
Senate and the House introduced bills to “ratify and confirm” Interior’s
2015 trust land acquisition for Mashpee. 535 These bills tracked language in
the Gun Lake Act, which “ratified and confirmed” the Secretary’s trust
acquisition decision for the Gun Lake Band.536 The two Democratic
Senators from Rhode Island sent a letter to Senate Minority Leader Charles
531. Trump Administration backs away from yet another pro-tribal legal
opinion, INDIANZ (July 25, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/25/
trump-administration-backs-away-from-yet.asp.
532. Indian County outnumbered at hearing on Indian Reorganization
Act, INDIANZ (July 13, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/13/indiancountry-outnumbered-at-hearing-on.asp.
533. H.R. 375, 116th Cong. (introduced Jan. 9, 2019).
534. H.R. REP. NO. 113-590 at 3.
535. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Reservation Reaffirmation Act, S.
2628, 115th Cong. (introduced Mar. 22, 2018); Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
Reservation Reaffirmation Act, H.R. 5244, 115th Cong., (introduced Mar. 9, 2018). It
is unclear how Interior’s recent decision, finding that the Mashpee Tribe was not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, might impact trust acquisition legislation for Mashpee.
See infra Section V(b); Letter from Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney
to Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Sept. 7, 2018)
[hereinafter 2018 Mashpee Remand Decision].
536. Id.
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Schumer in July 2018 threatening to use “all avenues to block this
legislation if there is an attempt to move it,” and arguing that it would
circumvent the Carcieri decision for and open the door to Rhode Island
tribes seeking similar legislation. 537 The letter is notable in that it
demonstrates the significant controversy surrounding Carcieri fix
legislation even among Democrats. The letter also misses the mark—the
Mashpee Bill and the Gun Lake Act were specifically tailored to specific
land that was already in trust. And the broader Carcieri fixes considered
by Congress do not guarantee trust land acquisition, rather, they simply
resolve the statutory authority requirement of a fee-to-trust decision. Even
if a clean Carcieri fix is passed, Interior will still be required to carefully
consider the interests of state and local governments and any
environmental impacts, among other criteria.
Congressman Byrne introduced a bill to reaffirm the status of
lands held in trust for the Poarch Band in the House of Representatives. 538
The Poarch bill passed the House, and was referred to the Senate, but not
passed. The House also passed a bill to ratify and confirm the actions of
Interior in acquiring approximately 1400 acres of land in trust for the Santa
Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation,
California (“Chumash”), which again was referred to the Senate. 539 The
Chumash bill included a prohibition on gaming. 540 It did not pass the
Senate. Each of these tribes has been the subject of litigation seeking to

537. Letter from Senator Jack Reed and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse to
Senator Charles Schumer (July 11, 2018), https://twt-media.washtimes.com/media/
misc/2019/01/10/Ltr_from_ReedWhitehouse_to_Schumer_on_Mashpee_7.11.2018.
pdf.
538. Poarch Band of Creek Indians Land Reaffirmation Act, H.R. 1532,
115th Cong. (introduced March 15, 2017). Noting the Poarch Band had to defend
against Carcieri challenges to its trust land, the House Natural Resources Committee
Report attacked Interior’s response to Carcieri and M-37029, noting that, “rather than
work with the Committee to find a resolution to Carcieri, the Obama Administration
increased the potential for litigation over the trust status of untold acres of lands owned
by tribes.” H.R. REP. NO. 115-513, at 2, 115th Cong. (2018).
539. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians Land Affirmation Act, H.R.
1491, 115th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2017).
540. Id.
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invalidate the trust transfers on the basis that the tribes were not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934. 541
In addition, Congress considered, but did not enact, two bills to
acquire land in trust for tribes that would eliminate the need for Carcieri
determinations for specific trust acquisitions. The first bill, the Lytton
Rancheria Homelands Act, would have taken certain land in trust for the
Lytton Rancheria of California (“Lytton”), and prohibited gaming on the
property.542 Opponents to the trust acquisition argue that Carcieri
forecloses trust acquisitions for Lytton, 543 and the legislation would have
resolved the Carcieri question by mandating the trust acquisition. The
Lytton Act also would have adopted a memorandum of agreement
between the tribe and the county governing land use regulation. 544 The
Lytton Act passed the House but did not pass the Senate. Additionally,
Congressman Rick Larsen introduced a bill to acquire 97 acres of land in
trust for the Samish Indian Nation (“Samish”).545 At the time the
legislation was introduced, a Carcieri determination for Samish remained
pending with Interior, and, as is the case for Lytton, the legislation would
have resolved the question of statutory authority, at least for the 97
acres.546 The Samish bill would have prohibited gaming on lands acquired
pursuant to the bill. 547 It died in subcommittee.
As of mid-January 2019, only one tribe-specific bill to address
Carcieri had been introduced in the 116th Congress. On January 8, 2019,

541. See Sections IV(viii)(a) and IV(b)(i), supra, Anne Crawford-Hall v.
United States, No. 17-1616, In Chambers Order Granting Def.’s Partial Mot. to
Dismiss (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2018) (rejecting Carcieri challenge to 1400 acre-trust
acquisition for Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Decision for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies).
542. Lytton Rancheria Homelands Act of 2017, H.R. 597, 115th Cong.,
§§ 4, 5 (Jan. 20, 2017).
543. Michael Robison and Mike Healy, Close to Home: Future of Lytton
tribe’s land is not inevitable, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Sept. 6, 2015),
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/opinion/4435433-181/close-to-home-future-of.
544. Id. at § 6.
545. Samish Indian Nation Land Conveyance Act, H.R. 2320, 115th
Cong. (May 3, 2017).
546. Legislative Hearings on H.R. 212, H.R. 2320, H.R. 3225 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, 115th Cong. (Nov. 15, 2017)
(statement of John Tahsuda, III, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).
547. H.R. 2320, § 5.
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Representative William Keating from Massachusetts introduced a bill to
reaffirm the trust status of land Interior acquired in trust for Mashpee.548
In sum, upon examination of recent congressional activity on
Carcieri, several themes become apparent. First, Congress is less likely to
enact a clean Carcieri fix than ever before. No Senator even introduced a
Carcieri bill during the 115th Congress. And no hearings were held on
the two Carcieri fixes pending in the House. Even though the Democrats
took control of the House of Representatives, the last time Democrats had
a majority in both houses, they were unable to pass a clean Carcieri fix.
At most, if one is introduced, a clean Carcieri bill could pass the House,
but it would likely be dead on arrival in the Republican-controlled Senate.
Second, certain House Republicans strongly oppose Interior’s approach to
Carcieri, as evidenced by comments in hearing memoranda and
committee reports.549 These Republicans are of the view that Carcieri
requires “recognition” in 1934, and that tribes like the Gun Lake Band who
went through the Federal acknowledgment process cannot meet this
requirement.
Third, the congressional debate about Carcieri is in reality a
debate about the land-into-trust process, and what Republicans (and
sometimes Democrats) see as overreach by Interior and a disregard of state
and local government and community interests. Senator Barrasso
previously coupled Carcieri with significant changes to the fee-to-trust
process, and other members of Congress have insisted that other changes
to the fee-to-trust process, including limits on the Secretary’s discretion,
are necessary.
Fourth,
although
Congress
has
enacted
one-tribe
specific Carcieri bill, and progress has been made on others, these tribespecific bills have significant limitations. The Samish, Chumash and
Lytton bills, for example, prohibited gaming. Permanent restrictions on
land use undermine self-determination; tribes, like other governments,
have the inherent right to make their own decisions about the best use of
the land they own and/or land over which they exercise jurisdiction. 550 In
addition, all three bills authorize specific land acquisitions, and do not
resolve Carcieri questions for other acquisitions. The Poarch and Gun
548. To reaffirm the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe reservation, and for
other purposes, H.R. 312, 116th Cong. (introduced Jan. 8, 2019).
549. See supra Section III(a).
550. See, e.g., Exec. Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Gov’ts, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000).
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Lake bills are backwards looking only, as they fail to authorize new trust
acquisitions.
Finally, these bills fall short in establishing finality and clarity
regarding tribal trust lands. The Gun Lake Act, enacted to end years of
litigation and uncertainty about the status of the tribe’s trust land, was
challenged all the way to the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, enacted in 1983, extended Section 5 trust acquisition
authority to tribes who had voted against the application of the IRA in
order to avoid piecemeal fee-to-trust legislation. 551 Yet, 35 years later,
Congress has reversed course, again returning to tribe and parcel specific
legislation.
In our view, the last ten years of Carcieri litigation and
congressional debates only serve to underscore the need for a universal,
clean Carcieri fix. Linking Carcieri and fee-to-trust has resulted in
wasted Congressional hearings, never-ending litigation, and the
expenditure of tribal, federal, and state/local government resources that
could be better spent providing essential services. There are legitimate
discussions to be had about jurisdictional and taxation issues associated
with trust acquisition, but Carcieri has not provided, and will not provide,
the appropriate framework in which to discuss those issues. We recognize
the tension between arguing that Congress must enact a clean Carcieri fix
and explaining why such a fix is unlikely. Yet the existing alternatives—
to give up and accept the status quo, or to allow the vocal few who oppose
all trust applications as a matter of course dictate the terms of
a Carcieri fix—are even worse. The better, and in our view, necessary,
path forward is to enact a clean Carcieri fix, and then separately discuss
changes to the fee-to-trust process with the conversation led by tribes.552

B.

Future Interior Action

As explained supra, Sections III(b) and IV, during the Obama
administration Interior responded to Carcieri in several different ways.
551. 25 U.S.C. § 2202; H.R. REP. NO. 97-908, at 13 (1982).
552. For example, in comments on Interior’s proposed changes to the feeto-trust regulations, discussed in Section V(b), infra, NCAI has proposed a larger
conversation about regulatory changes to the fee-to-trust process, beginning with a
study of land acquisition needs in Indian country. Letter from NCAI Exec. Dir.
Jacqueline Pata to Sec’y Zinke (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.ncai.org/12.4.17_NCAI_
Letter_to_DOI_re_Part_151_Regulation_Proposal.pdf.
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Interior consistently supported a clean Congressional fix to Carcieri.
Interior also established a “bright-line test” that if the Secretary held a
Section 18 election at a tribe’s reservation, that tribe was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934 without any additional analysis. For those tribes who
did not vote in a Section 18 election on whether to accept or reject the IRA,
Interior developed a two-part framework for determining whether the tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. This test, first set forth in a fee-totrust decision for Cowlitz, was institutionalized with the issuance of MOpinion 37029 in March 2014. Interior also vigorously defended its
Carcieri opinions in federal court. In addition, Interior considered
whether other statutory provisions besides the first definition of Indian
provided statutory authority for a trust acquisition, as in the case of
Mashpee, UKB, Alaska tribes, and Oklahoma tribes. Although Interior
did not issue regulations responding to Carcieri, Interior did promulgate
regulations in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak. The
“Patchak patch” eliminated a 30-day waiting period for fee-to-trust
regulations and clarified and mandated exhaustion of administrative
remedies.553
Two years into the Trump administration, Interior’s record on
Carcieri is mixed.554 The new administration has yet to support a Carcieri
fix. Although Interior has not yet taken formal action to withdraw or
modify M-37029, Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason has echoed the
concerns of House Republicans and described it as “loose” and not
sufficiently responsive to the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri.555
Thus, it remains possible that Interior may seek to withdraw the MOpinion altogether or introduce new requirements for being under federal
jurisdiction in 1934.
One particular fee-to-trust acquisition has gained attention in the
Trump administration. As noted above, the district court in Littlefield
553. 78 Fed. Reg. 67928 (Nov. 13, 2013).
554. The current administration has recently issued a few positive Carcieri
determinations in the context of fee-to-trust decisions. See, e.g., Assistant Secretary
– Indian Affairs Decision, Kramer v. Pac. Reg. Dir., (Feb. 25, 2019) (affirming the
2014 trust decision, and underlying analysis, for the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash
Indians); Snoqualmie Tribe Celebrates Land in Trust Decision, (Feb. 13, 2019)
http://snoqualmietribe.us/content/snoqualmie-tribe-celebrates-land-trust-decision.
555. Trump Administration backs away from yet another pro-tribal legal
opinion, INDIANZ (July 25, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/25/
trump-administration-backs-away-from-yet.asp.
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remanded the Mashpee fee-to-trust decision to Interior to issue a
determination as to whether the Mashpee were under federal jurisdiction
in 1934. On June 30, 2017, Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason shared
a draft determination that, applying M-37029’s two-part framework, the
Mashpee Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.556 Rather than
issuing a final decision, the Associate Deputy Secretary allowed the parties
to submit briefing on whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the Tribe
by Massachusetts could be a “surrogate” for federal jurisdiction. 557
Following supplemental briefing, on September 7, 2018, the
Department issued its final decision finding that the Mashpee Tribe was
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 558 The Department, acting through
Assistant Secretary―of Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney, concluded that
there was insufficient evidence of specific federal actions towards the
Mashpee before and during 1934.559 It further rejected the Mashpee’s
argument that certain legislation and legal principles, such as the NonIntercourse Acts and the United States’ assumption of the British Crown’s
obligations, created federal jurisdiction over the Tribe by operation of
law.560
The Mashpee remand decision does offer a scintilla of hope. First,
it expressly declined to vacate the M-Opinion, as urged by the Littlefield
plaintiffs.561 Second, it did not adopt the position that a state’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a tribe implies the surrender of federal jurisdiction over
that tribe.562 Nonetheless, the decision rejected the Tribe’s argument that
556. Letter from Associate Deputy Sec’y Jim Cason to Chairman Cedric
Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (June 30, 2017).
557. Id. at 2.
558. 2015 Mashpee Remand Decision, supra note 535.
559. Id. at 20–38.
560. Id. at 13–15.
561. Id. at 11, 13. The Remand Decision did, however, caveat its
declination to vacate by saying that only the Solicitor, Deputy Secretary, or Secretary
has the authority to modify an M-Opinion unless it is otherwise overruled by the
courts. Id. at 11, 13.
562. Compare id. at 9 (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments that federal and
state jurisdiction could not co-exist in the original 13 states) with id. at 16–20
(rejecting plaintiffs’ broad assertion that the 13 original states maintained independent
and exclusive authority over Indian affairs, instead analyzing whether Massachusetts’s
exercise of jurisdiction over Mashpee was coupled with federal participation or
authorization).
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Massachusetts’ exercise of jurisdiction was a surrogate for federal
jurisdiction due to the absence, in this particular case, of “any Federal
authorization, confirmation or ratification of state authority, or delegation
of Federal authority to the state.” 563 The decision, and the potential for the
United States to take the land out of trust and revoke its reservation status,
has alarmed Indian country, with the National Congress of American
Indians characterizing it as an attack on the Mashpee Tribe’s
sovereignty.564
One other Interior Carcieri opinion from the Trump
administration bears mentioning. On November 9, 2018, BIA issued a
determination to acquire 6.7 acres of land in trust for the Samish for nongaming purposes.565 As part of its decision, BIA applied the two-part
Carcieri framework and concluded that Samish was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. 566 Like Cowlitz, Samish was recognized through the
federal acknowledgment process, with the final acknowledgment decision
issued in 1995.567 In determining that the Samish were under federal
jurisdiction in 1934, BIA relied on: the negotiation and entering into of the
Treaty of Point Elliott of 1855; the federal government’s course of
dealings with the Samish and its members, including reporting Samish
members in federal censuses; the granting of allotments to Samish
members; federal attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Samish Indians
living off-reservation; and federal approval of attorney contracts with the
tribe.568 The Samish Carcieri opinion raised several interesting issues. It
considered a federal court decision that the modern Samish Tribe was not
a successor in interest to the Samish that were party to the Treaty of Point
Elliot and, accordingly, lacked off-reservation treaty fishing rights. The
opinion found the court’s determination legally distinct and not dispositive

563. Id. at 20.
564. NCAI: Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe ‘stripped’ of its sovereignty,
INDIANZ (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/09/11/ncai-mashpeewampanoag-tribe-stripped-of.asp.
565. Letter from to the Honorable Tom Wooten, Chairman, Samish
Indian Nation (Nov. 9, 2018), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/2018-1109-final-ftt-decision-reg-dir1.pdf.
566. Id., Attachment 1, https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/
2018-11-09-attachment-1-to-ftt-dec-samish-carcieri-analysis.pdf.
567. Id. at 6-7.
568. Id. at 16-28.

2019

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

133

of 1934 federal jurisdiction. 569 Similarly, the Carcieri opinion considered
the evidentiary relationship between treaty rights litigation, the
acknowledgment process, and Carcieri, determining that while the
relevant evidence overlaps significantly, the legal outcome in one context
does not dictate the outcomes for any other legal purpose. 570 Last, the
Carcieri opinion found that evidence of federal officials omitting the
Samish from lists of tribes under federal jurisdiction and listing individual
Samish as members of other tribes was insufficient to revoke federal
jurisdiction.571
Beyond case-by-case Carcieri determinations for individual
tribes, the new administration has taken a different approach to land-intotrust than that of the Obama administration. From nearly the day that
former Secretary Zinke was sworn in, he and his team expressed concerns
and skepticism about the importance of trust land and the fee-to-trust
process. On May 2, 2017, Secretary Zinke commented, “Is there an offramp? If tribes would have a choice of leaving Indian trust lands and
becoming a corporation, tribes would take it.” 572 Shortly thereafter, Jim
Cason delivered testimony to the House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular,
and Alaska Native Affairs expressing concern about the negative impacts
of off-reservation trust acquisitions on local communities.573 At a hearing
on October 4, 2017, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs John
Tahsuda III reiterated Cason’s concerns.574 Tahsuda largely ignored any
569. Swinomish Indian Tribal Community opposed the Samish
application, and argued that, “because [United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp.
1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979)] concluded that the Nation is not a successor to the Treaty
of Point Elliott, it cannot be a successor entity to the treaty Samish.” Id. at 12. BIA
rejected this argument, distinguishing between the requirements to establish treaty
rights, acknowledgment under the federal acknowledgment process, and federal
jurisdiction status in 1934. Id. at 16.
570. Id. at 12-16.
571. Id. at 30-31 (noting that “[s]uch inconsistencies are not uncommon,
and do not in themselves demonstrate that the Samish Nation was not under federal
jurisdiction”).
572. Secretary Zinke advocates ‘off ramp’ for taking lands out of trust,
INDIANZ (May 3, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/05/03/secretary-zinkeadvocates-offramp-for-ta.asp.
573. Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition Hearing, supra
note 527 (statement of James Cason, Acting Deputy Sec’y).
574. Doubling Down on Indian Gaming: Examining New Issues and
Opportunities for Success in the Next 30 Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
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benefits to tribes from off-reservation trust acquisitions; rather, his focus
was on the state and local government interests and impacts.575
That same day, Interior sent tribal leaders draft revisions to the
off-reservation fee-to-trust regulations, and scheduled consultation
sessions to discuss the proposed changes. 576 According to the Dear Tribal
Leader letter, the goal of these changes would be to “provide Tribes with
more certainty as to the possibility of an approval before expending
significant resources.” 577 The changes would have created a two-step
review and approval process for off-reservation acquisitions: an initial
review and then a final review. 578 A determination whether a tribe was
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, or other analysis of the statutory
authority for the application, would not be completed until the second
phase.579 The changes also would have reintroduced the 30-day waiting
period for trust land acquisition that had been eliminated by the Obama
administration.580
Interior subsequently withdrew the draft in response to calls from
tribes for additional consultation sessions, and issued a new consultation
schedule.581 The comment period closed on June 30, 2017.582 Indian
country communicated “near-universal opposition” to the proposed
changes to the fee-to-trust process, noting, inter alia, that they would give
an oversized role to the interests of state and local government, at the
Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. (Oct. 4, 2017) (statement of John Tahsuda III, Acting
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).
575. Id.
576. Letter from Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John Tahsuda
III
to
Tribal
Leaders
(Oct.
4,
2017),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/assets/asia/raca/pdf/DTLL - Trust Acquisition Revisions.pdf.
577. Id. at 1.
578. Id.
579. See Consultation Draft Part 151 – Land Acquisitions §
151.11(c)(2)(ii), (BIA Dep’t of Interior, Oct. 2017) https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.
com/2017/10/consultation-draft-trust-acquisition-revisions.pdf.
580. Consultation Draft § 151.12(c)(2)(iii).
581. Letter from Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John Tahsuda
III to Tribal Leaders (Dec. 6, 2017).
582. Letter from Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John
Tahsuda
III
to
Tribal
Leaders
(Feb.
15,
2018)
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/Updated_DTLL_02-1518_FTT.pdf.
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expense of tribes and tribal communities.” 583 In response, the Assistant
Secretary of Indian Affairs, Tara Sweeney, recently indicated that Interior
will not move forward with the proposed regulatory changes at this time.584
There is no guarantee that Interior will stay that course, however, or that
it will not eventually modify through regulation or other agency action the
fee-to-trust process, including changes that address Carcieri.
Significantly, however, with the exception of the Mashpee fee-totrust decision relying on the IRA’s second definition of “Indian,” the
United States has continued to defend the fee-to-trust decisions, including
the Carcieri opinions, of the Obama administration. The United States has
filed briefs and participated in oral argument before federal courts in the
North Fork, Enterprise, Ione, Oneida, Wilton, Chumash, UKB, and
Cowlitz cases.

C.

Pending Carcieri Litigation

As already discussed in Section IV(a), there are a number of feeto-trust cases pending in federal court.
The litigation on a non-gaming trust acquisition for UKB is
currently before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 585 The
Carcieri claim in this litigation does not concern an actual Departmental
determination of federal jurisdiction in 1934, but rather concerns whether
the Department is required to conduct a Carcieri analysis when relying
upon authority in Section 3 of the OIWA to effectuate a trust transfer. 586
If the Tenth Circuit affirms, the Department will need to determine on
remand whether the UKB was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. There is
a similar case raising the same Carcieri question for OIWA Section 3,
583. Letter from United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty Protection
Fund to Acting Assistant Sec’y John Tahsuda III, at 1 (June 29, 2018),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/91-USET.pdf.
584. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe no longer being financed by backer
of stalled casino, INDIANZ (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.indianz.com/
IndianGaming/2019/03/04/mashpee-wampanoag-tribe-no-longer-being.asp (quoting
Assistant Secretary Sweeney as saying “[a]fter reviewing the comments & hearing
from Indian Country, the department has determined it will not propose new
regulations at this time”).
585. The Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044 (10th Cir.
2017).
586. See supra Sections III(b)(iii)(a), IV(a)(vii).
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pending in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, that
concerns a proposed trust acquisition for UKB for gaming. 587 Given that
merits briefing was completed over four years ago, it may be that the
Northern District of Oklahoma is awaiting a final outcome in the Tenth
Circuit before issuing its own decision on the merits.
Another case brought by Stand Up! is currently before the District
Court for the District of Columbia.588 This litigation involves a
Department decision, made in the waning days of the Obama
administration, to acquire trust land on behalf of the Wilton Rancheria,
California (“Wilton”) for gaming purposes. 589 Stand Up!’s amended
complaint raises a claim that Wilton was not a recognized tribe under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, alleging that “the Rancheria was set aside for
homeless Indians, not a recognized tribe, and there is no established
connection between the Indians living on the Rancheria in 1934 and
members of the Wilton Rancheria today.” 590 The arguments strongly echo
those in the North Fork trust land litigation, also brought by Stand Up!,
which were rejected by the same district court.
Most recently, Mashpee has filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Department’s
September 2018 determination that it was not under federal jurisdiction in
1934.591 Mashpee alleges that Interior “failed to apply established law,
contorting some of the relevant facts and ignoring others to engineer a
negative decision.” 592 This case marks the first time a determination that a
tribe was not under federal jurisdiction will be litigated.
While it is impossible, and unwise, to predict the outcome of
particular cases, we expect that Carcieri will continue to fuel challenges

587. See The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 12-493, 2017 WL 2352011
(N.D. Okla. 2014).
588. See Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 315 F. Supp.
3d 289 (D.D.C. 2018).
589. See Trust Acquisition of 35.92 acres in the City of Elk Grove,
California, for the Wilton Rancheria, Rec. of Decision (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Jan.
2017), http://www.wiltoneis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/record-of-decision.
590. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶
86-91, Stand Up for California!, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-58).
591. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, No. 18-2242 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,
2018).
592. Id. ¶ 1.
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to fee-to-trust decisions and may also be invoked in broader settings as
time goes on.593

D.

Newly Recognized Tribes

As described throughout this Article, tribes may become formally
recognized by the federal government through two primary mechanisms:
(1) administratively via the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 acknowledgment process; or
(2) legislatively via specialized acts of Congress.594 Tribes who have
obtained any type of formal recognition since 1934 will continue to be
particularly susceptible to legal challenges on the basis of Carcieri.
For legislatively recognized tribes, the degree of vulnerability
regarding Carcieri depends greatly on the language of the act. Some
legislation may independently provide land acquisition authority, negating
the need to utilize IRA Section 5. For example, legislation recognizing six
Virginia tribes in early 2018 specifically addressed trust land
acquisitions.595 For each tribe, the legislation specified guidelines and
geographical boundaries for trust land acquisitions, mandating that upon
tribal request, the Department must take into trust tribal fee land acquired
before 2007 within certain geographic areas. Further, the legislation
provided the Department discretionary authority to take in trust tribal fee
lands acquired at any time (presumably after 2007) within those same

593. See, e.g., Heidi Staudenmaier & Celene Sheppard, Impact of the
Carcieri Decision, American Bar Association Gaming Law Gazette, Spring 2009, at
2-3, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL430000pub/newsletter/
200905/staudenmaier.pdf (predicting that Carcieri could be invoked anytime the
Department uses an IRA provision, beyond the land acquisition authority, or relies on
the IRA definitions as they are used for other federal laws and programs).
594. See supra Sections III(b)(i) (describing the Cowlitz Tribe’s 2002
acknowledgment through Part 83); III(b)(ii) (explaining the Carcieri M-Opinion’s
discussion on historical recognition versus modern recognition); III(b)(iii)(a)
(describing the UKB’s 1946 recognition act); and III(b)(iii)(b) (describing the
Shawnee Tribe’s 2000 recognition act).
595. Thomasina E. Jordan Indian Tribes of Va. Fed. Recognition Act of
2017, 115 Pub. L. 121, 132 Stat. 40 (Jan. 29, 2018) (recognizing the Chickahominy
Indian Tribe, the Chickahominy Indian Tribe—Eastern Division, the upper Mattaponi
Tribe, the Tappahannock Tribe, Inc., the Monacan Indian Nation, and the Nansemond
Indian Tribe).
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geographic areas.596 The Act expressly excludes these lands from
gaming.597 Yet the Act does not address whether the six tribes may acquire
trust land outside the specified geographic boundaries pursuant to other
legal authority, i.e. IRA Section 5 and the Part 151 regulations.
Other recognition acts may not provide independent authority for
trust land acquisitions, but instead more generally apply all the privileges
and benefits of the IRA to the subject tribe. It should be argued that such
privileges and benefits include Section 5, the capstone of the IRA, even if
the recognition act does not expressly state as much.
Tribes acknowledged through Part 83 may face even more
significant challenges since they lack the benefit of express congressional
action, including congressional guidance or independent authority for feeto-trust acquisitions. It is important to remember, however, that the
standard for Part 83 acknowledgement necessarily reflects longstanding
tribal existence and the lengthy acknowledgment records include
important evidence of federal interactions with the tribal entity, all of
which may support a positive departmental finding of 1934 jurisdiction
and/or rebut Carcieri-related claims by opponents.598

E.

Practice Tips for Tribal Attorneys

The last ten years of Carcieri offers several takeaways for tribes and
tribal attorneys. Accordingly, as we look to Carcieri’s future impact, we
have compiled ten practice tips.
(1)

All tribes have a Carcieri problem—not just newly recognized
tribes, tribes in certain regions, or tribes who lack an existing land
base. Regardless of tribal history, and the strength of evidence
supporting jurisdiction, Carcieri can and often is raised by

596. Id. §§ 106, 206, 306, 406, 506, 606.
597. Id. §§ 106(d), 206(d), 306(d), 406(d), 506(d), 606(d).
598. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 (requiring, among other criteria, that the
petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially
continuous basis since at least 1900, the petitioner comprises a distinct community
and demonstrates that it existed as a community from 1900 until the present, and that
petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an
autonomous entity from 1900 until the present). See also Carcieri M-Opinion, supra
note 56, at 25 (finding that “[e]vidence submitted during the regulatory Part 83
acknowledgment process thus may be highly relevant and may be relied on to
demonstrate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934”).
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opponents during the agency decision-making process and in
subsequent litigation. Following Carcieri, Interior must conduct
case-by-case inquiries into statutory authority, carefully
considering whether the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934,
or whether some other section of the IRA or tribe-specific statute
authorizes a trust acquisition. Therefore, be prepared at the onset of
the fee-to-trust process to provide historical evidence and legal
analysis supporting your tribe’s jurisdictional status or other
statutory authority.
(2)

Think outside the box when looking for a statutory basis for a feeto-trust acquisition. Consider relying on more than the IRA’s first
definition of Indian, or even more than one statute, to support a feeto-trust acquisition.599 Consider whether the OIWA, tribal
restoration acts, or other authorities constitute an appropriate
legislative hook—explicitly or implicitly—to provide tribes access
to the land acquisition authority set out in the IRA. Alternatively,
these authorities may provide trust land acquisition authority that is
separate and independent from the IRA altogether. 600

(3)

If the first definition of “Indian” is the only option for statutory
authority, consider relying on more than just one piece of evidence.
As demonstrated above, certain evidence Interior views as
dispositive, such as entering into treaties or voting in a Section 18
election, has still been challenged in federal court litigation. So, for
example, if your tribe entered into treaties with the federal

599. For example, in a trust acquisition decision for the Tunica-Biloxi
Tribe of Louisiana, Interior relied on both the first and second definitions of “Indian”
in the IRA to conclude that it had statutory authority to acquire the parcel at issue in
trust. Trust Acquisition of 703.26 Acres in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana for the TunicaBiloxi Tribe, Decision Letter (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Aug. 11, 2011),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/tunica-biloxi-carcieri-ruling-frominterior.pdf.
600. For example, in a trust acquisition decision for the Pokagon Band of
Potawatomi Indians, Interior relied on the Pokagon Restoration Act as independent
statutory authority. Trust Acquisition of 165.81 Acres in the City of South Bend,
Indiana, for the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Michigan and Indiana, Rec.
of
Decision
61
(BIA,
Dep’t
of
Interior
Nov.
2016),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc2-056228.pdf.
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government, the United States provided numerous services to your
tribe and its members in the years leading up to the IRA, and your
tribe voted on the IRA, include all of the above in your Carcieri
submission, particularly if you expect the fee-to-trust decision may
be challenged. In several recent decisions, Interior has concluded
that Section 18 votes are dispositive, but went on to note the
existence of other evidence as well. 601
(4)

In providing an analysis to Interior of why your tribe was under
federal jurisdiction in 1934, cite to, and apply, Interior’s two-part
framework. Referencing and incorporating the framework will
stage your arguments in a way that is easily understood by agency
personnel, streamlining the process. Moreover, considering the Mopinion while assembling your Carcieri submission will help you
identify relevant evidence.

(5)

Familiarize yourself with the body of Interior Carcieri opinions that
have already been issued for other tribes. You can likely pull
successful legal arguments and analogous fact scenarios from these
decisions. Conversely, you will avoid wasting time on previously
rejected arguments. We have tried to include citations to many of
these decisions throughout this article. In addition, you can search
the website of the IBIA, available at https://www.doi.gov/oha, for
their decisions on Carcieri matters.

601. See, e.g, Trust Acquisition of 35.92 acres in the City of Elk Grove,
California, for the Wilton Rancheria, Rec. of Decision 71–72 (BIA, Dep’t of Interior
Jan.
2017),
http://www.wiltoneis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/record-ofdecision.pdf. (relying on the Section 18 election and a land acquisition for the tribe in
1927, alone or together); Trust Acquisition of the Horseshoe Grande Site in Riverside
County, California, for the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians, California, Rec. of
Decision 454–456 and n.33 (BIA, Dep’t of Interior, May 2015),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc1-030437.pdf
(relying on the Section 18 election as dispositive, but also noting a wealth of other
evidence of federal jurisdiction); Trust Acquisition of 61.83 acres in Sonoma County,
California, for the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians of California, Rec. of
Decision
51–52
(BIA,
Dep’t
of
Interior
Apr.
2016),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc1-033914.pdf
(relying on the Section 18 election as dispositive but also relying on the acquisition of
the Cloverdale Rancheria in 1921).
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(6)

If you expect opposition to your acquisition, try to anticipate and
rebut the arguments of your opponents. For example, if you are
aware of statements by federal officials that the federal government
did not have any responsibilities to your tribe, be prepared to show
why these statements cannot overcome other indicia of federal
jurisdiction prior to and in 1934. Or, if there is a long period during
which the federal government did not take affirmative actions
towards your tribe, be prepared to provide the historical context, or
rely on arguments in the M-Opinion as to why such inaction did not
and could not terminate federal jurisdiction. Do not assume (or
hope) that these arguments will not be raised. Moreover, it
strengthens the integrity of your analysis if you concede and address
counterpoints upfront, rather than being perceived by agency staff
as “hiding the ball.” Be prepared to answer difficult questions by
agency staff. In addition, if an opponent files a lengthy submission
arguing that your tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934,
file a reply explaining why they are wrong. We recognize that this
requires a significant expenditure of resources, but it is better to
develop a strong record and address these issues upfront than having
to confront them for the first time in litigation.

(7)

Be persistent with the Department. If you provided your
submission and hear nothing for months or even years, regularly
follow-up with the Solicitor’s Office, BIA, or the Assistant
Secretary of Indian Affairs. Ask if they have any questions or need
additional information. Schedule calls to check-in and request
decision timelines. Build relationships with BIA and Solicitor’s
Office staff to ensure your submissions are adequately covering
issues/concerns that will be evaluated.

(8)

Do not evaluate your tribe’s history, or its relationship with the
federal government, in a vacuum. Consider the larger historical and
policy context(s), and whether such context explains any gaps or
incongruities in the evidentiary record.

(9)

Remember that Carcieri is only one component of a fee-to-trust
acquisition. As explained by Associate Deputy Secretary Jim
Cason and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
John Tahsuda, the Trump administration is very concerned about
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the impacts of trust acquisitions on state and local governments. If
you schedule a meeting with the Secretary’s Office or the Assistant
Secretary’s Office to discuss a proposed acquisition, be prepared for
questions about the views of state and local governments.
Particularly for off-reservation acquisitions, if you have entered into
an intergovernmental agreement with states and local governments
regarding fee-to-trust, include that information in your fee-to-trust
application. If you have not entered into such an agreement (and
such agreements are not required by the existing regulations), we
recommend that you be prepared to explain why. Relatedly,
consider that many states and local governments do not make
Carcieri arguments because they are actually invested in whether a
tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. As this article has
demonstrated, it is often a convenient vehicle for them to attack feeto-trust for other reasons.
(10) Think beyond the Department of the Interior. The real fix, as
explained supra, needs to come from Congress. Do not let your
local representatives forget that Carcieri continues to present an
enormous obstacle for tribes. If the substantial moral, historical,
and practical reasons for a fix do not appear to move your
representative, focus on the significant tribal and agency costs
involved in determining, and then litigating, these Carcieri
decisions. Tribes have had to hire expensive experts to compile
historical reports, sometimes taking years to complete. Litigation
has consumed tribal, Interior, and Department of Justice resources.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In 1994, Congress enacted changes to the IRA to ensure a policy
of equality between federally recognized tribes. Congress prohibited
Interior, and other federal agencies, from issuing any regulation or
decision “that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and
immunities available to [an] Indian tribe relative to other federally
recognized Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes.” 602
602. See 25 U.S.C. § 5123(f), (g). Recently, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia interpreted section (f) broadly, rejecting an
argument that it is limited to “powers of self-governance,” and applying it to gaming
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Consistent with this mandate, Interior has embraced the policy that “there
should not be different classes of federally recognized tribes.” 603 Yet, as
this Article has demonstrated, Carcieri means that there are some tribes
who may be ineligible to have land taken into trust on their behalf—a
reality that is irreconcilable with the sweeping purposes of the IRA.
Moreover, in the ten years since the Supreme Court decided
Carcieri, countless hours and incredible sums of money have been
channeled into its implementation and attempted correction. Congress has
contemplated fifteen clean Carcieri fixes, in addition to tribe-specific fixes
and a broader fee-to-trust overhaul, largely to no avail. Without a
legislative fix, the Department has had to forge a path on its own, crafting
extensive Carcieri guidance and continuing to process tribal fee-to-trust
applications with its limited resources. Opponents to tribal trust land
routinely challenge these decisions on the basis of Carcieri in scorched
earth litigation, drawing out any finality regarding tribal lands and
jurisdiction for years and years. Additionally, through its recent Mashpee
determination and testimony before Congress, Departmental leadership
has signaled a potential change of course in its Carcieri practice. This
signal has alarmed tribes and advocates.604
Ultimately, it is up to Congress to resolve this problem. We hope
that Congress will live up to its commitment of treating tribes
indiscriminately and provide all tribes—regardless of factual specifics
tethered to the year 1934—the ability to seek land in trust.

activities. The Koi Nation of Northern California v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 171718, at 58 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2019).
603. See Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76890
(removing the Alaska exclusion from the Department’s fee-to-trust regulations).
604. NCAI Objects to the Department of the Interior’s Decision on the
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe and Questions What It Means to the Future of Indian
Country, NCAI (Sept. 2018), http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2018/09/11/ncaiobjects-to-the-department-of-the-interior-s-decision-on-the-mashpee-wampanoagtribe-and-questions-what-it-means-to-the-future-of-indian-country.

